the purposes specified. A later law providing for the same tax as a former law repeals the latter. An act requiring county auditors to publish a list of lands sold for taxes, and unredeemed, was held to be repealed by a later law requir ing notice of the expiration of the period of redemption to be given to the party in whose name the land was assessed." § 264. Same-Acts relating to married women.- The statutes giving married women capacity of suing and being sued without the husband being joined repeal by implication the statutes which suspend the statute of limitations for coverture as a disability.

In Emerson v. Clayton' the court say: "By this statute a married woman must, since its enactment, be considered a feme sole in regard to her estate of every sort owned by her before marriage, or which she may acquire during coverture, in good faith, from any person not her husband, by descent, devise or otherwise, together with the rents, issues, increase and profits thereof. They designed to

make and did make a radical and thorough change in the condition of a feme covert. She is unmarried, so far as her property is concerned, and can deal with it as she pleases."

Though such acts do not purport to repeal the exemption of married women from the operation of limitation laws, they manifestly produce that result by a reasonable con

3 Tillotson v. Saginaw, 94 Mich. Smith, 50 Cal. 303; Ong v. Sumner, 240, 54 N. W. 162.

4 Commissioner of Sinking Fund v. Grainger, 98 Ky. 319, 32 S. W. 954.

5 Beumer v. Woll, 86 Minn. 294, 90 N. W. 530; Kenaston v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 59 Minn. 35, 60 N. W. 813.

6 Hayward v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 385; Castner v. Walrod, 83 id. 171; Enos v. Buckley, 94 id. 458; Geisen v. Heiderich, 104 id. 537; Brown v. Cousens, 51 Me. 301; Cameron v.

1 Cincin. Sup. Ct. 424; Ball v. Bullard, 52 Barb. 141; Hick's Estate, 7 Pa. Supr. Ct. 274. The exemption of married women in New York from the operation of the statute was re-enacted in the code after the passage of the act enabling married women to sue. See Clark v. McCann, 18 Hun, 13; Dunham v. Sage, 52 N. Y. 229; Acker v. Acker, 81 id. 143; Clarke v. Gibbons, 83 id. 107.

7 32 Ill. 493.

struction of the language used in connection with the scope, purpose and object of the statute.R

By statute as well as by the common law in Indiana prior to 1881 a husband and wife, upon a deed made to both, became neither joint tenants nor tenants in common, but were seized of the entirety, so that on the death of either the survivor took the whole; and during their lives neither could convey without the consent of the other, nor could any part of the land be taken on execution for the separate debt of either. This doctrine was not abolished or repealed by implication by the act passed in 1881, providing that "A married woman may take, acquire and hold property, real or personal, by conveyance, gift, devise or descent, or by purchase with her separate means or money; and the same, together with the rents, issues, income and profits thereof, shall be and remain her own separate property, and under her own control, the same as if she were unmarried." It was held that these laws could stand together. A married woman may well have all the personal rights conferred by the act of 1881 as to her separate property, without any interference or collision with the statutes as to entireties. When husband and wife take by entireties neither of them holds any of the property separately.9

A statute of Oregon of 1853 provided that the will of an unmarried woman should be deemed to be revoked by her subsequent marriage. It was held that this was not, repealed by a later law providing that a written will could only be revoked by another written will, or unless canceled and destroyed by the testator himself or by someone in his

8 Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171; Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. S. 674, 23 L Ed. 1005. See Hershy v. Latham, 42 Ark. 305; State v. Troutman, 72 N. C. 551; Briggs v. Smith, 83 id. 306.

9 Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 210. An act provided for extending the regular term of

the court so long as might be nec essary to finish the business pend ing therein; held not repealed by a later act containing the same provision, with some unimportant additions as to matters of detail, and a further provision authorizing special terms also. Cordell v. State, 22 Ind. 1.

presence and by his direction, as this had reference only to a revocation by some direct, affirmative act; nor by an act removing the disabilities of married women and vesting them with the complete control of their property, as if unmarried; nor by an act repealing all laws imposing civil disabilities upon the wife which were not imposed upon the husband.10 A statute limiting the husband's liability for the ante-nuptial debts and torts of the wife to the property acquired by him from his wife, in connection with a statute making the wife a feme sole so far as to enable her to carry on business on her own account, with the necessary right to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, was held not to repeal the common-law rule that the husband must be joined in a suit for a tort of the wife."

