773 Opinion of the Court. its criminal procedure. The due process clause is not susceptible of reduction to a mathematical formula.13 Furthermore, the fair conduct of a trial depends largely on the wisdom and understanding of the trial judge. He knows the essentials of a fair trial. The primary duty falls on him to determine the accused's need of counsel at arraignment and during trial. He may guide a defendant without a lawyer past the errors that make trials unfair. Cf. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra. Failure to protect properly the rights of one accused of serious offenses is unusual. Obviously a fair trial test necessitates an appraisal before and during the trial of the facts of each case to determine whether the need for counsel is so great that the deprivation of the right to counsel works a fundamental unfairness. The recent discussion of the problem in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra, makes further elaboration unnecessary. We think that the facts of this case, particularly the events occurring at the trial, reveal, in the light of that opinion and the precedents there cited, that petitioner was handicapped by lack of counsel to such an extent that his constitutional right to a fair trial was denied. This case is of the type referred to in Betts v. Brady, supra, at 473, as lacking fundamental fairness because neither counsel nor adequate judicial guidance or protection was furnished at the trial. A defendant who pleads not guilty and elects to go to trial is usually more in need of the assistance of a lawyer than is one who pleads guilty. The record in this case evidences petitioner's helplessness, without counsel and without more assistance from the judge, in defending himself against this charge of larceny. We take no note of the tone of the comments at the time of the 13 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 676; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 739. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. sentence. The trial was over. The questionable issues allowed to pass unnoticed as to procedure, evidence, privilege, and instructions detailed in the first part of this opinion demonstrate to us that petitioner did not have a trial that measures up to the test of fairness prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Concur in the judgment of the Court. They think that Betts v. Brady should be overruled. If that case is to be followed, however, they agree with the Court's opinion insofar as it holds that petitioner is entitled to relief under the Betts v. Brady doctrine. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE concur in the result. Syllabus. COSMOPOLITAN SHIPPING CO. v. MCALLISTER. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 351. Argued February 1-2, 1949.-Decided June 27, 1949. A general agent employed by the United States under the terms of the war-time standard form of general agency agreement to manage certain phases of the business of a ship owned by the United States and operated by the War Shipping Administration is not liable under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, known as the Jones Act, to a member of the crew of the ship who suffered physical injury through the negligence of its master and officers, when the injury occurred after March 24, 1943, the date of enactment of the War Shipping Administration Act, known as the Clarification Act. Pp. 785–801. 1. Rationale of Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155, followed; Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U. S. 707, overruled. Pp. 787-794. (a) The opinion in the Hust case misconceived the ruling of Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, which decided no more, directly or by implication, than that an action could be maintained against agents of the United States at common law for the agents' own torts and did not involve the right to recover against employers under the Jones Act. P. 789. (b) Neither the statutes relating to sailors' rights nor the history behind their enactment discloses any legislative purpose to create in seamen employees of the United States through the War Shipping Administration a right to enforce tort claims under the Jones Act against others than their employers or any recognition that such right ever existed. Pp. 789-790. (c) A construction of the Jones Act carrying out the intention of Congress to grant certain new rights to seamen against their employers does not require or permit a holding that a general agent under the standard form of war-time general agency agreement is an employer under the Jones Act. Pp. 790-791. (d) Nothing in the Clarification Act of March 24, 1943, or its legislative history indicates a congressional purpose to do anything other than to extend existing rights of merchant seamen to all seamen employed through the War Shipping Administration. Pp. 791-793. Counsel for Parties. 337 U.S. 2. The conclusion here reached is supported by a re-examination of the terms of the present standard service agreements, the actual conduct of the parties thereunder, and the purpose and effect of the agreements. Pp. 794-801. (a) An examination of the terms of the general agency agreement and the actual conduct of the parties thereunder demonstrates that the United States had retained for the entire voyage the possession, management, and navigation of the vessel and control of the ship's officers and crew to the exclusion of the general agent. Pp. 795-796. (b) The duties of the general agent were expressly and intentionally limited to those of a ship's husband, who has been engaged to take care of the shoreside business of the ship and who has no part in the actual management or navigation of the vessel. P. 796. (c) Under the standard service agreements, the shoreside services and administration of the merchant fleet were to be handled by existing private companies while the United States, through the master of the ship, retained full control over the navigation and physical operation of the vessel. Pp. 796-798. 169 F.2d 4, reversed. A member of the crew of a ship owned by the United States and operated by the War Shipping Administration obtained a judgment in a Federal District Court against a general agent employed by the United States to manage certain phases of the ship's business, for injuries sustained through the negligence of its master and officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 169 F. 2d 4. This Court granted certiorari. 335 U. S. 870. Reversed, p. 801. Leavenworth Colby argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Paul A. Sweeney and Morton Hollander. Jacob Rassner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Bertram J. Dembo. Silas B. Axtell and Myron Scott filed a brief for the Friends of Andrew Furuseth Legislative Association, as amicus curiae, supporting respondent. 783 Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, like Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U. S. 707, and Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155, presents questions concerning the liability for injury to third persons of a general agent who, under the terms of the wartime standard form of agency agreement, GAA 44–42,1 manages certain phases of the business of ships owned by the United States and operated by the War Shipping Administration. More specifically the issue raised by these facts is whether such a general agent is liable under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, known as the Jones Act,2 to a member of the crew who suffered physical injury through the negligence of the master and officers of such a vessel, when the injury occurred after March 24, 1943, the date of enactment of the War Shipping Administration (Clarification) Act.3 4 Respondent was procured from the union hiring hall by petitioner in accordance with the terms of the standard agreement and made available to the master for employment by him. The master is designated by the contract as an agent and employee of the United States. In July of 1945 respondent was signed on the S. S. Edward B. Haines at New York by the master of that vessel as second assistant engineer. In the space on the shipping articles entitled "Operating Company on this Voyage" there was written "Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., Inc., as general agent for the United States." The articles were 146 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. § 306.44. 2 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688, which provides in pertinent part: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; . . . 3 57 Stat. 45, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1291. See text, p. 796, infra. |