An act requiring county warrants on funds of the current year to be paid out of such funds in preference to warrants issued in former years, repeals an act requiring the treasurer of a specified county to pay warrants in their numerical order on presentation. A local act providing that the western boundary of Wilkes-Barre should be the low-water mark of the Susquehanna river, was held to be repealed by a general act providing that where any township, borough or city is bounded by the nearest margin of any navigable stream, and the opposite township, borough or city is also bounded by the nearest margin of the same stream, then the middle of the stream should be the boundary between them.15 A statute providing for a particular class of local improvements was held to be repealed by a subsequent statute providing for all kinds of local improvements and containing inconsistent provisions. 16 A statute authorizing the sheriff to bind the county for the support of prisoners, was held to be repealed by a law which provided that no county officer, except the board of county commissioners, should contract for the payment or expenditure of any county moneys for any purpose whatever, or purchase or contract for any goods, wares or merchandise, labor or services, without authority from the board.17 § 278. Illustrations - Local and special acts held not to be repealed by general acts.- An act prescribing a form of ballot in a particular case, as in elections for the organiza 14 Cooper v. Wait, 106 Ky. 628, 51 98 Mo. 675, 11 S. W. 743; Pleasant S. W. 161. Hill v. Dasher, 120 Mo. 675, 25 S. W. 15 Gilchrist v. Strong, 167 Pa. St. 566; State v. Davis, 129 N. C. 570, 628, 31 Atl. 931. 40 S. E. 112; Felts v. Delaware, L. 16 People v. Nelson, 156 Ill. 364, & W. R. R. Co., 170 Pa. St. 432, 33 40 N. E. 957. 17 State v. Washoe County Com'rs, 22 Nev. 203, 37 Pac. 486. The following additional cases are referred to: Spruance v. Truax, 9 Houst. 129, 31 Atl. 589; Starbird v. Brown, 84 Me. 238, 24 Atl. 824; Pool v. Brown, Atl. 97; S. C., 178 Pa. St. 290, 35 19 tion of villages, for the establishment of a high school district, for the issue of bonds by a county, and the like, is not repealed by a subsequent general ballot law which prescribes a form of ballot for the various sorts of elections.19 A provision in a special charter authorizing a municipality to regulate or prohibit the sale of liquor is not repealed by a subsequent general law on the subject. A special act granted to a cemetery association capacity to acquire lands in a village named for a public purpose; by the terms of the act the land so acquired was not liable to be taken for road purposes. An act was subsequently passed conferring general power to lay out and vacate roads and streets in cities and villages within their corporate limits. It was held that the two acts might stand together. Under the general law all roads and streets in the village are under its control except the lands of the association, and as to these the association has the exclusive control.20 In the following cases the general and special laws are stated and in each case the general was held not to repeal the special, local or particular law: A particular statute giving the sheriff the custody and care of the court-house and jail in his county and a general law that the county board shall have the care and custody of all the real and personal estate owned by the county; " a local act fixing the pay of the county auditors of Fayette county at three dollars a day without mileage and a general act fixing the pay of the county auditors at three dollars with mileage;" a special act for the extension of a certain railroad and au 18 People v. Marquiss, 192 Ill. 377, 61 N. E. 352; Rankin v. Cowden, 66 Ill. App. 137; Tinkel v. Griffen, 26 Mont. 426, 68 Pac. 859; Matter of Taylor, 3 App. Div. 244, 38 N. Y. S. 348; People v. Utah Com'rs, 7 Utah, 279, 26 Pac. 577. 19 Shea v. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14, 46 N. E. 138; State v. Labatut, 39 La. Ann. 513, 2 So. 550; State v. Lind. 21 quist, 77 Minn. 540, 80 N. W. 701; Murdock's Petition, 149 Pa. St. 341, 24 Atl. 222. 20 Village of Hyde Park v. Ceme tery Ass'n, 119 Ill. 141, 7 N. E. 627. 21 McDonough County v. Thomas, 84 Ill. App. 408. 22 Morrison v. Fayette County, 127 Pa. St. 110, 17 Atl. 755. 24 thorizing it to charge four cents a mile and a general law for the regulation of railroad fares; " a charter provision giving the mayor and council the power to remove and suspend officers and a general law providing that any officer guilty of misconduct in office shall forfeit his office and be removed therefrom, and providing for a hearing in court and a judgment determining the forfeiture and ordering the removal; a special charter provision that the village trustees shall be ex officio school trustees and a general law allowing women to vote for school trustees and to be elected to that office; 25 a special act detaching certain territory from one county and adding it to another, which required the approval of the voters of the latter county, and a general law that such a thing should not be done unless the question was submitted to and approved by the voters of both counties; 26 an act regulating costs in actions for assault and battery and a general law as to costs; 27 an act regulating appeals in condemnation cases and a general law as to appeals; 28 a special law authorizing a particular county to levy a tax to build a bridge and a general law limiting the rate of taxation by counties; 29 a law fixing the salary of county auditors in counties of over 150,000 inhabitants at five hundred dollars a year and a later law that the county auditors of each county should receive three dollars a day and mileage; a special provision that notice of appeal may be served on the adverse party or his attorney and a general law that, in all cases where a party has an attorney, the service of papers shall be on the attorney instead of the party.31 30 23 Parker v. Elmira, etc. R. R. Co., 165 N. Y. 274, 59 N. E. 81. 24 State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 24 S. W. 457, 41 Am. St. Rep. 663. 25 Trautman v. McLeod, 74 Minn. 110, 76 N. W. 964. 28 Seattle & Mont. Ry. Co. v. O'Meara, 4 Wash. 17, 29 Pac. 835. 29 Barnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 697, 37 S. W. 689, 34 L. R. A. 541. 30 Rymer v. Luzerne County, 142 Pa. St. 108, 21 Atl. 794, 12 L. R. A. 26 State v. Archibald, 43 Minn.328, 192. 45 N. W. 606. 31 Mantle v. Largey, 15 Mont. 116. 27 Meade v. French, 4 Wash. 11, 29 41 Pac. 1077. The following addiPac. 833. tional cases are referred to: Mills It is held in Pennsylvania that a special act relating to a particular city or county is not repealed by a subsequent act, general in form, which applies to a class of cities or counties, though such particular city or county may be the only one of the class at the time of the passage of the general law.32 § 279. Effect of constitutional provisions requiring general laws and laws of uniform operation upon repeal of special by general laws. Where the constitution requires uniformity in respect to any matter or thing, a law passed to carry out the provision will repeal all inconsistent local and special laws on the subject." Thus the constitution of Kentucky requires that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. A law passed in conformity with this provision was held to repeal all inconsistent special legislation." The supreme court of Pennsylvania says: "Ordinarily it is true that a v. Sanderson, 68 Ark. 130, 56 S. W. 779; People v. Knopf, 186 Ill. 457, 57 N. E. 1059; Kelly v. School Directors, 66 Ill. App. 134; Boyd v. Randolph, 91 Ky. 472, 16 S. W. 133; Casterton v. Vienna, 163 N. Y. 368, 57 N. E. 622. 32 Bell v. Allegheny County, 149 Pa. St. 381, 24 Atl. 209; Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Fricke, 152 Pa. St. 231, 25 Atl. 530. In the first of these cases the court says: "To say that the county of Allegheny was the only county to which the thirteenth section could apply, and that there fore the legislature had that county in mind, and framed the section specially in reference to it, proves too much. Whenever the intent is to legislate for a particular county the resultant legislation contravenes section 7 of article 3 of the constitution, no matter how carefully that intent may be disguised. But there is no evidence here of an intent to provide specially for Allegheny county by the thirteenth section. The act is an attempt, at least, at classification on the basis of population, and, if sustainable, it is so, and only so, because other counties may come into the several classes provided for. Hence it must not be assumed to have been enacted for the then present and with reference to certain counties, the names of which were cunningly suppressed, but for all time and with reference to the future changes of population." 33 McTigne v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 66, 35 S. W. 121; Commonwealth v. Wunch, 167 Pa. St. 186, 31 Atl. 551; Chalfant v. Edwards, 176 Pa. St. 67, 34 Atl. 922. 34 McTigue v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 66, 35 S. W. 121. general law will not operate to repeal a previous local act without some words indicative of such an intention. But when it is the duty of the legislature to change an existing system because of some constitutional provision on the subject, and a law is passed for this purpose introducing a new system which is general in its terms and evidently intended to provide a uniform system for all subjects to which it relates, no repealing words are necessary."35 So where the constitution requires a change of system, as that certain officers shall be compensated by salaries instead of fees, and a law is passed in obedience to the constitutional mandate.36 The constitution of New Jersey forbids special legislation for certain purposes and requires that such purposes shall be provided for by general laws. "In order to give effect to the manifest design of this constitutional provision," says the court of errors and appeals, "general statutes passed in pursuance thereof should be deemed to repeal all inconsistent rules in special charters, whether an express repeal be stated or not; for if this force be not ascribed to them, the generality of the statutes will be defeated by their being confined to narrower limits than an entire class, and thus, by judicial interpretation, the statutes will become unconstitutional." 37 The requirement that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state is held to impart to such laws the effect of repealing inconsistent local and special laws.38 But in Kentucky it is held that the passage 35 Chalfant v. Edwards, 176 Pa. L. 180, 182, 19 Atl. 176. See also St. 67, 71, 34 Atl. 922. Bowyer v. Camden, 50 N. J. L. 87, 11 Atl. 137; Hoetzel v. East Orange, 50 N. J. L. 354, 12 Atl. 911; Crookall v. Matthews, 61 N. J. L. 349, 39 Atl. 659; Commonwealth v. Macferron, 152 Pa. St. 244, 25 Atl. 556; Quinn v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. St. 55, 29 Atl. 289. 36 McCleary v. Allegheny County, 163 Pa. St. 578, 30 Atl. 120; Bounhorst v. Allegheny County, 163 Pa. St. 588, 30 Atl. 123; McGunnegle v Allegheny County, 163 Pa. St. 589, 30 Atl. 123; Commonwealth v. Grier, 152 Pa. St. 176, 25 Atl. 624. 37 Haynes v. Cape May, 52 N. J. 38 Miller v. Curry, 113 Cal. 644, 45 |