eral rule the insertion of this general repealing clause does
not add anything to the effect of the general act to repeal
local or special laws. But where there was only one gen-
eral act upon which the clause could operate and there
were many inconsistent local acts, it was held that the lat-
ter were repealed.95

When the legislator frames a statute in general terms or
treats a subject in a general manner, it is not reasonable to
suppose that he intends to abrogate particular legislation
to the details of which he had previously given his atten-
tion, applicable only to a part of the same subject, unless
the general act shows a plain intention to do so.96

Omaha, 63 Neb. 52, 54, 88 N. W. 117;
Buffalo Cem. Ass'n v. Buffalo, 118
N. Y. 61, 66, 22 N. E. 962; Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Haynes, 8
Okl. 576, 585, 58 Pac. 738.

94 Reading v. Shepp, 2 Pa. Dist.
Ct. 137; Casterton v. Vienna, 163
N. Y. 368, 57 N. E. 622. See State
v. Butcher, 93 Tenn. 679, 28 S. W.
296; Felts v. Delaware, L. & W.
R. R. Co., 170 Pa. St. 432, 33 Atl.
97; S. C., 178 Pa. St. 290; Felts v.
Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 195
Pa. St. 21, 45 Atl. 493.

95 Commonwealth v. Middletown,
3 Pa. Dist. Ct. 639; Commonwealth
v. McDonnell, 3 Pa. Dist. Ct. 767.
96 Crow Dog, Ex parte, 109 U. S.
556, 3 S. C. Rep. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030;
Dwarris on St. 532; Sedgw. St. &
Const. L. 98; State v. Judge of St.
Louis P. Ct., 38 Mo. 529; Brown v.
County Commissioners, 21 Pa. St.
37; State v. Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16,
24; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio
St. 472; Robbins v. State, 8 id. 131,
191; Williams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R.
2; Fitzgerald v. Champneys, 30 L.
J. Ch. 782; S. C., 2 Johns. & H. 31;
Thompson v. State, 60 Ark. 59, 28

S. W. 794; Mills v. Sanderson, 68
Ark. 130, 56 S. W. 779; Home for
Inebriates v. Reis, 95 Cal. 142, 30
Pac. 205; Bateman v. Colgan, 111
Cal. 580, 44 Pac. 238; People v.
Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 50 N. E.
599; Kelly v. School Directors, 66
Ill. App. 134; Rankin v. Cowden,
66 Ill. App. 137; McDonough
County v. Thomas, 84 Ill. App. 408;
Arnold v. Council Bluffs, 85 Iowa,
441, 52 N. W. 347; Boyd v. Ran-
dolph, 91 Ky. 472, 16 S. W. 133;
Music v. Kansas City, etc. Ry. Co.,
114 Mo. 309, 21 S. W. 491; State v.
District Court, 14 Mont. 452, 37
Pac. 9; Mantle v. Largey, 15 Mont.
116, 41 Pac. 1077; Rymer v. Lu-
zerne County, 142 Pa. St. 108, 21
Atl. 794, 12 L. R. A. 192; Altoona
v. Calvert, 21 Pa. Co. Ct. 362;
Hayes v. Arrington, 108 Tenn. 494,
68 S. W. 44; People v. Utah Com'rs,
7 Utah, 279, 26 Pac. 577; State v.
Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 Pac. 428;
State v. Purdy, 14 Wash. 343, 44
Pac. 857; Callvert v. Winsor, 26
Wash. 368, 67 Pac. 91; State v.
Hobe, 106 Wis. 411, 82 N. W. 336.
In State v. McCurdy, 62 Minn.

§ 275 (158). The special act must conflict, so far as it
operates to the extent of its lesser scope, with the general
act; otherwise there would generally be no question of re-
peal; it expresses a particular intent incompatible, pro tanto,
with the intent of the general law. The general law can
have full effect beyond the scope of the special law, and,
by allowing the latter to operate according to its special
aim, the two acts can stand together. Unless there is plain.
indication of an intent that the general act shall repeal the
other, it will continue to have effect, and the general words
with which it conflicts will be restrained and modified ac-
cordingly. Where there are in one act or several contem-
poraneously passed, specific provisions relating to a par-
ticular subject, they will govern in respect to that subject
as against general provisions contained in the same acts.98

509, 516, 517, 64 N. W. 1133, the
court says: "Repeals by implica-
tion are not favored. The ques-
tion is one of legislative intent,
and its intent is to be ascer
tained, as legislative intent is
ascertained in other respects, when
not expressly declared, by con-
struction. Considerations of con-
venience, justice and reasonable-
ness, when they can be invoked
against the implication of repeal,
are always very potent. Where a
general intention is expressed, and
also a particular intention is ex-
pressed which is incompatible with
the general one, the particular in-
tention shall be considered an ex-
ception to the general one. Thus,
when the legislature enacts a stat-
ute in general terms it is not rea-
sonable to suppose that they in-
tended to abrogate particular legis-
lation, to the details of which they
had previously given their atten-
tion, unless the general act shows

a plain intention to do so. The
general law can have full effect
beyond the scope of the particular
or special act, and, by allowing the
latter to operate according to its
special aim, the two acts can stand
together."

97 Dwarris on St. 765; Stockett v..
Bird, 18 Md. 484; Crane v. Reeder,
22 Mich. 322, 334; Fosdick v. Perrys-
burg, 14 Ohio St. 472; Williams v.
Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2.

