of a general law on a subject as to which special legislation is prohibited and general laws required does not necessarily repeai all special laws on the subject, and that it is still a question of legislative intent.39 The constitution of Missouri requires the general assembly, by general law, to designate the court or judge by whom the several classes of election contests shall be tried, and to regulate the manner of trial. In accordance with this provision a law was passed providing that the several circuit courts should have jurisdiction in cases of contested elections for county officers. This was held not to repeal a provision in a prior special act "establishing the office of marshal of Jackson county and defining his duties and powers," which conferred jurisdiction on the criminal court of that county to hear contested elections for said office.40 The court, sitting in bank, says: "The provision for a general law was not intended to repeal special local acts then in existence. Unquestionably it was and is the design of the constitution to rid the state of the evil of a multitude of local and special laws and to adopt general laws whenever it is feasible, but general subsequent laws have not heretofore been construed as repealing the various special laws and charters of this state unless appropriate language has been used for that purpose."

§ 280 (160). What is the later law which is potent to repeal. If a conflict exists between two statutes or provisions, the earlier in enactment or position is repealed by the later." Leges posterioris priores contrarias abrogant.

Pac. 877; Howard v. Hulbert, 63 Kan. 793, 66 Pac. 1041, 88 Am. St. Rep. 267. In the latter case the court says that we think the court ought to assume, at least in the absence of inherent evidence to the contrary, that the legislature, in enacting a general law purporting to be of general application, did so in view of this pro

vision of the constitution, and intended it to have such general application, and intended thereby to substitute it for all prior laws, special as well as general." p. 797.

39 Pearce v. Mason County, 99 Ky. 357, 35 S. W. 1122.

40 State v. Slover, 134 Mo. 10, 31 S. W. 1054, 34 S. W. 1102.

41 Ante, § 247; Davis v. Whidden,

43

Where there is an irreconcilable conflict between different sections or parts of the same statute the last words stand, and those which are in conflict with them, so far as there is a conflict, are repealed; that is, the part of a statute later in position in the same act or section is deemed later in time, and prevails over repugnant parts occurring before, though enacted and to take effect at the same time. This rule is applicable where no reasonable construction will harmonize the parts. It is presumed that each part of a statute is intended to co-act with every other part; that no part is intended to antagonize the general purpose of the enactment. To ascertain the legislative intent every part of an act, and other acts in pari materia, are to be considered. One part of an act may restrict another partan early section a later, and vice versa; but if one part is so out of line with other parts and the general purpose of the act that it can only operate by wholly neutralizing some other part, then the latter provision is supreme as expressing the latest will of the lawmaker. Hence, it is a rule that where the proviso of an act is directly repugnant to the purview the latter is repealed by it." Statutes speak from the time they take effect, and from that time they have posteriority. If passed to take effect at a future day, they are to be construed, as a general rule, as if passed on that day and ordered to take immediate effect. But, as

45

117 Cal. 618, 49 Pac. 766; State v. Halliday. 63 Ohio St. 165, 57 N. E. 1097; Aldrich v. Columbia Ry. Co., 39 Ore. 263, 64 Pac. 455.

42 Albertson v. State, 9 Neb. 429. 43 Ante, § 268; Bac. Abr., tit. Statutes, D.; State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237; Harrington v. Rochester, 10 Wend. 550; Branagan v. Dulaney, 8 Colo. 408; Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. 202, Fed. Cas. No. 11,361; Southwark Bank V. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446, 449; Elliott

v. Lochnane, 1 Kan. 135; Gibbons

v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232. See Thomas v. Collins, 58 Mich. 64, 24 N. W. 553.

44 Attorney-General v. Chelsea Water Works Co., Fitzgib. 195; Farmers' Bank v. Hale, 59 N. Y. 53. 45 Ante, § 175; State v. Edwards, 136 Mo. 360, 38 S. W. 73.

46 Ric Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125; Harrington v. Harrington's Est., 53 Vt. 649; Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Schmades, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 205.

between two acts, it has been held that one passed later and going into effect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going into effect later. Thus an act passed April 16th and in force April 21st was held to prevail over an act passed April 9th and in effect July 4th of the same year And an act going into effect immediately has been held to prevail over an act passed before but going into effect later Where two acts come into operation on the same day, and are repugnant, the one last approved repeals the other," unless a different intention is expressed.The relative time of approval may be ascertained from testimony," and, in the absence of any evidence on the ques

47 Dewey v. Des Moines, 101 Iowa, 410, 70 N. W. 605. And see to same effect, Dowty v. Pitwood, 23 Mont. 113, 57 Pac. 727; State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 298, 30 Atl. 543.

was

Belding Land & Imp. Co. v. Belding, 128 Mich. 79, 87 N. W. 113; Board of Education v. Tafoya, 6 N. M. 292, 27 Pac. 616; Heilig v. Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29, 34 Pac. 164. In the latter case some stress laid on the fact that the act going into immediate effect was passed with an emergency clause. Says the court: "But we are also of opinion that where two conflicting acts upon the same subject-matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be har monized and stand together, and one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, that one containing the emergency clause must be taken to overcome the other. The simple fact of there being an emergency clause would tend to show that the subject-matter of the act was more clearly and pointedly before the

legislature than the subject-matter of the other act."

