TAXES-Continued
INCOME TAX-Continued
not give rise to an actual indebtedness, there is no obligation to pay interest and purported interest payments are not deductible for income tax purposes. Section 23(b), Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. Broome, 298.
Internal Revenue 517
Abandonment of capital asset.
What constitutes.
Before a taxpayer can take a capital loss deduction for income tax purposes, the capital asset must be completely liquidated by dis- posing of it or permanently abandoning it as worthless. The abandonment of a capital asset involves an actual intent on the part of the owner to abandon, plus an act or acts designed to carry out such intention. Hazeltine Corp., 138.
Abandonment of trade-mark.
What constitutes.
Unless the trade-marked name of a patented article has become a generic designation of that article by the time the basic patent on the article expires, the trade-mark does not pass into the public domain with the patented article and the expiration of the patent in such a case does not result in the abandonment of the trade- mark. Hazeltine Corp., 138.
Trade-Marks and Trade-Names and Unfair Competition → 32
When the owner of a trade-mark adopts a resolution for the aban- donment of the trade-mark and directs the company officers to adjust the owner's accounts to reflect the writing off of the assets, which adjustment is made and then followed by a public announcement that the trade-mark has been abandoned as of and from a specific date, there has been an effective abandonment during that year for income tax purposes. Hazeltine Corp., 138.
Trade-Marks and Trade-Names and Unfair Competition — 82
Inasmuch as the registration of a trade-mark is merely prima facie evidence of ownership, failure to renew registration is not, of itself, conclusive on the issue of abandonment of the trade-mark; and where no other identifiable act of abandonment occurs during the
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INCOME TAX-Continued
DEDUCTIONS-Continued
LOSSES-Continued
year in which the trade-mark registration is allowed to expire, abandonment does not take place in that year. Hazeltine Corp., 138. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names and Unfair Competition 32
Nonuse of a trade-mark because the product previously associated with it is no longer in demand by the public is not the equivalent of the abandonment of the trade-mark, since the owner may retain it for possible use on another product of the same class. Hazeltine Corp., 138.
Trade-Marks and Trade-Names and Unfair Competition ←→ 82
Capital losses.
Stock transferred.
Where the taxpayer was allowed to deduct as a business expense the value of stock transferred to accomplish a business purpose, the taxpayer was also entitled to take a capital loss deduction on the difference between that stock's fair market value at the time of transfer and its higher cost of acquisition. Montana Power Co., 611. Internal Revenue 642
EXEMPTIONS. Organizations.
Destination of income test.
Where the destination of some of the income of a purported chari- table or educational (exempt) organization is private gain of indi- viduals rather than exclusively public benefit, the organization is not operated exclusively for the exempt purposes and is not entitled to the tax exemption under section 101 (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S.C. (1952) § 101 (6)). Horace Heidt Foundation, 322.
INCOME TAXABLE.
Income from rents and royalties.
Royalties as consideration for stock sale.
Income received by the owner of an "overriding royalty" in oil, gas and other mineral products, is taxable as ordinary income and not as capital gains, despite the fact that the taxpayer acquired the overriding royalty interest as a part of the consideration for the sale of its stock in the oil development company. Warren, 571.
TAXES-Continued
INCOME TAX-Continued
INCOME TAXABLE-Continued
Indebtedness or liability settled by taxpayer.
An obligation of a taxpayer representing commissions due a sales- man, which amount the taxpayer deducted in the year due, should have been reported as income in the later year to the extent that the deduction exceeded the amount for which the taxpayer settled the salesman's claim for the commissions in such later year. Boxy Custom Clothes Corp., 602.
Indebtedness or liability written off by taxpayer.
An amount which the taxpayer deducted as a liability and in a later year wrote off should have been reported as income in the year in which the taxpayer treated this amount as income avail- able for such use as it cared to put the money, even though there might then have existed a possibility that a demand for payment would be made. Roxy Custom Clothes Corp., 602.
The provision in the Internal Revenue Code relating to the right to a drawback is the grant of a privilege rather than a refund of taxes assessed and collected and as such must be construed in favor of the Government and against the party claiming the privilege. United States v. Walker-Hill Co., 79 F. Supp. 482. McCormick & Co., 160.
