26

not prevent one house from reading a bill the first time on the same day it was read the third time and passed in the other house. Nor is it any objection that one of the readings was on the day of final adjournment.27 Where a bill is vetoed and reconsidered it may be passed at once, and is not required to go through the prescribed readings as if an original bill.28 Of course if the journals show that the act was not read as required, it will be void.29

The constitution of Colorado provides that "no bill shall be considered or become a law unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom, and printed for the use of the members." 30 It has been held that this does not require a bill to be printed before it is read. The same constitution provides that all substantial amendments shall be printed for the use of the members before the final vote is taken on the bill. It is held that this provision is mandatory; that whether an amendment is substantial is a question for the courts, and if the provision is not complied with the act is void. 32

§ 55 (50). What shall be sufficient cause for suspending the rule requiring the readings on different days is solely Arthur, 57 Ala. 454; People v. N. C. 308, 31 S. E. 481; Smathers v. Whipple, 47 Cal. 592; Bibb County Loan Ass'n v. Richards, 21 Ga. 592. 26 Chicot Co. v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200; State v. Crawford, 35 id. 237. 27 Gilliland v. Baptist Church, 33 S. C. 164, 11 S. E. 684.

28 Lake v. Ocean City, 62 N. J. L. 160. 41 Atl. 427. In People v. Luby, 99 Mich. 89, 57 N. W. 1092, it was held that an objection that an act was not read in full on the first and second readings would not be considered when made for the first time on appeal.

29 Ante, § 52, note 98; Stanley Co. Com'rs v. Snuggs, 121 N. C. 394, 28 S. E. 539, 39 L. R. A. 439; Charlotte v. Shepard, 122 N. C. 602, 29 S. E. 842: Wilkes Co. Com'rs v. Call, 123

Commissioners, 125 N. C. 480, 34 S. E. 554; Hooker v. Greenville, 130 N. C. 472, 42 S. E. 141. Where a city charter required every ordinance to be read three several times before it became a law, adopting the language of the constitution, and the practical construction of the constitution by the legislature had been that one of the readings might be by title, it was held that the charter was intended to have the same construction. State v. Camden, 58 N. J. L. 515, 33 Atl. 846. 30 Art. 5, sec. 20.

31 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Col. L. & T. Co., 20 Colo. 1, 36 Pac. 793.

32 In re House Bill 250, 26 Colo 234, 57 Pac. 49.

within the discretion of the legislative body voting it, where power to dispense with it is given, and such cause need not appear upon the journals. The house may, by one order or resolution, dispense with the rule for two or more bills." It is not for the courts to say how the power shall be exercised.

The requirement that there be three readings and that they occur on three different days, being intended to prevent hasty and imprudent legislation, ought on principle to be, and by the weight of authority is, regarded as mandatory.35 In Ohio it seems to be regarded as directory.

36

§ 56 (51). Necessity of signature of presiding officers.Where the constitution requires every bill passed to be signed by the presiding officers of the respective houses, it is mandatory, and cannot be dispensed with where the journals are not records, and the act when passed and duly authenticated is conclusive as a record. Where the fact of signing is required to be entered on the journals, the provision is held to be mandatory by some courts, and directory by others.39 Where the constitution provides for a speaker pro tem., he may sign bills.40 If the constitution does not require their signing, it is not deemed essential." And since it is no part of the essential process of legislation, and is designed solely to verify the passage of the bill or resolution, where the legislative journals and files are records of which the court takes judicial notice, or which may

33 Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503.

34 People v. County of Glenn, 100 Cal. 419, 35 Pac. 302, 38 Am. St. Rep. 305.

35 Ante, § 49; Cooley, Const. L. 170. 36 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 481; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 id. 178.

37 State v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466. See Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Carver, 118 N. C. 328, 24 S. E. 352.

38 People v. Commissioners, 54 N. Y. 276; Pacific R. R. Co. v. The

Governor, 23 Mo. 364; Cooley's Const. Lim. 153; Burrough, Pub. Securities, 425. And see O'Hara v. State, 121 Ala. 28, 25 So. 622, where the question was whether the jour nal could be construed as showing the signing of the bill in question.

39 In re Roberts, 5 Colo. 525; State v. Long, 21 Mont. 26, 52 Pac. 645.

40 Robertson v. State, 130 Ala. 164, 30 So. 494.

41 Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. St. 376.

42

be brought to judicial notice, and from them it plainly appears that the bill or resolution, not signed by one or both of the presiding officers, was regularly considered and passed, there is much reason to sustain it as valid notwithstanding the absence of those signatures. If that evidence will prevail to avoid a statute erroneously signed by them, it should suffice to sustain one which was duly passed, though lacking that particular verification, if the other record evidence sufficiently shows the essential proceedings. The signature of the presiding officer is in such cases only a certificate to the governor that the bill or resolution has passed the requisite number of readings, and been adopted by the constitutional majority of the house over which he presides. But where the vote must be determined by the journals, the absence of the signatures of the presiding officers is not fatal, if the governor has signed the bill, for it will be presumed that the governor had sufficient evidence, the assurance which the journals afford to the court, of its passage at the time of his approval.

§ 57 (52). How the question of the due passage or enactment of statutes is tried. The court takes judicial notice of all general laws. This is a cardinal rule, and necessarily includes cognizance of whatever must be considered in determining what the law is; not because it is the prerogative of the courts arbitrarily to determine what are the public statutes, nor because they are required or supposed to have a knowledge of those laws without evidence of them, but because they have the means, and it is their duty, to make themselves acquainted with them.43 Whatever extrinsic facts are proper to be considered, the courts may have recourse to aid them in their duty to ascertain the law. Judicial knowledge takes in its whole range and scope at once; it embraces simultaneously, in contemplation of

42 Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503; Cot- ton, etc. R. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. trell v. State, 9 Neb. 128; Commis- 343. sioners v. Higginbotham, 17 Kan. 75; State v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 39; Hous

43 Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 8.

law, all the facts to which it extends. It would be a solecism to hold that a statute regularly authenticated is prima facie valid, if there exists facts of which the court must take judicial notice showing it to be void.

On principle and the weight of authority the courts take judicial notice of the legislative journals. If they invalidate a statute it is not apparently valid, for in every view of it the court perceives what impugns it and prevents it having force. And if the court has other sources of information which explored disclose facts fatal to an act, it is void from the beginning, void on its face; for what is manifest to the judicial mind is legally palpable to the whole public. None can plead ignorance of it. It is, however, held in some of the states that the courts do not take such judicial notice of legislative journals and extrinsic facts. In Grob v. Cushman," the court says: "It is true that they are public records, but it does not follow that they are to be regarded. as within the knowledge of the courts like public laws. Like other records and public documents they should be brought before the court as evidence. But when offered they prove their own authenticity. Until so produced they cannot be regarded by the courts." It is held in that state not to be the province of the court, at the suggestion or request of counsel, to explore the journals for the purpose of ascertaining the manner in which a law duly certified went through the legislature and into the hands of the governor.

46

$ 58 (53). These cases came under review in the supreme court of the United States in Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, and that court was in doubt and divided on the question whether by the state decision the validity of a statute was a conclusion of law or fact, when the statute, properly authenticated, is avoided by the legislative journals showing it was not constitutionally enacted. The majority,

44 45 Ill. 124, 125; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Larrison v. Peoria, etc. R. R. Co., 77 id. 18; People v. De Wolf, 62 Ill. 253.

45 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Cantrell v. Seaverns, 168 Ill. 165, 48 N. E. 186. 46 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. Ed. 154.

by Bradley, J., say: "In our judgment it was not necessary to have raised an issue on the subject, except by demurrer to the declaration. The court is bound to know the law without taking the advice of a jury on the subject. When once it became a settled construction of the constitution of Illinois that no act can be deemed a valid law unless by the journals of the legislature it appears to have been regularly passed by both houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard. The courts of Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless the parties bring the matter to their attention, but on general principles the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one, and must be so regarded by the courts of the United States." 47

In a recent case the supreme court of the United States says: "As a statute duly certified is presumed to have been duly passed until the contrary appears (a presumption arising in favor of the law as printed by authority, and, in a higher degree, of the original on file in the proper repository), it would seem to follow that wherever a suit comes to issue, whether in the court below or in the higher tribunal, an objection resting on the failure of the legislature to comply with the provisions of the constitution should be so presented that the adverse party may have opportunity to controvert the allegations and to prove by the record due conformity with the constitutional requirements." 48 It is also said in the same case that "it has often been held by state courts that evidence of the contents of legislative journals, which has not been produced and made part of the case in the court below, will not be considered on appeal." 49

48 In re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449, 457, 458, 11 S. C. Rep. 573, 35 L. Ed. 219; and see State v. Wray, 109 Mo. 594, 19 S. W. 86.

47 Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 43 Ill. 77; Bedard v. Hall, 44 Ill. 91; 667. Greb v. Cushman, 45 Ill. 119; Hinsoldt v. Petersburg, 63 Ill. 157; Auditor v. Haycraft, 14 Bush, 284; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33. In State v. Brown, 33 S. C. 151, 11 S. E. 641, the supreme court refused to consider the journals because they

49 Citing the following cases: Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Wren,