gressional enactment not confined in its operation to unlawful discrimination on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude transcends the constitutional limit, and is unauthorized. Waite, C. J., said: "We are therefore directly called upon to decide whether a penal statute enacted by congress, with its limited powers, which is in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial construction so as to make it operate only on that which congress may rightfully prohibit and punish. For this purpose we must take these sections of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a part which is unconstitutional and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding words that are in the section, but by inserting those that are not now there. Each of the sections must stand as a whole or fall altogether. The language is plain. There is no room for construction, unless it be as to the effect of the constitution. The question, then, to be determined is whether we can introduce words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only. It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. The courts enforce the legislative will when ascertained, if within the constitutional grant of power. . . . To limit this statute in the manner now asked would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one. That is no part of our duty." This view has been repeatedly approved in subsequent cases." Where 44 United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 290; Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 305, 29 L. Ed. 185. In Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. a statute forbade the sale of all kinds of intoxicating liquors, and was void as to some such liquors, it was held to be wholly void. To be separable for the purpose of sustain 678, 7 S. C. Rep. 656, 763, 30 L. Ed. 766, the plaintiff had been in custody on a charge of violating an act of congress which provided for punishment of those who "in any state or territory conspire, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws." Sec. 5519, R. S. U. S. Waite, C. J.. said: In United States v. Harris, supra, it was decided that this section was unconstitutional as a provision for the punishment of conspiracies of the character therein mentioned within a state. It is now said, however, that in that case the conspiracy charged was by persons in a state against a citizen of the United States and of the state, to deprive him of the protection he was entitled to under the laws of that state, no special rights or privileges arising under the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States being involved; and it is argued that although the section be invalid so far as such an offense is concerned, it is good for the punishment of those who conspire to deprive aliens of the right guaranteed to them in a state by the treaties of the United States. In support of this argument reliance is had on the well settled rule that a statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that under some circumstances the part which is constitutional will be enforced, and only that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. To give effect to this rule, however, the parts-that which is constitutional and that which is unconsti tutional — must be capable of separation, so that each may be read by itself. This statute, considered as a statute punishing conspiracies in a state, is not of that character, for in that connection it has no parts within the meaning of the rule. Whether it is separable so that it can be enforced in a territory, though not in a state, is quite another question, and one we are not now called on to decide. It provides in general terms for the punishment of all who conspire for the purpose of depriving any person, or any class of persons, of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws. A single provision, which makes up the whole section, embraces those who conspire against citizens as well as those who conspire against aliens; those who conspire to deprive one of his rights under the laws of a state and those who conspire to deprive him of his rights under the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. The limitation which is sought must be made, if at all, by construction, not by separation. This, it has often been decided, is not enough." ing the remainder of the act, such remainder must be complete in itself and sufficient to accomplish the legislative intent without aid from the void part." 47 § 301 (174). The main purpose being unconstitutional the whole act void. Where all the provisions of an act are connected as parts of a single scheme, the incidental or dependent provisions must fall with the failure of the main purpose. That which is merely auxiliary to the main design must fall with the principal to which it is merely an incident.49 If only one object is aimed at, and that is unconstitutional, and all the provisions are contributory to that object, and were enacted solely for that reason, the whole act is void. An act provided for a new police district, and police justice, with exclusive jurisdiction not only of new offenses created by the same act, but of matters previously cognizable by other courts. As the creation of the new district and court were essential to accomplish the purpose of the act, and that part of it being held unconstitutional, the whole act was void.50 Where the entire scheme must fail because of a want of power to enact it, Ga. 36, 31 S. E. 402; Harris v. State, 133; Eckhart v. State, 5 W. Va. 114 Ga. 436, 40 S. E. 315. 