part. "If the legislative purpose as expressed in the valid portions of the act can be accomplished, independently of the unconstitutional portion, and, considering the entire act, it cannot be said that the legislature would not have passed the valid portion had it been known that the invalid portion must fail, effect will be given to so much as is good.""

On the other hand, if it is obvious that the legislature did not intend that any part should have effect unless the whole, including the part held void, should operate, then holding a part void invalidates the entire statute. "If all the provisions of an act are so interwoven as to be incapable of distinct separation, or are of such a character that it cannot be said that the legislature intended that the valid parts shall be enforced if the other parts fail, the entire law will be held to be invalid." If the obnoxious section or part is of such import that the other sections or parts without it would cause results not contemplated or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute must be held inoperative.o

If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, or to deal with two or more independent subjects, and the provisions as to one are void, it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to any other.10 Illustrations of this

7 English v. State, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689. "If the court can see and say that the act, in the form in which it is left with the obnoxious portions excised, is still such an act as it may be presumed that the legislature would have passed had it known that certain provisions were void, the remainder, under well-settled rules of construction, may stand." Dwyer v. Parker, 115 Cal. 544, 47 Pac. 372. See also Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 28, 19 So. 857; Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 66, 19 So. 901; Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278; Branch v. Lewerenz, 75 Conn. 319, 53 Atl. 658;

Ballentine v. Willey, 3 Idaho, 496, 21 Pac. 994; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247, 41 Am. St. Rep. 278, 24 L. R. A. 141; Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. St. 250, 20 Atl. 583, 9 L. R. A. 366. 8 Johnson v. State, 59 N. J. L. 271, 273, 35 Atl. 787; S. C. affirmed, 59 N. J. L. 535, 37 Atl. 949, 38 L. R. A. 373.

9 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 565, 22 S. C. Rep. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679.

10 People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585; Towles, Ex parte, 48 Tex. 413; State v. Clinton, 28 La. Ann. 201; Wells, Ex parte, 21 Fla. 280; Hinze v. Peo

proposition are furnished by numerous cases where acts are violative of the constitutional injunction that an act shall relate to but one subject, which shall be stated in the title. If the act embraces more than one subject, and one is stated in the title, it is valid as to that subject if complete in itself, but void as to any other. The elimination of the latter leaves a constitutional act, where there is no interdependence between the subjects." If the matter of the act foreign to the subject stated in the title is divisible from that which is clearly within the title, and the latter can stand and have effect without the former, then only so much of the act as is not embraced in the title is void.12 But otherwise the whole act is void.13

ple, 92 Ill. 406; Lombard v. Antioch College, 60 Wis. 459, 19 N. W. 367; Sparrow v. Commissioner of Land Office, 56 Mich. 567, 23 N. W. 315; People v. Luby, 56 Mich. 551, 23 N. W. 218; Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588, 66 N. W. 805, 32 L. R. A. 380; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. C. Rep. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294.

11 People v. Hall, 8 Colo. 485, 9 Pac. 34; State v. Hurds, 19 Neb. 317; Whited v. Lewis, 25 La. Ann. 568; Gibson v. Belcher, 1 Bush, 145; Jones v. Thompson, 12 id. 394; Fuqua v. Mullen, 13 Bush, 467; Harris v. Supervisors, 33 Hun, 279; Mississippi, etc. Co. v. Prince, 34 Minn. 79; Municipality No. 3 v. Michoud, 6 La. Ann. 605; State v. Exnicius, 33 id. 253; State v. Crow ley, 33 id. 782; State v. Dalon, 35 id. 1141; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Thomason, Ex parte, 16 Neb. 238; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151.

13 Yerby v. Cochrane, 101 Ala. 541, 14 So. 355; Elliott v. State, 91 Ga. 694, 17 S. E. 1004; State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 28 So. 917, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123; State v. Atkins,

12 Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447, 26 L. Ed. 405; Moore, Ex parte, 62 Ala. 471; Walker v. State, 49 id. 329; Lowndes County v. Hunter, 49 id. 507; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74; Matter of Sackett St., 74 N. Y. 95; Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199; Bucky v. Willard, 16 Fla. 330; State v. Wilson, 7 Ind. 516; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, 24 L. Ed. 377; Matter of De Vaucene, 31 How. Pr. 341; Harris v. Supervisors, 33 Hun, 279; Rader v. Township of Union, 39 N. J. L. 509; Colwell v. Chamberlin, 43 id. 387; Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261; People ex rel. v. Briggs, 50 id. 553; Fleischner v. Chadwick, 5 Ore. 152; Matter of Paul, 94 N. Y. 497; Dewhurst v. City of Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. 437; Allegheny Co. Home's Case, 77 Pa. St. 77; Lea v. Bumm, 83 Pa. St. 237; Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill, etc. Plk. R. Co., 104 La. 37, 28 So. 919; State v. Walker, 105 La. 492, 29 So. 973; Tolley v. Courter, 93 Mich. 469, 53 N. W. 620; Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N. W. 869.