98 Felt v. Felt, 19 Wis. 193, 196;
State v. Goetz, 22 id. 363; Crane v.
Reeder, 22 Mich. 322. In Nusser v.
Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St. 126, the
question was whether an act impos-
ing a fine of $50 for selling liquors
on Sunday within the county of
Allegheny, and authorizing a sum-
mary conviction before a single
justice of the peace, was repealed
by a later statute imposing the
same penalty for the same offense
committed anywhere in the state,
and prescribing a mode of proced-

It seems to be immaterial which statute is first enacted.
If the special statute is later the enactment operates neces-
sarily to restrict the effect of the general act from which it
differs.99

These interpretations harmonize with the rule that when
a general intention is expressed, and also a particular in-
tention, which is incompatible with the general one, the
particular intention shall be considered an exception to the
general one. The special act is in the nature of an excep-
tion to the general law and suspends its operation in the
field covered by the special act, and when the latter is re-

pealed the general law operates as if the special law had never existed.2

276 (159). The question is one of intent.-There is no rule of law which prohibits the repeal of a special act by a general one, nor is there any principle forbidding such repeal without the use of words declarative of that intent. The question is always one of intention, and the purpose to abrogate the particular enactment by a later general statute is sufficiently manifested when the provisions of both cannot stand together. A special and local law provided that certain property should be subject to taxation; a subsequent general one that all such property should be exempt, and repealed all local or special acts inconsistent with its provisions. It was held that the special act was repealed. Special or local laws will be repealed by general laws when the intention to do so is manifest, as where the latter are intended to establish uniform rules for the whole state. Where there is an express repeal of all acts and parts of acts, general or special, which are inconsistent, the intent is manifest. A general law for the care of the poor provided that it should not be construed to repeal any local acts under which poor-houses had been built, or lands bought, or buildings commenced. This was held to show an intent to repeal all other local or

2 Santa Barbara v. Eldred, 95 Cal. 378, 30 Pac. 562; Territory v. Pratt, 6 Dak. 483, 43 N. W. 711; Buckwalter v. Lancaster County, 12 Pa. Supr. Ct. 272.

3 New Brunswick v. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165; Pausch v. Guer rard, 67 Ga. 319; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Bridges, 30 N. J. L. 112; State v. Miller, id. 368, 86 Am. Dec. 188; Great Central Gas Cons. Co. v. Clarke, 13 Com. B. (N. S.) 838; Bramston v. Colchester, 6 E. & B. 246; Evansville v. Bayard, 39 Ind. 450; Willing v. Boz man, 52 Md. 44.

4 State v. Pearcy, 44 Mo. 159; People v. Miner, 47 Ill. 33; People v. Furman, 85 Mich. 110, 48 N. W. 169; Buffalo v. Neal, 86 Hun, 76, 33 N. Y. S. 346; People v. Brady, 49 App. Div. 238, 63 N. Y. S. 145; Barker v. Floyd, 61 App. Div. 92, 60 N. Y. S. 1109; Fraim v. Lancaster County, 171 Pa. St. 436, 33 Atl. 339; Jadwin v. Hurley, 10 Pa. Supr. Ct. 104; People v. Dalton, 158 N. Y. 175, 52 N. E. 1113.

5 Louisville Water Co. v. Clark. 143 U. S. 1, 12 S. C. Rep. 346, 36 L. Ed. 55; State v. Swanson, 85 Minn. 112, 88 N. W. 416.

special acts. An act provided that a president of each and every village and incorporated town should be elected annually. The language was held to show an intent to repeal the special charter provisions of such municipalities as were inconsistent. A general statute provided that the real es tate of every educational, benevolent and ecclesiastical corporation or association, which is leased or used for other purposes than the specific purposes of such corporation or association, should be subject to taxation as if held by an individual taxpayer. This was held to repeal an exemption in the charter of a theological institution. Other cases are to the same effect."

A general act prescribing a mode of punishment for a specific offense throughout the state will repeal an act limited to a single county prescribing a different punishment.10 A general statute for the suppression of prostitution is inconsistent with a local statute authorizing a regulation of it." A local or special law which adopts, by reference, provisions relating to procedure from an existing general statute, is not necessarily abrogated or affected by the subsequent repeal of the act containing the adopted provisions.12

§ 277. Illustrations — Local and special acts held to be repealed by general acts.- A general law authorizing counties to issue bonds to build roads and bridges was held to repeal a special law forbidding a particular county to issue bonds except for the purpose of refunding its indebtedness."

6 Commonwealth V. Summerville, 204 Pa. St. 300, 54 Atl. 27.

7 McCormick v. People, 139 Ill. 499, 28 N. E. 1106.

8 Hartford v. Hartford Theological Seminary, 66 Conn. 475, 34 Atl. 483.

9 In re House Resolution, 12 Colo. 289, 21 Pac. 484; Hunt v. Card, 94 Me. 386, 47 Atl. 921; Quinn v. Cum. berland County, 162 Pa. St. 55, 29 Atl. 289; Wagner Free Institute v. Philadelphia, 132 Pa. St. 612, 19

Atl. 297, 19 Am. St. Rep. 613; Wahl v. Nauvoo, 64 Ill. App. 17; Matter of Dobson, 146 N. Y. 357, 40 N. E 988; State v. Angel, 71 N. H. 224. 51 Atl. 905.

10 Nusser v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa St. 126; Keller v. Commonwealth, 71 id. 413.

11 State v. Lewis, 5 Mo. App. 465. 12 Schwenke v. Union Depot & R. R. Co., 7 Colo. 512, 5 Pac. 816. 13 State v. West Duluth Land Co., 75 Minn. 456, 71 N. W. 115.