new act in the same manner as it did the first." 86 This is especially true if the intermediate law is special or particular and the re-enacted law is a general law on the same subject.87 Where a law is amended and re-enacted as amended, any intermediate law inconsistent with the new matter introduced, or change made by the amendment, will be repealed. Where a law is substantially re-enacted it is said to show that the legislature did not regard it as repug nant to an intermediate act to some extent covering the same subject. A town charter granted in 1857 forbade the sale of liquor. An amendment made in 1859 gave power tc license its sale. In 1870 the charter of 1857 was re-enacted and the limits of the town extended. This was held not to repeal the act of 1859, but to be a mere declaration that the act of 1857 was still in force, and related back to the time of its original passage. Section 5 of an act of Nevada of 1885 in regard to the compensation of county officers fixed the compensation of the county officers of Elk county, giv ing the sheriff certain fees, the district attorney a salary of $2,000 and the superintendent of schools a salary of $600 February 23, 1887, an act was passed to consolidate certain county offices, which provided that district attorneys should be ex officio superintendents of schools without additional compensation. On March 5, 1887, section 5 of the act of 1885 was amended so as to give the sheriff of Elk county a salary of $4,000, in lieu of fees, and the section re-enacted
86 Harrison v. Board of Supervisors, 117 Mich. 215, 75 N. W. 456; Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N. W. 850; Hawes v. Fliegler, 87 Minn. 319, 92 N. W. 223; Co-operative S. & L. Ass'n v. Fawick, 11 S. D. 589, 79 N. W. 847; Bently v. Adams, 92 Wis. 386, 66 N. W. 505; Haritwen v. The Louis Olsen, 52 Fed. 652; The Louis Olsen v. Haritwen, 57 Fed. 845.
414; State v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218, 29 Pac. 531; State v. Commissioners, 106 Wis. 584, 82 N. W. 549.
88 Hawes v. Fliegler, 87 Minn. 319, 92 N. W. 223; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451, 28 Atl. 348; Sheriff v. Kershaw County, 56 S. C. 400, 34 S. E. 694.
89 Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan. 367, 40 Pac. 666.
90 Horn v. State, 114 Ga. 509, 40
87 Gazollo v. McCann, 63 Mo. App. S. E. 768.
including the salary of $600 for the superintendent of schools. It was held that the only object of the act of 1887 was to change the compensation of the sheriff to a salary, that it did not repeal or affect the act of February, 1887, and that the district attorney was not entitled to the salary of $600 as ex officio superintendent of schools.o1
§ 274 (157). As a rule general laws will not impliedly repeal those which are special or local.— A general law prescribing a rule universal as to a subject properly includes that entire subject and operates over every part of the state. The common law adapts itself to varying conditions by its flexible principles; but statutes are made to apply to given conditions by classifications, provisos, exceptions and limitations. A general law may thus be prevented from operating upon every subject, and from taking effect in every place. The purpose of a general act relative to a given subject may harmonize with a different purpose on that subject in a particular locality, or under special conditions, or as it affects a particular interest or a particular person or class; it may harmonize in the sense that both purposes may be effectuated. The purpose of the general law may be carried out except as to the particulars in which a different intention is manifested. It is a principle that a general statute without negative words will not repeal by implication from their repugnancy the provisions of a former one which is special, local, or particular, or which is limited in its application, unless there is something in the general law
91 State v. Elk County Com'rs, 21 Nev. 19, 23 Pac. 935. In Hawes v. Fliegler, 87 Minn. 319, 92 N. W. 223, the court says: "A statute amending a previous one, while it might not affect an intermediate law, if its terms give best expression to the legislative will, should be held to do so if a reasonable regard for the apparent purpose of the lawmakers required that result, for
the rules which have been adopted by the courts to construe acts of the legislature have the ultimate object of discovering their sensible design, rather than to reach logical deductions, since the intention of the legislature should always be followed whenever it can be discovered, although the construction seem contrary to the letter of the statute."
or in the course of legislation upon its subject-matter that
makes it manifest that the legislature contemplated and
intended a repeal.92 "It is the established rule of construc-
tion that the law does not favor a repeal by implication, but
92 City Council v. National B. &
L. Ass'n, 108 Ala. 336, 18 So. 816;
Roy v. Henderson, 132 Ala. 175, 31
So. 457; Ex parte Smith, 40 Cal.
