reconcile the two acts. The court, by Swayne, J., said: "It is possible to reconcile the two acts. It may well be that the legislature intended to vest the title retrospectively for the purpose of giving effect to mesne conveyances and preventing frauds, without intending also to throw the burden of the costs of an action of ejectment, then pending, upon a defendant who, as the law and facts were at the commencement of the action, must have been the successful party. A stronger case than this must be presented to induce us to sanction such a result by our judgment. If the plaintiff can recover, it must be in an action brought after the 16th of February, 1857. He cannot recover upon a title acquired since the commencement of the suit." 66 In a curative act it was provided that when an instrument made in good faith and on a valuable consideration, and intended to operate as a conveyance, is placed on record in the county where the lands lie, and the paper has a defect in some statutory requisites in the acknowledgment or certificate of acknowledgment, the record shall operate as legal notice of all the rights secured by the instrument. Six years afterwards the legislature enacted an amendment to the statutes relative to deeds by adding a section prohibiting the recording of such defective conveyances. This was held not a repeal of the curative act. Repeals by implication," say the court, "are not favored, and there is certainly much room for both of these statutes to operate without conflict. Both are designed to guard and secure rights; not to impair or destroy them. And the grounds of policy for the [curative statute], as one to operate in future, were as evident [when the other was subsequently passed]; and when the legislature required registers to abstain from recording defective papers, they were well aware that such papers after all would sometimes get on record, and that important interests might be sacrificed unless some effect should be given to such records. Accepting this as a true and practical view of the matter, they allowed the [curative act] to remain and endeavored by [the other act] to lessen the occasions for its application." A Mississippi act passed in 1852 appropriated a fund derived from a certain source, then in the state treasury, to the several counties to be expended for a speci fied purpose. A portion of this appropriated fund was still in the treasury in 1857, and was largely increased by accre tions subsequently to the appropriation. The legislature, by an amendment passed the last mentioned year, not referring to the other nor specially to the money appropriated by it, directed a different use of the moneys then in the treasury. It was held possible to reconcile these acts. The portion of the fund which was in the treasury in 1852 was held still appropriated and subject to the act of that year, and that act not repealed; that the subsequent act related only to the residue; that thus the acts could stand together." - § 259. Repeal by implication — Particular acts construed Acts relating to the liquor traffic.- Two acts were passed at one session of the legislature; the first one taking effect imposed a license tax, for the state $300, and for the county $400, upon every vendor of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, doing business for one year or less, and provided that any person who should engage in the sale thereof without having paid this tax should, on conviction, be fined in double the amount of the license. The other act was to regulate for police purposes the same traffic; it prescribed a penalty of not less than two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars for clandestine sales. It was held that there was no repeal. The last act was intended to punish for occasional sales of liquor by unauthorized persons having no barrooms or regular places of business, and whose sales would be no particular detriment to the revenue; the other act applied to those who engaged in selling as a business.49 An act prohibited the sale of liquor in four counties, one of which contained a city of the fourth class. A later law authorized cities of the fourth class to prohibit, license and 47 Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich. 215. 48 McAfee v. Southern R. R. Co., 36 Miss. 669. 49 Blackwell v. State, 45 Ark. £0. regulate the liquor traffic. This was held to repeal the former law as to such city.50 A local-option law applicable to part of a county was held to be repealed by a subsequent license law applicable to the whole county." An act prohibiting the sale of liquor within five miles of specified churches was held not to repeal an act granting to a city within the five-mile limit the power to regulate the sale of liquor.52 An act similar to the former was held not to be repealed, as to a town within the prescribed limits, by the mere passage of a later act giving such town the power to license such sale; but it was held the prohibitory act would continue in force until the town acted under the power given.53 A statute of Kentucky authorized Hardin county by vote to prohibit the sale of liquor therein. The vote was taken and prohibition adopted. A later act provided that the question should be again submitted to the voters of the county and the vote taken by districts. The old act was held to remain in force until a vote was taken, and after that in such districts as voted for prohibition. An act which provides for the inspection of liquors is not repealed by an act to regulate their sale. A law against selling liquor without a license was held not to be repealed by a subsequent act which prohibited the keeping a place where liquors were received or kept for unlawful sale or use, and which also made the sale of such liquors a crime. A general law imposing a penalty for selling without a license is not repealed or affected by a later act authorizing cities of the third class to license and regulate such sale and to impose a penalty for violating the ordinances passed under 54 56 50 Brown v. Commonwealth, 98 Tabor v. Lander, 94 Ky. 237, 21 S. Ky. 652, 34 S. W. 12. W. 1056; State v. Witter, 107 N. C. 51 Yunger v. State, 78 Md. 574, 28 792, 12 S. E. 328. Atl. 404. 