His lordship in that case mentioned an instance of a lunatic Timber directseized ex parte paterna of estate A. and ex parte materna of Wherever from the nature of the transaction there is not evidence of entire good faith, and the contract or other act is not seen to be just in itself, or for the benefit of these persons, courts of equity will set it aside, or make it subservient to their just rights and interests. Where indeed a contract is entered into with good faith, and is for the benefit of such persons, courts of equity will uphold it. And if a purchase is made in good faith, without any knowledge of the incapacity and no advantage had been taken of the party, courts of equity will not interfere to set aside the contract, if injustice will thereby be done to the other side, and the parties cannot be placed in the state in which they were before the purchase. 1 Story's Eq. Juris. sec. 228. In the management of the lunatic's estate, the interest of the lunatic is more regarded than the contingent interest of those who may be entitled to the suc cession; and the court, if it be for the interest of the lunatic, may direct real estate to be converted into personal, or personal into real. Thus it may direct timber standing to be sold. Matter of Salisbury, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 347. Where the chancellor becomes satisfied that a person who has been found to be a lunatic upon an inquisition issued out of the court for that purpose, has so far recovered his reason as to be capable of disposing of his estate, by will, with sense and judgment, he has the power to suspend the proceedings against such lunatic partially, so as to enable him to make a will. In the matter of Burr, 2 Barb. Ch. Rep. 208. But the chancellor will direct such will to be made under the superintendence of some proper officer of the court in order to guard such a testator against the immediate exercise of any undue or improper influence. Ib. The court of chancery, in the exercise of its discretion, may authorize the committee of a lunatic to apply the personal property for the improvement of unproductive real estate, by the erection of buildings thereon, &c. In the matter of Livingston, 9 Paige, 440. The court of chancery has the power, out of the surplus income of the estate of a lunatic, to provide for the support of persons not his next of kin, and whom the lunatic is under no legal obligation to support, where it satisfactorily appears to the chancellor that the lunatic himselt would have provided for the support of such persons had he been of sound mind. In the matter of Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. Rep. 326. (Vide Craig & Phil. Rep. 76. The court may also make an allowance out of the lunatic's estate, for the education of persons whom he had adopted as children while he was in a sound state of mind. Ib. And the committee of the lunatic may be authorized to provide for the keeping up of the lunatic's family establishment, with the same number of domestics as had been customary previous to the lunacy; and to expend for that purpose, annually, an amount not exceeding that which had been annually expended by the lunatic himself, before his lunacy. Ib. The committee may also be authorized by the court to place at the lunatic's disposal, so long as he is competent to judge of the claims of applicants, small sums of money for purposes of charity. Ib. And the court may also authorize the committee to pay for the support of the institutions of religion, in the church where the lunatic and his family have been accustomed to worship, such sums from time to time as the lunatic may desire him to pay for that purpose, not exceeding the amount which the lunatic had been in the habit of paying annually, before his faculties became impaired. Ib. But the committee will not be allowed personally to expend any part of the estate of the lunatic, for ed to be felled. Timber direct- estate B., the latter being subject to a mortgage; and timber cut upon A. having been applied in discharge of a mortgage ed to be felled. general charity or objects of benevolence, or of piety, for which the lunatic himself had not been in the habit of contributing specifically and regularly, while he was competent to manage his own affairs. Ib. The court of chancery during the continuance of the lunacy, by statute, has the whole control of the personal estate and choses in action of the lunatic. And it can transfer the title to the same by directing a sale by the committee; and it may direct the committee to release any right of action in relation thereto, as may be equitable and just. So that when a matter relating to the personal estate of the lunatic has been fairly litigated by the committee in that court, and decided against them, the court may protect the defendant against a new suit by the lunatic or his representatives, although the lunatic was not a formal party to the suit brought by his committee; by directing the committee to transfer the property which was in litigation to the defendant, or to release him from any further claim on account thereof. Gorham v. Gorham, 3 Barb. Ch. Rep. 24. Adeed executed and delivered by one when non compos may be avoided by the purchaser during a lucid interval; though the vendor be still alive. Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 245. A lunatic makes a deed, and afterward, when sane, conveys the same land to another grantee. Though the first deed is not absolutely void, the subsequent grantee, because of the privity of contract between him and the lunatic, may avoid it. Cates v. Woodson, 2 Dana, 454. A deed made while the grantor was a lunatic, would require a re-execution when he was of sound mind, to give it validity-if the incompetency arose from disease producing feebleness of intellect only, long acquiescence after restoration would amount to a confirmation. Jones et al. v. Evans, 7 Dana, 96. Mental imbecility not amounting to absolute disqualification, induces a strict and vigilant examination in chancery of the contracts made by one laboring under it, and when coupled with gross inadequacy of consideration they constitute such evidence of fraud as may vacate a contract. Cruise v. Christopher's adm'r., 5 Dana, 182. (See Am. Ch. Digest by Waterman, title IDIOTS AND LUNATICS.) The feoffment and livery of a lunatic are not void but voidable; and as they work a divesture of his seisin, they preclude the possibility of an escheat by his death; because seisin must be found at his death as well as failure of heirs, devisees or known kindred; and though escheats take effect in Pennsylvania, not on principles of tenure, but by force of our statutes, yet these statutes require the decedent to have been seised at his death. Desilver's estate, 5 R. 111. But a deed of bargain and sale, though by the express words of the statute, it has the force and effect of a feoffment and livery, "for the purpose of giving possession and seisin, and making good the title and assurance," is not equivalent in all respects to a feoffment and livery; and if executed by a lunatic it is void. Ib. Therefore, on the trial of a traverse of an inquisition of escheat, evidence is admissible on the part of the commonwealth, to show the insanity of the deceased, at the time he executed a deed of bargain and sale. Ib. When the committee of a lunatic, under a decree of the court for payment of his debts, sell his realty, no conversion of the surplus remaining in the hands of the committee is effected, but such surplus remains real estate, and is distributed as such according to the rules of descent. See remarks of Coulter, J. in upon B. it was on a question between the heirs held, that A. Timber directwas not to be recouped. Dyer v. Cornell, 4 Barr, 363. Lloyd v. Hart, 2 id. 473. It is incompetent for A lunatic, whose real estate had been sold by order of the court, for his maintenance and payment of his debts, died intestate, unmarried, and without issue, father or mother, brother or sister of the whole blood, uncle or aunt, but leaving to survive him, three brothers and a sister of the half blood, children of his mother by a second marriage, and ten cousins, children of deceased paternal uncles. The half-brothers and sisters were of the blood of the intes tate through his mother, who was a descendant of the paternal great-grandfather of the intestate and his cousins, the common ancestor from whom the intestate remotely derived a part of the estate by descent, devise or gift, and who was also related by blood to the intestate's grandfather, from whom another portion of the estate was remotely derived by devise and descent; the persons last seised thereof immediately before the intestate having been his father and a paternal uncle, who died intestate. At the time of the death of the intestate, an unexpended balance of the fund made by the sale of his real estate, remained in the hands of his committee. Held, first, that this balance was to be regarded as land for the purposes of distribution; and second, that the half-brothers and sister were entitled to it in equal portions, in preference to the cousins. Hart's Appeal, 8 Barr, 32. ed to be felled. 82 Of injunctions to stay purprestures. *CHAPTER XI. OF INJUNCTIONS TO STAY PURPRESTURES AND NUI SANCES.[1] The jurisdiction of courts of equity, in cases of purpresture and nuisance, though not very frequently exercised, is undoubted. It is founded on the right to restrain the exercise or the erection of that, from which irreparable damage to individuals, or great public injury would ensue.(a) [2] (a) 3 Atk. 751. Redes. Tr. 117. [1] A common nuisance, says Hawkins, seems to be an offence against the public, either by doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires. The People v. The Corporation of Albany, 11 Wen. 539. Tanner v. Trustees of the Village of Albion, 5 Hill, 121. The term "nuisance" signifies anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, damage or annoyance. The rule of the common law is that of the civil law, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas." Nuisances are of two kinds, viz. public or private nuisance; public or common nuisances affect the public, and are an annoyance to all the king's subjects; and private nuisances which merely hurt or annoy the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another. The latter are only remediable by civil proceedings; but the former, as they annoy the whole community in general, and not merely some particular persons, are punishable by indictment, and are not the subject of a civil suit. It would be unreasonable to multiply actions by giving every man a separate right of action, for what damnifies him in common only with the rest of his fellow-subjects. Aldred's case, 9 Co. 59, a.; Williams' case, 5 ib. 73. [2] The court will interfere, by injunction, to suppress the commission or continuance of a nuisance. Nuisances are of two kinds,—those which are injurious to the public at large, and those which are injurious to the rights and interests of private persons. With regard to public nuisances, the jurisdiction seems to be of very ancient date, and to be founded on the irreparable damage to individuals or the great public injury which is likely to ensue. The jurisdiction is applicable not only to nuisances strictly so called, but also to purprestures. 