419; Wood v. Election Com'rs, 58
Cal. 561; People v. Sands, 102 Cal.
12, 36 Pac. 404; Banks v. Yolo
County, 104 Cal. 258, 37 Pac. 900;
People v. Pacific Imp. Co., 130 Cal.
442, 62 Pac. 739; Schwenke v.
Union Depot & R. R. Co., 7 Colo.
512, 5 Pac. 816; Rice v. Goodwin,
2 Colo. App. 267, 30 Pac. 330; New
York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v.
Bridgeport Traction Co., 65 Conn.
410, 32 Atl. 953, 29 L. R. A. 367; Ter-
ritory v. McPherson, 6 Dak. 27, 50 N.
W. 351; United States v. Sampson,
19 App. Cas. (D. C.) 419; Haywood v.
Mayor, 12 Ga. 404; Mayor v. Minor,
70 Ga. 191; McGruder v. State, 83
Ga. 616, 10 S. E. 441; Montford v.
Allen, 111 Ga. 18, 36 S. E. 305; West-
ern & Atlantic R. R. Co. v. Atlanta,
113 Ga. 537, 38 S. E. 996, 54 L. R. A.
294; Covington v. East St. Louis,
78 Ill. 548; People v. Mayor, 130 Ill.
406, 22 N. E. 833; Kuenster v. Board
of Education, 134 Ill. 165, 24 N. E.
609; Cook County v. Gilbert, 146
Ill. 268, 33 N. E. 761; Trausch v.
Cook County, 147 Ill. 534, 35 N. E.
477; Ridgway v. Gallatin County,
181 Ill. 521, 55 N. E. 146; People v.
Brown, 189 Ill. 619, 60 N. E. 46;
People v. Marquiss, 192 Ill. 377, 61
N. E. 352; Quincy v. O'Brien, 24 Ill.
App. 591; Rushville v. Rushville,
31 Ill. App. 320; Gilbert v. Cook
County, 44 Ill. App. 69; People v.
Mount, 87 Ill. App. 194; Shea v.
Muncie, 148 Ind. 14, 46 N. E. 138;
Commonwealth v. Cain, 14 Bush,
525; Adams Express Co. v. Owens-
boro, 85 Ky. 265; Cravens v. Adair
County Court, 17 Ky. L. R. 71, 30
S. W. 414; Board of Trustees v.
Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 17 Ky. L.
R. 160, 30 S. W. 620; Mauget v.
Plummer, 21 Ky. L. R. 641, 52 S.
W. 844; State v. Labatut, 39 La.
Ann. 513, 2 So. 550; Garrett v.
Mayor, 47 La. Ann. 618, 17 So. 238:
Cooper v. Holmes, 71 Md. 20, 17
Atl. 711; McCracken v. State, 71
Md. 150, 17 Atl. 932; Crane v.
Reeder, 22 Mich. 322, 334; High-
land Park v. McAlpine, 117 Mich.
666, 76 N. W. 159; University Re-
gents v. Auditor-General, 109 Mich.
134, 66 N. W. 956; Tierney v. Dodge,
9 Minn. 166; State v. Archibald, 43
Minn. 328, 45 N. W. 606; Moore v.
Minneapolis, 43 Minn. 418, 45 N. W.
719; State v. Egan, 64 Minn. 331, 67
N. W. 77; Trautman v. McLeod,
74 Minn. 110, 76 N. W. 964; State v.
Lindquist, 77 Minn. 540, 80 N. W.
701; Deters v. Renick, 37 Mo. 597;
McVey v. McVey, 51 Mo. 406; Pa-
cific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 53
Mo. 17; State v. Severance, 55 Mo.
378, 386; State v. De Bar, 58 Mo.
395; State v. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426, 11
S. W. 973; State v. Walbridge, 119
Mo. 383, 24 S. W. 457, 41 Am. St.