A statute which denied to a married female the right to dispose of land by will is not impliedly repealed by a subsequent statute which made it lawful for her to receive by gift, grant, devise or bequest, and to hold to her sole and separate use as if she were a single female, real and personal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, and assuring the same against her husband's disposal and his debts. The language of the statute gave her only the right to receive and hold a mere jus tenendi, not disponendi. The common law and statutory estate by the curtesy is held abolished by the statutes which assure to married women the possession and control of their separate property with the rents, issues and profits, and confer power of disposition by deed or will. A statute that married women and minors may, in their own right, make and draw deposits, and draw dividends, and give valid receipts therefor, was held not to be repealed by a later provision that all property ac

13

10 Booth's Will, 40 Ore. 154, 61 Pac. 1131, 66 Pac. 710.

13 Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60; Billings v. Baker, 28 Barb. 343. And

11 Taylor v. Pullen, 152 Mo. 434, see Hurt v. Cook, 151 Mo. 416, 52 S. 53 S. W. 1086.

12 Naylor v. Field, 29 N. J. L. 287.

W. 396.

quired after marriage by either husband or wife, with certain exceptions, should be community property.14

An act

§ 265. Same-Acts relating to the limitation of actions. Three successive acts of limitation were passed; each provided a bar to an action of assumpsit if not commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued. The second in terms repealed the first. The third was put in force without any repealing clause. A right of action run three years under the first, and three years under the second, and the action was brought after the third had been enacted; it was held that the action was barred. There was no repeal, for the acts were not inconsistent.15 of 1713 provided that when a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on error or when judgment was given against the plaintiff on motion in arrest of judgment, he or his representatives might commence a new action at any time within a year from such reversal or arrest. An act of 1895 provided that an action for wrongful injury to the person should be brought within two years from the injury, and not afterwards. This was held to repeal the earlier act so far as such actions were concerned.16 Such a statute would repeal a prior law allowing six years for the commencing of such action.17

§ 266. Same-Miscellancous cases. A road law which only goes into effect in any county on the recommendation of the grand jury is not repealed by a later law providing a different scheme, and which only goes into effect on adoption by popular vote.18 A law providing how warrants on the county treasurer should be drawn, and providing that no money should be paid out except upon warrants so drawn, was held not to be repealed by a later law, allowing jurors

14 Rowe v. Hibernia Sav. & L. Co., 190 Pa. St. 358, 42 Atl. 953. To Soc., 134 Cal. 403, 66 Pac. 569. same effect, Voight v. Gulf, etc. Ry. Co., 94 Tex. 357, 60 S. W. 658.

15 McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Ore. 31. 16 Speer v. Boggs, 204 Pa. St. 504, 54 Atl. 346.

17 Rodenbaugh v. Phila. Traction

18 McGinnis v. Ragsdale, 116 Ga. 245, 42 S. E. 492.

19

attending an inquest $1 a day, to be paid out of the county treasury on the certificate of the coroner, as both acts could apply. The repealing effect of an act cannot be enlarged by its title.20 A provision requiring the supreme court reporter to have all decisions in the hands of the publisher, if enough for a volume, within twenty days after their rendition, on penalty of removal from office, was held to be repealed by implication by a later law requiring all decisions to be reported, as compliance with both laws would be impossible. A primary election law was held to repeal the provisions of a general election law relating to nominations by party conventions." An act to provide for the organization of mutual insurance companies was held not to repeal so much of a prior act for the organization of insurance companies of various kinds as related to mutual companies.23 An act provided that every franchise or privilege to construct or operate a railroad upon any public street or highway should be granted to the highest bidder. An act going into effect one day later authorized county boards to grant franchises for all lawful purposes "upon such terms, conditions and restrictions as in their judgment may be necessary and proper." This was held not to repeal the former act as to railroad franchises granted by county boards, as there was room for both acts to operate. An act granted to the defendant company certain franchises in New York City and required it to pay certain license fees to the city. A later act granted additional privileges and provided that, if the same were accepted, it should pay a percentage on net receipts to the city. There was held to be no repeal, the payment provided for in the later statute not being exclusive.25 The grant to a telephone company to use the streets

19 Kern v. People, 44 Ill. App. 181. 20 The New York, 108 Fed. 102, 47 C. C. A. 232.

23 State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N. W. 876.

24 Thompson v. Board of Super

21 State Reporter's Case, 150 Pa. visors, 111 Cal. 553, 44 Pac. 230.

St. 550, 24 Atl. 908.

25 New York v. Dry Dock, etc. R.

22 State v. Jensen, 86 Minn. 19, 89 R. Co., 47 Hun, 199.

N. W. 1126.