A corporate charter is not entirely vitiated because it provides unconstitutionally for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for certain purposes," or unconstitutionally restricts the right to vote for officers.15 Parts relating to mere detail incident to the main purpose of an act may be stricken out without prejudice to the remainder of it, which contains valid provisions amply sufficient to enable the corporation to fully perform all its functions, unless vital to the main purpose as means or as compensation.16 Where a new offense is created and procedure for punishment provided, if the latter is invalid, and there are general laws under which prosecutions for such an offense could be conducted, the invalidity of the part relating to the procedure will not affect the part creating the offense." An act re

22 Barb. 634; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Savannah, etc. Ry. Co. v. Geiger, 21 Fla. 669, 58 Am. Rep. 697; Callaghan v. Chipman, 59 Mich. 610, 26 N. W. 806; State v. Persinger, 76 Mo. 346; Stiefel v. Maryland Institute, 61 Md. 144; Wynkoop v. Cooch, 89 Pa. St. 450; Ex parte Cowert, 92 Ala. 94, 9 So. 225; Bradley v. State, 99 Ala. 177, 13 So. 415; Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 28, 19 So. 857; Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 66, 19 So. 901; State v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148, 30 So. 344, 89 Am. St. Rep. 23; Cullen v. Glendora Water Co., 113 Cal. 503, 39 Pac. 769, 45 Pac. 822, 1047; Hancock v. State, 114 Ga. 439, 40 S. E. 317; Ritchie v. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454, 462, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315, 29 L. R. A. 79; Dixon v. Poe, 159 Ind. 492, 65 N. E. 518; Steenken v. State, 88 Md. 708, 42 Atl. 212; Belding Land & Imp. Co. v. Belding, 128 Mich. 79, 87 N. W. 113; State v. County Court, 102 Mo. 531, 15 S. W. 79; State v. Courtney, 27 Mcnt. 378, 71 Pac. 308; State v.

Humboldt County Com'rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974; Jones v. Morristown, 66 N. J. L. 488, 49 Atl. 440; Parfitt v. Ferguson, 3 App. Div. 176, 38 N. Y. S. 466; Commonwealth v. Ayers, 2 Pa. Supr. Ct. 352.

14 Morgan v. Monmouth Plank R. Co., 26 N. J. L. 99; Matter of Village of Middleton, 82 N. Y. 196.

15 State ex rel. v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45, 9 N. W. 791; People ex rel. v. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294.

16 Id.; Phillips v. Mayor, etc., 1 Hilt. 483; State v. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 278; Wakeley v. Mohr, 15 Wis. 609; State v. Rosenstock, 11 Nev. 128; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; Board of Com. v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; Turner v. Board of Commissioners, 27 Kan. 314; Matter, etc. of Village of Middleton, 82 N. Y. 196; Gordon v. Cornes, 47 id. 617; Zwerneman v. Van Rosenberg, 76 Tex. 522, 13 S. W. 485. See post, § 298.

17 State v. Newton, 59 Ind. 173.

districting a county for supervisors was held valid, though it unconstitutionally provided that incumbents should hold over beyond their election terms until they could be immediately succeeded by supervisors elected under the act.18 The powers of a judicial officer are so separable and independent that a grant of them may be void as to one part or subject and good as to others.19 An act providing for impounding cattle taken damage feasant, and for detention of them until costs and damages are paid, may be sustained, though it include a void provision for a summary sale of such cattle.20 A statute which prohibits traffic in intoxicating liquors, provides penalties therefor, and also forfeiture of liquors kept for sale, and the vessels in which the same are kept, is not an entirety. The forfeiture clause may be held unconstitutional, and the remainder nevertheless be sustained.21

In Skagit County v. Stiles " the court says: "In determining whether part of an act can stand where another part has been held unconstitutional, a different rule as to presumptions is recognized from that which obtains where the whole act is being considered. The general rule that legislative acts are primarily presumed to be constitutional, and that all intendments are to be made in favor of the act to give it effect according to the intent of the lawmaking power, does not apply in such cases, as the upholding of part of an act is not favored; and where a part has been held unconstitutional, and the remaining portion comes up for consideration as to whether it can stand as an independent proposition, the presumptions are generally against it, and it will not be sustained unless that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance

18 Christy v. Board of Supervisors, Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144, 39 Cal. 3. 159, 46 Am. Rep. 625.

19 Mayor, etc. v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369; Reid v. Morton, 119 Ill. 118, 6 N. E. 414.

20 Rood v. McCargar, 49 Cal. 117;

21 State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. 22 10 Wash. 388, 39 Pac. 116.

with the apparent legislative intent wholly independent of that which was rejected."

§ 298 (171). Rule when physical severance is impossible Whether words and provisions can be severed in their application or scope.-In most cases which arise where statutes are void in part only, the void part consists of distinct sections or provisions which can be literally and physically separated from the remainder, and such remainder can be read independently of the void part. But sometimes the provisions of a statute are valid as applied to certain cases or objects and invalid as applied to others, and the question arises whether such a statute is void in toto because it embraces too much, or whether it will be construed as applying only to the objects and cases within the power of the legislature and so upheld as valid legislation. The supreme court of New Hampshire, in an opinion often quoted with approval, lays down the following rule on the subject: "The rule of construction universally adopted is that when a statute may constitutionally operate upon certain persons, or in certain cases, and was not evidently intended to conflict with the constitution, it is not to be held unconstitutional merely because there may be persons to whom, or cases in which, it cannot constitutionally apply; but it is to be deemed constitutional and to be construed not to apply to the latter persons or cases, on the ground that courts are bound to presume that the legislature did not intend to violate the constitution." The supreme court of Kansas says that the rule that only the invalid parts of a statute are ineffective is not confined to cases where the invalid parts consist of separable words, clauses, sentences or sections which may be literally stricken out, as it were, but that "it applies as well to exclude from the operation of the statute subjects and classes of things lying without the legislative intent, although comprehended within the

23 Opinion of the Justices, 41 N. H. 555, quoted and approved in

Northrup v. Hoyt, 31 Ore. 524, 49
Pac. 754.