Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. ant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action." 9 Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; § 1404 (a) of the Code deals with the right to transfer an action properly brought. The two sections deal with two separate and distinct problems.10 Section 1404 (a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously. The Code, therefore, does not repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as demonstrated by its failure to list the section in the meticulously prepared schedule of statutes repealed." We cannot agree that the order before us effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of forum non conveniens to Liability Act 9"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. . . ." 45 U. S. C. § 56. For a brief historical sketch, see Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 49–50 (1941). 10 In almost every state, the requirements for venue and for transfer are treated in different statutory sections. Brief for New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. as amicus curiae, pp. 11-12, Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., post, p. 75. See, e. g., N. Y. Civil Practice Act, §§ 182, 187. 11 Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 992, § 39. Congress did list the pertinent statutes, when Code provisions in fact changed the basic venue requirements. For example, §§ 1394, 1395, 1396 and 1400, respectively, prescribe a new definition of appropriate forums for actions against the Comptroller of the Currency, involving fines and forfeitures, internal revenue taxes and patent and copyright suits; and the following statutes are therefore listed as repealed: 28 U. S. C. § 110; 28 U. S. C. §§ 104, 107, 108; 28 U. S. C. § 105; 28 U. S. C. § 109 and 17 U. S. C. § 35. 55 Opinion of the Court. suits derives from the Kepner decision. And there this Court expressly stated that "If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative . . . ." 314 U. S. at 54. That opinion discusses § 6 of the Liability Act, to be sure, but this Court did not and could not suggest that the legislative answer had necessarily to be addressed to that section. Since the words selected by Congress for § 6 denote nothing, one way or the other, respecting forum non conveniens, there was no occasion to repeal that section, expressly or impliedly; Congress chose to remove its judicial gloss via another statute. Discussion of the law of implied repeals is, therefore, irrelevant. Third. Petitioner's chief argument proceeds not from one side or the other of the literal boundaries of § 1404 (a), but from its legislative history. The short answer is that there is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear. "The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction." Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 260 (1945). This canon of construction has received consistent adherence in our decisions.12 Nevertheless, we need not rest our decision on it solely. For the legislative history does not support petitioner's position. Petitioner's argument is based on these twin premises: Congress intended no "controversial change" to be incorporated in the Code; and § 1404 (a) is such a change. 12 E. g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947); United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940) and cases there cited. The rule as to statutory revisions is the same. Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U. S. 527, 530 (1942); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 45 (1895); United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513 (1880). Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. To establish the former premise, petitioner cites a number of statements by legislative leaders in charge of the Code revision. For example, Representative Keogh, Chairman of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws which initiated the work, said at the hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, "The policy that we adopted . . was to avoid wherever possible and whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as controversial substantive changes of law." 13 And Senator Donnell, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering the Code, said on the floor that ". . . the purpose of this bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into positive law, with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial and noncontroversial nature." But these statements clearly are not unequivocal promises that no changes would be made. The legislation was announced to be a revision as well as a codification. It is obvious that the changes in law retained in the Code were not considered as "controversial" by these Congressional spokesmen. 14 Petitioner does not offer any definition of "controversial," but he does point to one concrete example of what he regards as a "controversial" measure. This is the 13 Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947). He also testified as follows: ". . . we proceeded upon the hypothesis that since that was primarily a restatement of existing law, we should not endanger its accomplishment by the inclusion in the work of any highly controversial changes in law." And, in response to the Chairman's question, "And this bill does not include controversial matters?" Rep. Keogh replied that "We have sought to avoid as far as possible . . . any substantive changes that did not meet with unanimity of opinion." Ibid., 11. 14 94 Cong. Rec. 7928 (1948). The Senator had just given an illustration of "various changes that have been made." 55 Opinion of the Court. Jennings Bill,15 which was under consideration in the House in the spring of 1947, as was the Code revision.16 The Jennings Bill and § 1404 (a) of the Code meet the same problem, the alleged abuses in the selection of 15 H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.: "A Bill To amend the Employers' Liability Act so as to limit venue As ultimately reported to the House, it repealed all of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, except the last sentence prohibiting removal of actions brought in state courts to federal courts; and added the following paragraph to the then general venue statute, § 51 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 112: "A civil suit for damages for wrongful death or personal injuries against any interstate common carrier by railroad may be brought only in a district court of the United States or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, in the district or county (parish), respectively, in which the cause of action arose, or where the person suffering death or injury resided at the time it arose: Provided, That if the defendant cannot be served with process issuing out of any of the courts aforementioned, then and only then, the action may be brought in a district court of the United States, or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, at any place where the defendant. shall be doing business at the time of the institution of said action." H. R. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 9–10 (1947). 16 The House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the Code, before Subcommittee No. 1, on Mar. 7, 1947, and four hearings on the Jennings Bill, before Subcommittee No. 4, from Mar. 28 to April 18, 1947. Congressman Jennings himself was a member of Subcommittee No. 1, considering the Code. Congressman Devitt, a member of Subcommittee No. 4, considering the Jennings Bill, testified in favor of the Code; Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055 (Code), 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1947); Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 3214 (Code), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948). The unanimous Judiciary Committee Report favoring the Code was published in April, 1947. H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. The divided Report on the Jennings Bill was submitted in June. H. R. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (in three parts). On July 7, 1947, the House passed the proposed revision by a vote of 342 to 23. 93 Cong. Rec. 8392. Ten days later, the Jennings Bill was passed by 203 to 188. 93 Cong. Rec. 9193-4. Opinion of the Court. 337 U.S. forums for Liability Act suits." But the Jennings Bill was far more drastic than § 1404 (a). The Jennings Bill would in large part have repealed § 6 of the Liability Act. It would have delimited the available forum for actions brought in state as well as federal courts.18 It would have eliminated the right to sue in any district in which the railroad did business. Initially, this applied only to Federal Employers' Liability Act plaintiffs, but in final draft the Jennings Bill generally restricted all, including passengers, who might sue railroads for personal injuries. Inasmuch as none of these changes in the law was contained in the Code, it is evident that § 1404 (a) might well be considered "noncontroversial" by the same Congress which would regard the Jennings Bill as "controversial." 19 17 See, e. g., Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-12, 17-22, 31-8 (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 3-6; Pt. 2, 1-2, 4 (1947). 18 As one of its three grounds of opposition to the Jennings Bill, the minority Report stated, "The bill restricts State courts in the administration of justice, deprives them of their prerogatives to require change of venue of lawsuits where necessary, and transcends the provisions of State laws governing the jurisdiction of State courts." H. R. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, 1 (1947). Doubt was expressed that Congress had constitutional power so to affect state courts. See, e. g., letter of Acting The Assistant to the Attorney General, Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1567 and H. R. 1639 (Jennings Bill), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1948). 19 Furthermore, petitioner's argument suggests at most that § 1404 (a) was as "controversial" as the Jennings Bill, as of July, 1947. Thereafter, however, both the Code and the Jennings Bill were referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which held hearings on both. The same three Senators composed the Subcommittee holding these hearings: Sen. E. H. Moore, Chairman at the hearings on the Jennings Bill in January, 1948; Sen. Donnell, Chairman at the hearings on the Code in April and June, 1948; and Sen. McGrath. The relationship between the two proposals was ex |