Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

tity of the bill is clear. A bill was sometimes referred to as No. 399 and sometimes as No. 339, but always under the same title. The bill with the title in question, when introduced, was numbered 399, and bill No. 339 was previously passed. It was held that the title identified the bill, that all the entries in question related to the same bill, and that it was duly passed. A conference committee agreed upon certain amendments to bill No. 258 S., relating to game, which were reported to the respective houses. The senate duly concurred in the amendments. There was pending in the house, bill No. 258 A., relating to change of county seats. The house journal showed that these amendments, setting them forth at length, were offered to bill No. 258 A., and were adopted, and that bill No. 258 A., giving its proper title, as amended by the conference committee, was read and passed. The court held that it could not presume that the use of 258 A., with its title, was a mistake for 258 S., with a different title, and therefore held that the house journal did not show the passage of the bill." The fact that the entries in the journal are confused or inconsistent will

9 Attorney-General v. Parsell, 100 Mich. 170, 58 N. W. 839; Nelson v. Haywood County, 91 Tenn. 596, 20 S. W. 1.

10 Miesen v. Canfield, 64 Minn. 513, 67 N. W. 632. We quote as follows: "It is reasonably clear, if not absolutely certain, that all entries in the journal relating to a bill of this title refer to one and the same bill, and the fact that it was sometimes numbered house file 339 was merely a clerical mistake. The file number is no legal or constitutional part of the title of a bill. It is merely designed for the convenience of the legislative members and clerks. It may therefore be rejected as surplusage, and, if this is done, there is neither defect

nor ambiguity in the legislative journals."

11 State v. Wendler, 94 Wis. 369, 68 N. W. 759. The court says: "We are vehemently urged to hold that the bill referred to as number 258 A. in the assembly journal was number 258 S., and that the use of the wrong letter was simply a palpable clerical error which the court could overlook. It appeared that there was a bill introduced in the assembly and known as 258 A. It was a bill amending the law relating to elections held to consider the change of county seats. This bill is pertinently and correctly described in the assembly journal. It is described by number, and its title is given at length. It is this

not invalidate the act.12 Where the journals show that an act was vetoed and do not show that it was passed over the veto, it is not a law. 131

§ 53 (48). Matters which the constitution expressly requires to be entered in journal. If the constitution, however, requires a certain proceeding in the process of legislation to be entered in the journals, the entry is a condition on which the validity of the act will depend. The vital fact that on the final passage of a bill the required number of votes are given in its favor is extensively directed by constitutions to be entered on the journals, together with the names of those voting. Under the operation of theseprovisions, there is no presumption that the required vote was given if the journal is silent. It must affirmatively appear by the journals that this constitutional requirement has been complied with." Where the journal shows only

bill which the assembly journal says in direct and unmistakable language was read a third time and passed. Can the court say, in face of this positive declaration, that it was another bill which passed? We think not. If it could, then there would be no reliance to be placed on the legislative record. The most that can be said is that it seems very probable that a mistake was made, and that 258 S. was the bill which was acted on. But laws cannot rest on probabilities, even though they be extreme probabilities. If a court can say, 'It is true the legislative record shows that one bill was passed, still it appears to the court that the record is mistaken, and that an entirely different bill was meant, and consequently it shall be enforced as law,' then there is an end of all certainty. The law rests no more upon records, but upon the guess

of a court made long afterwards. This cannot be endured. The official record must govern when its language is clear and free from doubt or ambiguity; and that record shows that bill number 258 S. was never acted on in the assembly after it went to the conference committee." pp. 377, 378.

12 Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 45. La. Ann. 222, 12 So. 1, 40 Am. St. Rep. 220.

13 Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 181, 47 S. W. 136.

14 State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 599; State v. Francis, 26 Kan. 724; In re Vanderberg, 28 id. 243; Weyand v. Stover, 35 id. 545, 11 Pac. 355; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. Ed. 154; People v. Mahaney, 13. Mich. 481; Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297, 58 Am. Dec. 571; People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 id. 160; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U, S. 667; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W.

the names of those voting in the affirmative, the act will be invalid, unless it is also stated that there were no negative

Va. 85; Bouldin v. Lockhart, 1 Lea, 195; State v. Corbett, 61 Ark. 226, 32 S. W. 686; People v. Knopf, 198 Ill. 340, 64 N. E. 1127; Norman v. Kentucky Board of Managers, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S. W. 901, 18 L. R. A. 556; State v. Mason, 155 Mo. 486, 55 S. W. 636; Union Bank v. Com'rs, 119 N. C. 214, 25 S. E. 916, 34 L. R. A. 487; Rodman v. Washington, 122 N. C. 39, 30 S. E. 118; Charlotte v. Shepard, 122 N. C. 602, 29 S. E. 842; Wilkes Co. Com'rs v. Call, 123 N. C. 308, 31 S. E. 481; Smathers v. ·Com'rs, 125 N. C. 480, 34 S. E. 554; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N. C. 730, 36 S. E. 167; New Hannover Co. Com'rs v. Derossat, 129 N. C. 275, 40 S. E. 43; Hooker v. Greenville, 130 N. C. 472, 42 S. E. 141; Debnam v. Chitty, 131 N. C. 657, 43 S. E. 3; State v. Swan, 7 Wyo. 166, 51 Pac. 209, 75 Am. St. Rep. 889; Stanley Co. Com'rs v. Coles, 96 Fed. 284, 37 C. C. A. 484; State v. Frank, 60 Neb. 327, 83 N. W. 74; S. C. on rehearing, 61 Neb. 679, 85 N. W. 956; Ames v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 64 Fed. 165.