Rep. 663; State v. St. Louis School
Board, 131 Mo. 505, 33 S. W. 3; Wil-
son v. Knox County, 132 Mo. 387,
34 S. W. 45, 477; State v. Slover,
that where there are two or more provisions relating to the
same subject-matter they must, if possible, be construed so
as to maintain the integrity of both. It is also a rule that
where two statutes treat of the same subject, one being
134 Mo. 10, 31 S. W. 1054, 34 S. W.
1102; Ruschenberg v. Southern
Electric R. R. Co., 161 Mo. 70, 61 S.
W. 626; State v. Fitzporter, 17 Mo.
App. 271, 274; State v. Willard, 39
Mo. App. 251; State v. Daly, 49 Mo.
App. 184; Tinkel v. Griffen, 26
Mont. 426, 68 Pac. 859; Jackson v.
Board of Sup'rs, 34 Neb. 680, 686, 687,
52 N. W. 169; Dawson County v.
Clark, 58 Neb. 756, 79 N. W. 822;
Kountze v. Omaha, 63 Neb. 52, 88
N. W. 117; State v. Branin, 23 N.
J. L. 484; State v. Belvidere, 25 N.
J. L. 563; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. L.
177; Anderson v. Hill, 42 N. J. L.
351; Vail v. Easton, etc. R. R. Co.,
44 N. J. L. 237; Sheridan v. Steven-
son, 44 N. J. L. 371; People v.
Palmer, 52 N. Y. 83; People v.
Quigg. 59 N. Y. 83; McKenna v.
Edmundstone, 91 N. Y. 231; Weller
v. Nembach, 114 N. Y. 36, 20 N. E.
623; Buffalo Cem. Ass'n v. Buffalo,
118 N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. 962; Casterton
v. Vienna, 163 N. Y. 368, 57 N. E.
622; Parker v. Elmira, etc. R. R.
Co., 165 N. Y. 274, 59 N. E. 81; People
v. Supervisors, 40 Hun, 353; People
v. Edwards, 56 Hun, 377, 10 N. Y.
S. 335; People v. Pierson, 59 Hun,
450, 13 N. Y. S. 365; Reynolds v.
Niagara Falls, 81 Hun, 353, 30 N.
Y. S. 954; Matter of Taylor, 3 App.
Div. 244, 38 N. Y. S. 348; Boechat
v. Brown, 9 App. Div. 369, 41 N. Y.
S. 467; Lewis v. Syracuse, 13 App.
Div. 587, 43 N. Y. S. 455; People v.
Keller, 31 App. Div. 248, 52 N. Y.
S. 950; People v. Keller, 35 App.
Div. 493, 54 N. Y. S. 1011; People v.
O'Grady, 46 App. Div. 213, 61 N. Y.
S. 577; Walden v. Relyea, 89 App.
Div. 241; McLaughlin v. Page, 14
Daly, 274; People v. Carson, 10
Misc. 237, 30 N. Y. S. 817; Robbins
v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131, 191; Ginn
v. Commissioners, 11 Ohio C. C.
396; State v. Commissioners, 2 Ohio
C. D. 227; Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
R. Co. v. Haynes, 8 Okl. 576, 58 Pac.
738; State v. Sturgess, 10 Ore. 58:
Omit v. Commonwealth, 21 Pa. St.
426; Dyer v. Covington, 28 Pa. St.
186; Jefferson v. Reitz, 56 Pa. St.
44; Rounds v. Waymont, 81 Pa. St.
395; Harrisburg v. Speck, 104 Pa.
St. 53; Dick's Appeal, 106 Pa. St.
589; Mallory v. Commonwealth,
115 Pa. St. 25, 7 Atl. 790; Morrison
v. Fayette County, 127 Pa. St. 110,
17 Atl. 755; Murdock's Petition,
149 Pa. St. 341, 24 Atl. 222; Bell v.
Allegheny County, 149 Pa. St. 381,
24 Atl. 209; Safe Deposit & T. Co.
v. Fricke, 152 Pa. St. 231, 25 Atl.
530; Shroder v. Lancaster, 170 Pa.
St. 136, 32 Atl. 587; Commonwealth
v. Cotton, 14 Phila. 667; Reading v.
Shepp, 2 Pa. Dist. Ct. 137; North
Towanda v. Bradford County, 2 Pa.
Dist. Ct. 517; Commonwealth v.
Angle, 3 Pa. Dist. Ct. 637; Provi-
dence v. Union R. R. Co., 12 R. I.
473; Lowrey v. Mayor, 23 R. L. 284,
49 Atl. 963; Ex parte Schmidt, 24
S. C. 363; Barnett v. Maloney, 97
Tenn. 697, 37 S. W. 689, 34 L. R. A.
541; Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co.
v. State, 95 Tex. 507, C2 S. W. 114;
special and the other general, unless they are irreconcilably
inconsistent, the latter, although latest in date, will not be
held to have repealed the former, but the special act will
prevail in its application to the subject-matter as far as
coming within its particular provisions. A special statute
providing for a particular place, or applicable to a particular
locality, is not repealed by a statute general in its terms
and application, unless the intention of the legislature to
repeal or alter the special law is manifest, although the
terms of the general act would, taken strictly and but for
the special law, include the case or cases provided for
by it." 93
In many of the cases just cited there was a general re-
peal of all inconsistent acts and parts of acts. As a gen-
Ogden City v. Hamer, 12 Utah, 337,
42 Pac. 1113; University of Utah v.
Richards, 20 Utah, 457, 59 Pac. 96, 77
Am. St. Rep. 928; Town School Dis-
trict v. School District, 72 Vt. 451,48
Atl. 697; Treby v. Marye, 100 Va. 40,
40 S. E. 126; Meade v. French, 4 Wash.
11, 29 Pac. 833; Seattle & Mont. Ry.
Co. v. O'Meara, 4 Wash. 17, 29 Pac.
835; Pierce County v. Spike, 19
Wash. 652, 53 Pac. 822; Western
Am. Co. v. St. Ann Co., 22 Wash.
158, 60 Pac. 158; Conley v. Super-
visors, 2 W. Va. 416; Mason v.
Harper's Ferry Bridge Co., 17 W.
Va. 397; Sturm v. Fleming, 31
W. Va. 701, 8 S. E. 263; Baines v.
Janesville, 100 Wis. 369, 75 N. W.
404; Harris v. Fond du Lac, 104
Wis. 44, 80 N. W. 66; Davies v.
Fairbairn, 3 How. 636, 11 L. Ed.
760; State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425,
21 L. Ed. 650; Movius v. Arthur,
95 U. S. 144, 24 L. Ed. 420; Cass
County v. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585, 25
L. Ed. 585; Kankakee County v.
Etna Life Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 668,
2 S. C. Rep. 80, 27 L. Ed. 309; Sa
vannah v. Kelly, 108 U. S. 184, 2 S.
C. Rep. 468, 27 L. Ed. 696; Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 3 S. C.
Rep. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030; United
States v. Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601,
17 S. C. Rep. 701, 41 L. Ed. 1130;
Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S.
83, 22 S. C. Rep. 582, 46 L. Ed. 816;
United States v. Nix, 189 U. S. 199,
23 S. C. Rep. 495; Conservators of
River Thames v. Hall, L. R. 3 C. P.
415; Thorpe v. Adams, L. R. 6 C.
P. 125; Queen v. Champreys, L. R. 6
C. P. 384; Mahoney v. Wright, 10
Ir. C. L. (N. S.) 420. See Red Rock
v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 1 S. C. Rep.
434, 27 L. Ed. 251.
93 People v. Pacific Imp. Co.,
130 Cal. 442, 445, 446, 62 Pac.
739. Similar expressions of opin-
ion will be found in the follow-
ing cases: Ridgeway v. Gallatin
County, 181 Ill. 521, 526, 55 N. E.
146; Moore v. Minneapolis, 43 Minn.
418, 422, 45 N. W. 719; State v.
Egan, 64 Minn. 331, 67 N. W. 77;
State v. St. Louis School Board, 131
Mo. 505, 516, 33 S. W.3; Kountze v.
|