Internal Revenue 1962
Production-what constitues.
Distilled spirits imported from abroad and taxed as "alcohol" but arriving in this country in such an impure state as to require much additional distillation and purification in a domeste plant, are not, for the purposes of the drawback provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, "produced" in a domestic plant within the meaning of sections 2809(b)(1) and 3124(a)(1) of the Code. McCormick & Co., 160.
Plaintiff's claim for a drawback under section 3250 (1) of the In- ternal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S.C. (1952) 3250(1)), arises when it uses distilled spirits in the manufacture of nonbeverage products and the plaintiff is the "real party in interest" for pur- poses of prosecuting the action in this court within the meaning
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of the court's Rule 20(a), despite the fact that the industrial al- cohol plant which sold the alcohol to plaintiff bore the expense of plaintiff's lawsuit and secured the ultimate payment of the plain- tiff's claim against defendant, McCormick & Co., 160,
Statutes-construction and operation.
Since section 3250(1) of chapter 27 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provides for a drawback on nonbeverage distilled spirits subject to the taxing provisions of chapter 26 of the Code, chap- ter 26 is a proper place to look for definitions to determine the meaning of the term "produced" used in chapter 27, section 3250(1). Aetna Insurance Co. v. United States, 142 C. Cls. 771, distinguished. McCormick & Co., 160.
TEMPORARY PROMOTION ACT. See Military Pay.
THIRD PARTIES. See Pleading and Practice.
See Counterclaims; Court of Claims-Jurisdiction.
TRADE-MARKS. See Taxes-Income Tax.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT.
VESTING POWER.
Limitations on.
The President, who had been entrusted by Congress with complete power over the subject of alien property, including the authority to determine what property was subject to vesting, effectively lim- ited that power to vest with respect to property acquired by Ger- man or Japanese interests after December 31, 1946, when the At- torney General, together with the Secretaries of the Treasury, State, and War, issued a press release on March 4, 1947, announcing that the Office of Alien Property of the Department of Justice would not vest such property and that the fiduciaries of enemy property acquired after December 31, 1946, need no longer report it and were free to transfer it. That press release was an invitation to aliens to bring property into, or acquire property in, this coun- try without danger of confiscation. Further evidence of the Presi- dent's intention to limit the right to vest such property are the letters sent to the Vice President, as President of the Senate, and to the Speaker of the House, proposing congressional action ter- minating the state of war but preserving the right to vest German property acquired before January 1, 1947. Gmo. Niehaus & Co., 173. War and National Defense - 12
TRIAL. See Pleading and Practice.
ACT OF ILLINOIS. See Contracts.
VETERANS' EDUCATION APPEALS BOARD. See Court of Claims— Jurisdiction.
VETERANS' PREFERENCE ACT. See Civilian Pay.
VETERANS' TRAINING.
COURT OF CLAIMS JURISDICTION.
Veterans' Education Appeals Board decisions.
Where the "customary cost of tuition" (section 2, Public Law 610, 64 Stat. 336, 338) determined by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, is based on prior contract rates which had been found by the Veterans Administration to be fair and reasonable, and the reasonableness of the rate determination had never been attacked by plaintiff at the agency level, and the evidence before the court indicates that the holding of the Veterans' Education Appeals Board as to what was plaintiff's customary rate was neither arbitrary, capricious nor lacking in substantial evidence, there is no basis for the court to overturn the holding of the board. B. & S. Lenox Trade School, 723.
Misrepresentation by school.
Implied promise to make restitution.
Where a private school engaged in the training of veterans under contract with the Veterans Administration, by misrepresentation, induced the Administration to make overpayments for tuition, sup- plies and subsistence allowances for students, the law will imply a promise on the part of the school to repay such overpayments. Tennessee Mechanical Institute, 344.
Armed Services 105
Recoupment.
Right of Veterans Administration.
Where the Veterans Administration had determined plaintiff's cus- tomary cost of tuition for the training of veterans on the basis of false and inflated cost data, the Administration had the right and duy to redetermine the school's tuition rate retroactively and to recoup such overpayments. Tennessee Mechanical Institute, 344. Armed Services 105
WARSAW CONVENTION. See Carriers.
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