2d Inst. 38, 272; Harg. Law. Tracts, 84, 87. In cases of purpresture the remedy is either by information for an intrusion at the common law, or by information in equity at the suit of the attorneygeneral. The consequence of a judgment at common law being the abatement of the erection or grievance complained of, whether it is or is not a nuisance; whilst upon an information in equity, where the trespass does not produce any public injury, the court may direct an inquiry whether it is most beneficial to the crown to abate the purpresture, or to suffer the erection to remain and be assessed as a part of the legal revenue. Atty.-Gen. v. Richards, Purpresture, or more properly pourpresture, is derived from Of injunctions the French word pourprise, and, according to Lord Coke, to stay purprestures. 2 Anst. 603; Atty.-Gen. v. Johnson, 2 J. Wil. 87; Rex v. Earl Grosvenor, Purpresture. Starkie's N. P. In cases of public nuisances, properly so called, an indictment lies to abate and to prosecute the offender; but an information will also lie in equity to stop the mischief and to restrain the continuance of it. Mayor of London v. Bolt, 5 Ves. 129; Atty.-Gen. v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 338. Thus Lord Cottenham held, that there was a clear jurisdiction in a court of equity, to restrain the magistrates of a county from doing that which would have been a nuisance to a public road. Atty.-Gen. v. Forbes, 2 & M. C. 124. As a general rule, a suit of this kind should be instituted by the attorneygeneral, or, at all events, he should be a party to it, unless the individual injury is distinct from that which is done to the public at large. In that case, but in that case only, the persons injured have a special right, in respect of which they are entitled to apply.- Baines v. Baker, Amb. 158; Atty.-Gen. v. Cleaver, 18 Ves. 211; Spencer v. The L. & B. Railway Company, 18 Sim. 193; Sampson v. Smith, ib. 272. Wherefore, in information and proceedings in cases of public nuisance, the ordinary course is for the attorney-general to take on himself to sue as representing the public; but it is equally certain that individuals who conceive themselves aggrieved may come forward and ask the assistance of the court to prevent a public nuisance from which they have individually sustained damage. Atty.-Gen. v. Forbes, 2 M. & C. 123. With regard to private nuisances, the court will interfere by way of injunction where the mischief is irreparable. The general ground of its interference is that sort of material injury to property or health requiring the application to prevent as well as remedy an evil for which damages, more or less, would be given in an action at law. Atty. Gen. v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 343. It is not every case that would furnish a right of action against a party which would justify the interposition of the court of equity to redress the mischief or remove the annoyance. But there must be such an injury as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately compensated for by damages, or such as, from its long continuance, occasions a constantly recurring grievance which cannot be otherwise prevented but by an injunction. Fishmongers' Company v. E. I. Company, 1 Dick. 163; Atty.-Gen. v. Nichol, ubi supra. Thus it has been said that every common trespass or a mere diminution of the value of the premises is not a ground for an injunction; but, if the trespass continue so long as to become a nuisance, or if the diminution of the value of the premises amount to irreparable mischief, then the court will undoubtedly interfere. Coulson v. White, 2 Atk. 21; and see Atty.-Gen. v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 342. The ordinary instances in which the court exercises this jurisdiction occur where it is called upon to restrain a party from building so near the plaintiff's house as to darken his ancient lights. Ryder v. Bentham, 1 Ves. 543; Back v. Stacy, 2 Russ. 121; E. I. Company v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83. Injunctions have also been granted to stop the diversion of water-courses, and to prevent the pulling down of banks of rivers, whereby the plaintiff is exposed to inundations from which the banks had protected him. Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Bro. C. C. 588, [Perkins' ed. notes;] Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 194, [Sumner's ed. notes (a) and (b) and cases cited ;] Chalk v. Wyatt, 3 Mer. 688. Lord Cottenham had, upon several occasions, to investigate the nature of the jurisdiction of a court of equity in cases of this description, where a party |