46 Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 26 L. Ed. 318; People v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68; Hinze v. People, 92 Ill. 406; Towles, Ex parte, 48 Tex. 413; Bittle v. Stuart, 34 Ark. 224; Black v. Trower, 79. Va. 123; State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455. 47 Randolph v. Builders' & Painters' Supply Co., 106 Ala. 501, 17 So. 721; Orange County v. Harris, 97 Cal. 600, 32 Pac. 594; Jones v. Jones, 104 N. Y. 234, 10 N. E. 269; Black v. Trower, 79 Va. 123. 48 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 270, 304, 5 S. C. Rep. 903, 29 L Ed. 185. 49 515; Brooks v. Hydoon, 76 Mich. 273, 43 N. W. 1122; Blades v. Board of Water Com'rs, 122 Mich. 366, 81 N. W. 271; State v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 662, 48 S. W. 929, 69 Am. St. Rep. 625; Grey v. Dover, 62 N. J. L 40, 40 Atl. 640; Dover v. Grey, 62 N. J. L. 647, 42 Atl. 674. 50 People v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68: Reed v. Omnibus R. R. Co., 33 Cal. 212; Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269; Sumter Co. v. Gainesville Nat. Bank, 62 Ala. 464, 34 Am. Rep. 30; State v. Chamberlin, 37 N. J. L. 388; Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 6 N. W. 246, 381, 35 Am. Rep. 786; 19 Darby v. Wilmington, 76 N. C. Slinger v. Henneman, 38 Wis. 504.. there can be no possible good in upholding an isolated provision which it was, perhaps, competent for the law-giver to enact, but which is unreasonable and unjust if left to stand alone."1 § 302 (175). A law is entire where each part has a general influence over the rest, and all are intended to operate together for one purpose. In such case the invalidity of that purpose will affect the whole act.52 Nevertheless if only one incidental provision is invalid, that may not render the whole act void.53 It is not entire in that sense.5+ Where a repeal of prior laws is inserted in an act in order to the unobstructed operation of such act, and it is held unconstitutional, the incidental provision for the repeal of prior laws will fall with it.55 An act was passed to dissolve municipal corporations and provided the manner in which they might re-incorporate. The latter was the object of the enactment, and that being held unconstitutional the former was also invalid.56 In such cases the object of the legislature is frustrated; when the void part is eliminated, there is not a complete act remaining expressive of the intent of the legislature and sufficient to carry it into effect.57 51 Fant v. Gibbs, 54 Miss. 396, 411. 52 Second Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann. 111; Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 10; Towles, Ex parte, 48 Tex. 413; Neely v. State, 4 Baxt. 174. 53 Bradley v. State, 99 Ala. 177, 13 So. 415; Wilson v. State, 136 Ala. 114, 33 So. 831; Cullen v. Glendora Water Co., 113 Cal. 503, 39 Pac. 769, 45 Pac. 822, 1047; Alexander v. Du luth, 57 Minn. 47, 58 N. W. 866; State v. County Court, 102 Mo. 531, 15 S. W. 79; State v. Franklin, 59 N. J. L. 106, 34 Atl. 1088; English & Scottish Am. Mort. Co. v. Hardy, 93 Tex. 289, 55 S. W. 169. 54 Ante, § 306. 55 Quinlon v. Rogers, 12 Mich. 168; State v. Commissioners, 38 N. J. L. 320; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Randolph v. Builders' & Painters' Supply Co., 106 Ala. 501, 17 So. 721; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778, 11 L. R. A. 370; Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N. E. 37; Barringer v. Florence, 41 S. C. 501, 19 S. E. 745; ante, § 245. But see Equitable Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Donahoe, 3 Penn. (Del.) 191, 49 Atl. 372. 56 State v. Stark, 18 Fla. 255; Quinlon v. Rogers, 12 Mich. 168. 57 Towles, Ex parte, 48 Tex. 413. § 303 (176). Where the void part is inducement to or consideration of residue of act. A leading case on this subject is Warren v. Mayor, etc.58 In that case was involved the validity of a statute for the annexation of the city of Charlestown to the city of Boston. There were provisions intended to secure to the inhabitants of Charlestown certain constitutional rights of representation in the legislature until the time when they could enjoy them within the city of Boston. Some years must elapse before that time. The provisions to secure such rights during the interval were held unconstitutional, and therefore that the whole act was void. Shaw, C. J., said: "If [the parts of the act] are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional and connected must fall with them." "The object of the act is the annexation; the merger of one municipality and the enlargement of the other. This must necessarily affect the municipal and political rights of the inhabitants of both, guaranteed as they are by the constitution. The legislature manifestly felt it to be their duty, in accomplishing this object, to make provision for the preservation of these constitutional rights; if this object is not effectually accomplished, we have no ground on which to infer that the legislature would have sanctioned such annexation and its consequences. The various provisions of the act, therefore, all providing for the consequences of such annexation, more or less immediate or remote, are connected and dependent; the different provisions of the act look to one object and its incidents, and are so connected with each other that, if its essential provisions are repugnant to the constitution, the entire act must be deemed unconstitutional 58 2 Gray, 84. 1 |