54 Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 52 Hart v. State, 88 Ga. 635, 15 S. 95 Ky. 326, 25 S. W. 113. E. 684. 53 Gilmore v. State, 125 Ala. 59, 28 So. 382. To same effect, State v. Snow, 117 N. C. 774, 23 S. E. 322; State v. Meek, 26 Wash. 405, 67 Pac. 76. 56 State v. McCoy, 86 Minn. 149, 90 N. W. 305. such power. A statute making it unlawful for any maker, brewer or distiller of beer or other intoxicating liquor, or other person or corporation, to sell or deliver any beer or other intoxicating liquor in the District of Columbia on Sunday, was held not to repeal a prior act which permitted hotel keepers to sell to their guests at their meals or in their rooms on Sunday.59 An act imposing a penalty on any minor over sixteen years of age, who, for the purpose of inducing any person to sell or give him liquor, represents to such person that he is twenty-one, was held not to repeal a prior act making it a misdemeanor to sell liquor to minors." 60 61 § 260. Same-Acts relating to courts, jurisdiction, practice, procedure, etc.— A subsequent statute which institutes new methods of proceeding does not, without negative words, repeal a former statute relative to procedure. The statute authorizing a proceeding to contest the validity of a will" by petition to the court of common pleas" does not repeal the provisions of the former statute authorizing a proceeding by bill in chancery. A statute which authorizes a certain oath to be taken before a particular officer is not repealed by a statute which extends the power to administer oaths to a class of officers. A statute giving a new remedy does not take away a remedy previously existing.63 A statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction of certain cases upon a particular court repeals a law giving the same jurisdiction to another court. An act requiring motions for new trials to be filed within two days after the 57 State v. Hoeffner, 9 Wash. 680, 38 Pac. 157. To same effect, State v. Carter, 28 S. C. 1, 4 S. E. 790. 58 District of Columbia v. Reut ter, 15 App. Cas. (D. C.) 237. 62 Ruckman v. Ransom, 35 N. J. L. 565. 63 Racho v. Detroit, 90 Mich. 92, 51 N. W. 360; Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 24 S. W. 1035, 41 Am. 59 State v. Gulley, 41 Ore. 318, 70 St. Rep. 673; State v. Martin, 68 Pac. 385. 60 Sharp v. Warren, 6 Price, 131; Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13. 61 Raudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 307. Vt. 93, 34 Atl. 40; Fisher v. Bald- 64 Gassenheimer v. District of Columbia, 6 App. Cas. (D. C.) 108. 65 67 verdict was held not to repeal a prior statute authorizing the court for good cause shown to enlarge the time fixed by statute for doing any act, even after the time has expired. A statute giving a mode of serving process on corporations does not repeal a prior statute providing a different mode.66 A law requiring appeals from county commissioners to be taken within twenty days is repealed by a later law allowing three months for such appeals." An act that the presiding judge, when interested, may grant a change of venue on his own motion is not repealed by an act providing for a change of venue on petition.68 A statute making parties competent witnesses was held not to repeal statutory provisions giving the chancery court power to compel a discovery in suits by judgment creditors.69 A provision that violations of the gambling act should be prosecuted by indictment was held to be repealed by a later statute, which authorized all misdemeanors to be prosecuted by information.70 A statute authorizing the chancel.lor to require the complainant to give a bond before appointing a receiver was held to repeal a prior statute which expressly made the requiring of such bond discretionary." An act provided for holding two additional terms of the circuit court of Cedar County, at El Dorado Springs, which was other than the regular place of holding the court, and provided for selecting a court-room, keeping the records, etc. A subsequent general act in regard to the holding of circuit courts provided for two terms in Cedar county at different times than those fixed for the terms at El Dorado Springs. This was held not to repeal the former act.72 65 Leavenworth v. Billings, 26 Wash. 1, 66 Pac. 107. 66 Lesser Cotton Co. v. Yates, 69 Ark. 396, 63 S. W. 997; Congdon v. Butte Consol. Ry. Co., 17 Mont. 481, 43 Pac. 629. 67 Baum v. Sweeny, 5 Wash. 32 Pac. 778. 65 Wallace v. Jameson, 179 Pa. St. 98, 36 Atl. 142. 69 McCreery v. Cobb, 93 Mich. 463, 53 N. W. 613. 70 Territory v. Cutinola, 4 N. M. 305, 14 Pac. 809. 71 David v. Levy, 119 Ala. 241, 24 So. 589. 72 State v. Stratton, 136 Mo. 423, 38 S. W. 83. |