49 State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237, 16 Atl. 529; Socorro County Com'rs v. Leavitt, 4 N. M. 37, 12 Pac. 759; Bailey v. Drane, 96 Tenn. 16, 33 S. W. 573: Rex v. Middlesex, 2 B. & Ad. 818.

50 The Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446. In this case it appeared that the legislature repealed a part of a bill pending before the governor, and he approved the repealing statute. Held, that he had no power to reinstate the repealed provision by subsequently signing the act in which it was contained.

51 Straus v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292; Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499, 18 L. Ed. 890. In Mead v. Bagnall, 15 Wis. 156, it was held that when the legislative intent is to be inferred from the priority of one act to another, regard must be had to the dates of approval of the acts and not to their dates of publication. The court say: “It is true that general laws must be published before they can take effect,

tion, they will be presumed to have been approved in numerical order.52

The legislature of Washington passed an act in regard to death warrants and their execution which repealed the old law on the subject and was to go into effect on June 12, 1901. On that day the legislature in special session passed an act repealing the act referred to and provided that it should go into effect immediately "for the purpose of preventing the act hereby repealed from ever becoming operative for any purpose." It was held that the repealing act was in effect from the first moment of June 12th, that the act repealed was never in force, and consequently that the old law in regard to death warrants remained in force.53

§ 281 (161). Effect where different statutes are incorporated into a revision. Where two statutes in pari materia, originally enacted at different periods of time, are subsequently incorporated in a revision and re-enacted in substantially the same language, with the design to accomplish the purpose they were originally intended to produce, the times when they first took effect will be ascertained by the courts, and effect will be given to that which was the latest declaration of the will of the legislature, if they are not harmonious. An existing statute is not to be consid

but that does not make the printer a part of the law-making power, nor enable him, by delaying the publication of one law longer than that of another which was passed at the same time, to change the relations of the two upon the point of priority."

52 Straus v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292; Metropolitan Board of Health v. Schmades, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 205. See Thomas v. Collins, 58 Mich. 64, 24 N. W. 553; Socorro County Com'rs v. Leavitt, 4 N. M. 37, 12 Pac. 759: ante, § 180; State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237, 16 Atl. 529.

53 In re Boyce, 25 Wash. 612, 66 Pac. 54. See also to same effect, Turnipseed v. Jones, 101 Ala. 593, 14 So. 377.

54 Winn v. Jones, 6 Leigh, 74; Blackford v. Hurst, 26 Gratt. 206; Hurley v. Town of Texas, 20 Wis. 638; United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 25 L. Ed. 631; Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498, 26 L. Ed. 633; Mobile Savings Bank v. Patty, 16 Fed. 751; Lamar v. Allen, 108 Ga. 158, 33 S. E. 958; Commonwealth v. Railroad Companies, 95 Ky. 60, 23 S. W. 868; Mette v. Feltgen, 148 Ill. 357, 36 N. E. 81; Lyon v. Ogden,

ered as original because it is embodied in a revision, and therefore is not to be construed on the theory that none of its provisions had been in effect prior thereto. The appearance of such a statute in the form and body of a revision has no other effect than to continue it in force.55 Where a revision was made in part by the mere compilation of prior statutes not re-enacted and in part fo statutes compiled and re-enacted, it was held that a re-enacted section, of earlier origin, would prevail over a section of later origin not reenacted.56

§ 282 (162). Effect of repeal in general. The general rule is that when an act of the legislature is repealed without a saving clause, it is considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as though it had never existed.57 This is not true in an absolute sense, nor without exception, unless it is provided that the repealed statute cannot be revived by the repeal of the repealing statute. A repealed law is indefinitely suspended while the repealing statute is in force. When that statute is repealed its repealing force is spent, and the one which is repealed thereupon comes again into operation.58 This revival would not ensue if the repeal had the effect of absolute extinguishment.59 In the interpretation of statutes, clauses which have been repealed may still be considered in construing the provisions that remain in force.60 Where a doubt exists as to the meaning

85 Me. 374, 27 Atl. 258; Pool v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675, 11 S. W. 743.

55 City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 509; City of Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 id. 428, 14 Am. Rep. 427; State ex rel. Att'y-Gen'l v. Heidorn, 74 Mo. 410. See ante, § 238.

bama Med. College v. Muldon, 46 Ala. 603; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677; McQuilkien v. Doe ex dem. Stoddard, 8 Blackf. 581; Hunt v. Jennings, 5 id. 195; Potter's Dwarris, 160.

58 Post, § 288; Bac. Abr., tit. Stat

56 Bryson v. Johnson County, 100 ute, D.; Phillips v. Hopwood, 10 B. Mo. 76, 13 S. W. 239. & C. 39; Brinkley v. Swicegood, 65 N. C. 626; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252.

57 Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294, 37 N. E. 1031, 49 Ill. App. 503; Curran v. Owens, 15 W. Va. 208; Surtees v. Ellison, 9 B. & C. 750; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Ala

59 Home Ins. Co. v. Taxing Dist., 4 Lea, 644.

60 Bank for Savings v. The Col