ions of the state when considered in their governmental capacity. Classification of counties is therefore as permissible as classification of cities, and the legislature may determine what differences in situation, circumstances and needs call for a difference of class, subject to the supervision of the courts as the final interpreters of the constitution to see that it is actual classification, and not special legislation under that guise." 56 If the classification is founded on correct principles, it is no objection that a class may contain but one county at the time the act is passed. An act relating to the fees of county officers applied to counties of over 100,000 population and not more than 185,000, of which there was only The act was assailed on the ground particularly that it did not include all counties over 100,000. But the court held it could not say that there was no ground for a distinction and sustained the act.58 An act regulating fees of county officers except in counties containing more than one. 56 Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. St. 213, 218, 35 Atl. 199. 57 People v. Onahan, 170 Ill. 449, 48 N. E. 1003; Stone v. Wilson, 19 Ky. L. R. 126, 39 S. W. 49; State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 75 N. W. 8; State v. Berkeley, 64 S. C. 194, 41 S. E. 961; Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 65 N. W. 871. 58 State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 75 N. W. 8. The court says: "The only thing that could cast any possible doubt on the propriety of the basis adopted in this act is the fact that it excludes from the class counties having more than 185,000 inhabitants. is urged that this is an arbitrary classification, not founded upon any apparent natural reason suggested by a difference between the situation and circumstances of the counties included and those ex It cluded from the class, or which suggests the necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to them. The subject of classification by population is so largely a matter of policy, and the considerations which enter into it are so numerous and complex, that the legislature must necessarily be allowed a large discretion in the matter; and the courts ought not to hold a statute invalid or special legislation unless it appears, very clearly, that the basis of classification adopted is purely arbitrary. We cannot say that there may not be some natural reason, founded on a difference in situation and circumstances, why counties having over 185,000 inhabitants should be excluded from the class, as well as those having less than 100.000, or why counties having a population 150,000 inhabitants or less than 10,000 was held to be not classification but a mere exclusion of certain counties and void.59 An act applicable to counties having a population of from 35,190 to 35,200 was held evasive and special. 63 Classification by population has been held proper for the purpose of regulating the fees and compensation of county officers,1 for regulating the manner of selecting jurors,“ for preventing stock from running at large, for regulating the manner of assessing property for taxation," providing for laying out and regulating the public roads, and for the administration of county affairs.66 An act providing for the Torrens system of registering land titles, applicable only to counties having over 75,000 inhabitants, was held valid. between those limits should not have different legislation in respect to salaries of county officers." 59 Morrison v. Backert, 112 Pa. St. 322, 5 Atl. 739. 60 Hixon v. Burson, 54 Ohio St. 470. 43 N. E. 1000. To same effect, Owen County Com'rs v. Spangler, 159 Ind. 575, 65 N. E. 743. 61 Stone v. Wilson, 19 Ky. L. R. 126, 39 S. W. 49; State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 75 N. W. 8; State v. Frank, 60 Neb. 327, 83 N. W. 74; State v. Frank, 61 Neb. 679. 85 N. W. 956; Hudson County v. Clarke, 65 N. J. L. 271, 47 Atl. 478; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 18 Phila. 646; Morrison v. Bachert, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 153; Minnehaha County v. Thorne, 6 S. D. 449. 61 N. W. 688. 62 People v. Onahan, 170 Ill. 449, 48 N. E. 1003; Dunne v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 131 Mo. 1, 32 S. W. 641; Coombs Commission Co. v. Block, 130 Mo. 668, 32 S. W. 1139; Sherwood v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 132 Mo. 339, 33 S. W. 774; State v. Slover, 134 Mo. 607, 36 S. W. 50; State v. Berkeley, 64 S. C. 194, 41 S. 65 E. 961. In the last case the act was applicable to counties having a city of 40,000 inhabitants. 63 Peterson v. State, 104 Tenn. 127, 56 S. W. 834. 64 Burton Stock Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 Ill. 10. 58 N. E. 418. 65 Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 65 S. W. 871. 66 Mortland v. State, 52 N. J. L. 521, 20 Atl. 673; Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. St. 213, 35 Atl. 199. 67 State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571. The court says: "We are of the opinion that the facts that the larg est cities of the state are within the limits of the classified counties, that the platted portions thereof embrace a greater number of subdivisions and parcels of land than the less densely populated portions of the state, that the individual owners of the land are more numerous, the value thereof much greater, and that the records of the evidence of the titles thereto rapidly increase in volume and become more complex with the in An act to provide for the treatment of indigent inebriates at the public expense in counties of 50,000 population or more was held special and void.68 Counties may be classified according to assessed valuation for the purpose of regu lating the fees of county officers.69 An act on a subject of a general nature which applies to one county only, or which excludes one or more counties from its operation, is local and special and void.70 The fees and compensation of county officers is held to be a subject of a general nature," and so is the erection of county buildings. It is held that an act is not rendered special or 72 crease of population, whereby the risks of defective titles, and expenses for abstracts thereof, and the delays and difficulties in transferring real estate, are proportionately increased, were proper for the consideration of the legislature in determining whether there was a practical necessity or propriety for the classification in question and justify it." p. 440. 68 Murray v. County Com'rs, 81 Minn. 359, 84 N. W. 103, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379, 51 L. R. A. 828. 69 Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 16 S. C. Rep. 890, 40 L. Ed. 1069. Such classification is expressly authorized by the constitution of Wyoming. Guthrie v. Converse County, 7 Wyo. 95, 50 Pac. 229. In this case it was held that when a county changed its class during an official's incumbency his salary did not change. 70 Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356, 68 S. W. 72; Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91. 35 Pac. 833; State v. Bergen County, 52 N. J. L. 302, 19 Atl. 718; Matter of Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, 50 N. E. 61, 42 L. R. A. 132; Mott v. Hubbard, 59 Ohio St. 199, 53 N. E. 47; State v. Brown, 60 Ohio St. 462, 54 N. E. 525; Commonwealth v. Carey, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 293; Nance v. Anderson County, 60 S. C. 501, 39 S. E. 5; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L. R. A. 589; Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Forest County, 95 Wis. 80, 70 N. W.77; Adams v. Smith, 6 Dak. 94, 50 N. W. 720; State v. Otis, 68 N. J. L. 64, 52 Atl. 305; State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St. 90. 23 N. E. 931, 21 Am. St. Rep. 772; Commissioners v. Rosch Bros., 50 Ohio St. 103, 33 N. E. 408, 40 Am. St. Rep. 653; Silberman v. Hay, 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 N. E. 258; Matter of Roberg, 18 Ohio C. C. 367; U. S. Mort. & T. Co. v. Wood, 19 Ohio C. C. 358. 71 State v. Krost, 140 Ind. 41, 39 N. E. 46; State v. Board of Com'rs, 140 Ind. 506, 40 N. E. 113; State v. Yates, 66 Ohio St. 546, 64 N. E. 570 (overruling Pearson v. Stephens, 56 Ohio St. 126, 46 N. E. 511); State v. Garver, 60 Ohio St. 555, 64 N. E. 573; Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N. W. 131, 53 L. R. A. 635. See State v. Garver, 13 Ohio C. D. 140. 72 State v. Brown, 60 Ohio St. 462, 54 N. E. 525. local because it provides that it shall not apply to counties where the subject-matter is regulated by prior special acts." 74 The following acts were held not local or special: An act permitting a higher rate of taxation for road purposes in counties having an assessed valuation of $15,000,000 or over and also having more than one hundred and fifty miles of macadamized and graveled roads; " an act in regard to the construction of highways and bridges and limited to counties adjoining a city of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants;" an act to provide for the acquisition of certain rights in freshwater lakes and in adjoining lands for public use and limited to counties containing a lake of one hundred acres area or over; an act relating to poor relief by counties which excepted cities from its operation and thereby excepted a county co-extensive with a city;" an act organizing certain new counties and giving the first county commissioners a longer term than was provided by the general law. But in case of the act last referred to, a provision limiting the rate of taxation as to such new counties was held special and void." 76 The constitution of California provides for a division of counties into classes, according to population, for the purpose of fixing the fees and compensation of county officers.80 It is held, construing the provision, that it is mandatory, that such classification must be made as a condition to valid legislation on the subject, that it rests with 73 Mattox v. Knox, 96 Ga. 403, 23 S. E. 307; Cheltenham Township Road, 140 Pa. St. 136, 21 Atl. 238. See Stewart v. Collier, 91 Ga. 117, 17 S. E. 279. 81 77 Rose v. Beaver County, 204 Pa. St. 372, 54 Atl. 263. 78 Spencer v. Griffith, 74 Minn. 55, 76 N. W. 1018. See Schweiss v. District Court, 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 74 State v. Arnold, 136 Mo. 446, 38 289, 34 L. R. A. 602. S. W. 79. 79 State v. Walker, 83 Minn. 295, 75 Treanor v. Eichhorn, 74 Hun, 86 N. W. 104. 58, 26 N. Y. S. 314. 76 Albright v. Sussex Co. Lake & Park Commission, 68 N. J. L. 523, 53 Atl. 612. 80 Art. XI, sec. 5; Cody v. Murphy, 89 Cal. 522, 26 Pac. 1081. 81 Dwyer v. Parker, 115 Cal. 544, 47 Pac. 372; Knight v. Martin, 128 Cal. 245, 60 Pac. 849. 82 the legislature to say how many classes there shall be, and that legislation upon other subjects for the classes so established is unauthorized and void. Some officers may be compensated by fees and others by a salary, without violating the rule of uniformity. The legislature must fix the salary and not delegate it to the county boards.85 84 86 An act provided that hospitals established in cities of 20,000 inhabitants or more should receive from the county a certain sum for the support of poor patients under treatment in such hospitals. The act was held to make an arbitrary classification of counties for the purpose of imposing such liability and to be void. Where an act was so framed as to require administration to be granted under certain conditions in counties of 200,000 population to the public administrator and in all other counties under the same conditions to the widow or next of kin, it was held that the classification had no reasonable relation to the purpose of the act and that it was special legislation and void.87 The administration of estates is a subject of a general nature. and laws in relation thereto must be of uniform operation.88 Hence a law providing for the appointment of certain corporations as administrators, executors, etc., and applicable only to certain counties, is unconstitutional.69 § 218. Schools, school districts and school affairs.- In Ohio it is held that the creation of school districts is a sub 82 Summerland v. Bicknell, 111 Cal. 567, 44 Pac. 232. 83 San Luis Obispo Co. v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71, 23 Pac. 1032; Welsh v. Bramlett, 98 Cal. 219, 33 Pac. 66: Walser v. Austin, 104 Cal. 128, 37 Pac. 869; Bloss v. Lewis, 109 Cal. 493, 41 Pac. 1081; Marsh v. Hanley, 111 Cal. 368, 43 Pac. 975; Hale v. McGettigan, 114 Cal. 112, 45 Pac. 1049; San Francisco v. Broderick, 125 Cal. 188, 57 Pac. 887; Pratt v. Brown, 135 Cal. 649, 67 Pac. 1082. |