Where it appeared upon the journals of the house of representatives that the bill did not receive the requisite vote on its third reading in that body, but did upon its final passage by the house after its return from the senate with amend ments, it was held a substantial compliance. Bond Debt Cases, 12 S. C. 200.

In Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, it appeared that the full senate had consisted of twenty-two mem

bers; that one afterwards resigned. On the final passage of the bill in question, after such resignation, there were eleven votes in its favor, and it was declared passed and by a majority of the members elected. Held, that there was doubt whether the vote was not sufficient, and the act was sustained by resolving the doubt in favor of its validity.

In State v. Francis, 26 Kan.724, the act in question was passed in the house by a vote in its favor, including, to make the required majority, the votes of four members (who were identified) beyond the maximum membership fixed by the constitution; held void.

Under the Michigan constitution, requiring on the final passage of a bill a majority of all the members elected, it was held that the court would not enter into an inquiry whether de facto members were properly elected. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481.

In Turley v. County of Logan, 17 Ill. 153, it was said by the court that "while the absence of facts in the journals may rebut the presumption raised by the signatures of the proper officers, and the publication of the act as a law, still we cannot doubt the power of the same legislature, at the same or a subsequent session, to correct its Own journals by amendments which show the true facts as they actually occurred, when they are satisfied that by neglect or design the truth has been omitted or suppressed."

votes.15 Where the journal showed that the act in question was passed by a vote of 64 yeas to 7 nays, but gave the names of only 62 voting in the affirmative, the act was held not impeached, though 63 votes were required for a constitutional majority.16 As to what is the "final passage of a bill" within the meaning of the constitution, there is a difference of opinion. Some courts hold that the final. passage of a bill is when it is first passed in each house, and that concurrence in subsequent amendments made by the other house, or in the report of a conference committee, may be made without a yea and nay vote, and without entering the result in the journals.17 Other courts hold that it is the last vote in each house which gives efficacy to the bill.18

In Miller v. State,19 Thurman, C. J., used this emphatic language: "That the power to make laws is vested in the assembly alone, and that no act has any force that was not passed by the number of votes required by the constitution, are nearly or quite self-evident propositions. These essen

15 Smathers v. Com'rs, 125 N. C. 480, 34 S. E. 554; New Hannover Co. Com'rs v. Derossat, 129 N. C. 275, 40 S. E. 43; Debnam v. Chitty, 131 N. C. 657, 43 S. E. 3.

journal, does not apply to amendments or the report of conference committees. If so, then no matter how material the change, a majority vote of a quorum may pass

16 Homzighausen v. Knoche, 58 the bill. The words 'final passage,' Kan. 646, 50 Pac. 879.

17 State v. Corbett, 61 Ark. 226, 32 S. W. 686; Brake v. Collison, 122 Fed. 722; Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503. 18 Norman v. Ky. Board of Managers, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S. W. 901, 18 L. R. A. 556. The court says: "It is true it has been held that the 'final passage' of a bill means when it first passes the body, and not when it returns to it, after amend ment, for adoption; and it is said that the constitutional provision as to the number of votes, and the entry of the yea and nay vote on the

as used in our constitution, mean final passage. They do not mean some passage before the final one, but the last one. They do not mean the passage of a part of a bill, or what is first introduced, and which may by reason of amendments become the least important. If so, then the body may pass what is practically a new bill in a manner counter to both the letter and spirit of the constitution." pp. 544, 545.

19 3 Ohio St. 475

tials relate to the authority by which, rather than to the mode in which, laws are to be made."

§ 54 (49). Required reading, printing and reference of bills. The readings required of bills are intended to afford opportunities for deliberate consideration of them in detail, and for amendment.20 Hence, amendments are admissible during the progress of a bill through the process of enactment; they are not subject to the same rule as bills in regard to the number of readings. They must be germane to the subject of the bill, and are not required to be read three times. And this rule is held to apply though the amendment consists in the substitution of a new bill on the same subject. Nor does concurrence by one house in amendments made by the other require the yeas and nays, and their entry on the journal, under the provision for these things on the final passage of bills.23

22

It is not necessary that everything which is to become law by the adoption of a bill be read. Thus a bill may be passed for the adoption of the common law, and it would not be necessary to set it forth in the bill. And where a bill was passed adopting a revised code, prepared by a conmission, it was held unnecessary to read the code referred to and adopted.24 An act was held valid which provided for the punishment as at common law of misdemeanors for which no punishment was provided by statute.25

The requirement that bills be read on different days will

20 State v. Platt, 2 S. C. 150, 16 be read the prescribed number of Am. Rep. 647. times.

V.

21 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; People v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; State v. Platt, 2 S. C. 150, 16 Am. Rep. 647; Illinois Central R. R. Co. People, 143 Ill. 434, 33 N. E. 173, 19 L. R. A. 119; Gilliland v. Baptist Church, 33 S. C. 164, 11 S. E. 684; State v. Hooker, 36 Fla. 358, 18 So. 767. In Glenn v. Wray, 126 N. C. 730, 36 S. E. 167, it is held that if the amendment is material it must

22 Nelson v. Haywood County, 91 Tenn. 596, 20 S. W. 1; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. 969; Brake v. Collison, 122 Fed. 722.

23 Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503; ante, § 52, note 98.

24 Central of Georgia R. R. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S. E. 531, 42 L. R. A. 518.

25 Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 471, 65 Am. Dec. 362; Dane v. Mc

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »