islation may not be inconsistent with those of a new enactment, still when it is plain that it is the legislative intent to embrace the whole subject, it is well settled that what is not included in the later statute must be held to have been discarded." 62

A revising statute embracing antecedent general laws on various subjects and reducing them to one system and one text repeals all prior statutes upon the same subjects not included in the body of the revision and not exempted by an express clause.63 Where one act is framed from another, some parts taken and others omitted; or where there are two acts on the same subject, and a later embraces all the provisions of the first and also new provisions, the later act operates, without any repealing clause, as a repeal of the first. But the object of the old and the new acts must be the same.65 The fact of revision raises a presumption of a complete code, or a complete treatment of the subjects embraced in it.66

§ 271 (156). The important question in these cases is whether a later act is intended by the legislature to be a re

8 S. W. 212; Puckett v. Springfield, 97 Tenn. 264, 37 S. W. 2; Dane County v. Reindahl, 104 Wis. 302, 80 N. W. 438.

62 Camden v. Varney, 63 N. J. L. 325, 329, 43 Atl. 889 (Court of Errors and Appeals). To same effect: Dillon v. Bicknell, 116 Cal. 111, 47 Pac. 937. In People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 57 N. E. 841, the court says: "Where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain sub ject-matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to such subjectmatter and make a revision of the whole subject, there is in effect a legislative declaration, that whatever is embraced in the new stat

ute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is discarded."

63 State v. Judge, 37 La. Ann. 578; Clay Co. Sup'rs v. Chickasaw Co. Sup'rs, 64 Miss. 534; Stebbins v. State, 22 Tex. App. 32; State v. Courtney, 73 Iowa, 619, 35 N. W. 685.

64 Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 20 L Ed. 153; Mears v. Stewart, 31 Ark. 17.

65 United States v. Claffin, 97 U. S. 546, 24 L. Ed. 1082, 1085; Matter of Commissioners of Central Park, 50 N. Y. 493, 497.

66 Broaddus v. Broaddus, 10 Bush, 299; Commonwealth v. Mason, 82 Ky. 250; Jernigan v. Holden, 34 Fla. 539, 16 So. 413.

vision of the law relating to the subjects within its purview. It cannot be so intended unless it is a complete substitute for the previous law and contains the only rule or all the legislation which is intended to have force with regard to those subjects. An act which professes to be a revision, and has such scope of subject-matter that its title and profession are not illusory, should obviously so operate.67 So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed.68 Though a revision operates to repeal the laws revised whether repugnant or not, those portions that are re-enacted are continuations.69 The revision is, however, a re-enactment, and to be alone consulted to ascertain the law when its meaning is plain; but when there is irreconcilable conflict of one part with another, the part last enacted in the original form will govern.70 And when it becomes necessary to construe language used in the revision which leaves a substantial doubt of its meaning, the

67 United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 25 L. Ed. 631; Arthur v. Dodge, 101 U. S. 34, 25 L. Ed. 948; Myer v. Car Co., 102 U. S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 59; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 10 S. C. Rep. 625, 33 L. Ed. 1080; Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498, 26 L. Ed. 633; Pratt v. Street Com'rs, 139 Mass. 559, 2 N. E. 675; Broaddus v. Broaddus, 10 Bush, 299; Commonwealth v. Mason, 82 Ky. 256; Cambria Iron Co. v. Ashburn, 118 U. S. 54, 6 S. C. Rep. 920, 30 L. Ed. 60.

68 Bracken v. Smith, 39 N. J. Eq. 169; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 617, 22 L. Ed. 429; Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211; Johnston's

Estate, 33 Pa. St. 511; Herron v. Carson, 26 W. Va. 62; Rhoads v. Hoernerstown Building, etc. Ass'n, 82 Pa. St. 180; Cahall v. Citizens' Mut. B. Ass'n, 61 Ala. 232.

69 Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 406; Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 458, 17 L. Ed. 805; Mitchell v. Halsey, 15 Wend. 241; Douglas v. Douglas, 5 Hun, 140; Matter of Southworth, id. 55; Stafford v. His Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 470; State ex rel. v. Wiltz, id. 439.

70 Winn v. Jones, 6 Leigh, 74; Blackford v. Hurst, 26 Gratt. 206; Hurley v. Town of Texas, 20 Wis. 634.

original statutes may be resorted to for ascertaining that meaning. In such case the title of the original act may be considered, especially where such act is passed in a state whose constitution requires the subject to be there expressed. In Louisiana it seems to be settled that the reenactment into a code of the general provisions of prior laws does not repeal exceptions to which those general provisions were subject.73

75

§ 272. Apparent exceptions to the general rule — Effect of express repeal of inconsistent acts and parts of acts. Where the revising act prescribes its operation or effect upon a previous statute, it will have no other. Where a revising act is declared to be in aid of and supplemental to the former, the latter is continued in force as to all provis ions which are not repugnant to the new act. There is apparently some difference of opinion as to the effect of a clause in the revising act which expressly repeals all inconsistent acts and parts of acts. If the new act is intended as a revision and substitute for the former act or acts, the general rule applies, and the former act or acts are repealed in toto though they may contain parts or provisions which are not embraced in the new act and are not repugnant to its provisions. Some cases, however, hold that the insertion of such an express repealing clause implies that the acts

77

71 United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 25 L. Ed. 631; United States v. Hirsch, id. 33, 25 L. Ed. 539; Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498, 26 L Ed. 633; Myer v. Car Co., 102 U. S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 59; United States v. Lacher, 154 U. S. 624, 10 S. C. Rep. 625, 33 L. Ed. 1080.

76

N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 42 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 383.

75 People v. Harris, 123 N. Y. 70, 25 N. E. 317.

76 See ante, § 256.

77 Attorney-General v. Parsall, 100 Mich. 170. 58 N. W. 839; State v. Carron Hill Coal Co., 4 Wash.

72 Myer v. Car Co., 102 U. S. 1, 26 422, 30 Pac. 728; Baer v. Choir, 7 L. Ed. 59. Wash. 631, 32 Pac. 776, 36 Pac. 286;

73 Miller v. Mercier, 3 Martin (N. Smith v. Eau Claire, 78 Wis. 457, 47 S.), 236, 15 Am. Dec. 156. N. W. 830; The Paqueta Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 20 S. E. Rep. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320.

74 Patterson v. Tatum, 3 Sawy. 164, Fed. Cas. No. 10,830; Pursell v.

and parts of acts not inconsistent were not intended to be repealed, and consequently that they remain in force.78

An Illinois act of 1872 in regard to justices of the peace and constables, in sections 75 to 80 provided for writs of certiorari from the circuit court to justices of the peace and prescribed the procedure in such cases. In 1895 an act was passed to revise the law in regard to justices of the peace and constables, which omitted the above sections and made no provision for such writs. The new act, in several sections, recognized the right to such a writ. It was held that the sections in question were not repealed.79 An act for the organization and management of industrial schools, for the care and training of such boys and girls as might be committed to them under the act, provided that the expense of the children so committed should be borne by the county of their residence. Afterwards the act was revised and this provision was omitted and no provision made for the payment of such expense. It was held that the provision was not repealed. An act to revise and consolidate the various acts on a general subject will not repeal a particular act relating to some branch of that subject which is omitted from the revision and whose subject-matter is not covered by it. Thus, an act to revise the criminal law and containing no provisions on the subject of pools, trusts, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, was held not to repeal a particular act on that subject. So a general revision of the revenue laws was held not to repeal the inheritance tax

78 Bank of British North America v. Cahn, 79 Cal. 463, 21 Pac. 863; Johnson v. Southern Mutual B. & L. Ass'n, 97 Ga. 622, 25 S. E. 358; Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271, 22 N. W. 614; Barden v. Wells, 14 Mont. 462, 36 Pac. 1046; State v. Craig, 22 Ohio C. C. 441; State v. Pollard, 6 R. I. 290; Hurst v. Samuels, 29 S. C. 476, 7 S. E. 822; CoshMurray Co. v. Tuttich, 10 Wash.

81

449, 38 Fac. 1134; Lewis v. Stout, 22 Wis. 234; Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483, 11 S. E. Rep. 143, 34 L. Ed. 734.

79 Gibson v. Ackerman, 70 III. App. 399.

80 Wisconsin Industrial School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N. W. 422.

81 Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 108 Ky. 59, 57 S. W. 471.

82

law, nor a law imposing a privilege tax on railroads; the new law being silent on those subjects. A revision of the law in regard to local improvements was held not to repeal a provision of the former law prescribing a special limitation for the bringing of any suit to set aside or enjoin a special assessment.83

§ 273. Repeal and re-enactment-Effect of re-enactment on intermediate acts.-This subject has already been considered to some extent in a former chapter.84 Where an act is amended or revised, and the former act expressly or by implication repealed, such provisions of the old law as are substantially re-enacted are deemed to be continuous."5 "A later law which is merely a re-enactment of a former does not repeal an intermediate act which has qualified or limited the first one, but such intermediate act will be deemed to remain in force, and to qualify or modify the

82 Zickler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 104 Tenn. 277, 57 S. W. 341.

83 Kansas City v. Kimball, 60 Kan. 224, 56 Pac. 78. See also In re Assignment of Gilbert, 94 Wis. 108, 68 N. W. 863.

84 See ante, §§ 234, 238.

85 Forbes v. Board of Health, 27 Fla. 189, 9 So. 446, 26 Am. St. Rep. 63; Swan v. Kemp, 97 Md. 686; State v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S. W. 524; Sternberg v. State, 50 Neb. 127, 69 N. W. 849; S. C. on rehearing, 50 Neb. 139, 69 N. W. 853; State v. Wimpfheimer, 69 N. H. 166, 38 Atl. 786: State v. Bellamy, 120 N. C. 212, 27 S. E. 113; Robinson v. Goldsboro, 122 N. C. 211, 30 S. E. 324; Gull River Lumber Co. v. Lee, 7 N. D. 135, 73 N. W. 430; Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 246, 74 N. W. 241; Barclay v. Leas, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 314; Pratt v. Swan, 16 Utah, 483, 52 Pac. 1092; State v.

Mines, 38 W. Va. 125, 18 S. E. 470; Burns v. Hays, 44 W. Va. 503, 30 S. E. 101; Cox v. N. W. Lumber Co., 82 Wis. 141, 51 N. W. 1130; Bear Lake & Riv. W. W. & Irr. Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1, 17 S. C. Rep. 7, 41 L. Ed. 327; Julien v. Model B., L. & L. Ass'n, 116 Wis. 79, 92 N. W. 561; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal 136, 45 Pac. 1068; State v. Kates, 149 Ind. 46, 48 N. E. 365; Hancock v. District Township, 78 Iowa, 550, 43 N. W. 527; State v. Bemis, 45 Neb. 724, 64 N. W. 348; Matter of Davies, 168 N. Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118; Matter of Brundage, 31 App. Div. 348, 52 N. Y. S. 362; Mudgett v. Liebes, 14 Wash. 482, 45 Pac. 19; State v. Howe, 95 Wis. 530, 70 N. W. 670; Dennison v. Allen, 106 Mich. 295, 64 N. W. 3S; State v. Prouty, 115 Iowa, 657, 84 N. W. 670; Matter of Estate of Prine, 136 N. Y. 347, 32 N. E. 1091, 18 L. R. A. 713.