state commissioner of public roads a fixed salary instead of a per diem, and limited the expense connected with his office. It was held to be a general law because there was no other office with like characteristics and it formed a class by itself. "The case turns, therefore," says the court, 'upon the classifiability, for the purposes of legislation, of the object of the present law. This is a question of fact. The law is entirely clear that if an object be susceptible of classification it cannot be legislated for separately. Correlatively, it is equally clear that an object that is not susceptible of classification is not, on that account, placed beyond the pale of legislative control." "9 An Illinois act authorized any board of park commissioners, upon certain conditions, to take control of any city street for the purpose of connecting any park under its control with any part of any city, town or village. There was but a single city having parks under the control of park commissioners, and consequently only one city where it could operate. It was held not local or special.40 Additional cases of the same purport are referred to in the margin." An act which designates a particular city or county by name, or by a description so qualified that a particular city or county is plainly intended, and that no other can reasonably be expected to have the distinguishing characteristics, and whose operation is limited to such city or county, is held to be local or special."2 act: "Although it deals with the lands of the state under tide water only in certain localities, the mat ters which it regulates are of general, not local, concern. The lands themselves belong to the people of the state, not to the citizens of the counties where they are located." p. 189. a single city had such parks, an act general in its application to all cities would be local or special leg islation, no valid act could be passed affecting such existing parks." p. 176. 41 Trausch v. Cook County, 147 Ill. 534, 35 N. E. 477; State v. Stratton. 136 Mo. 423, 38 S. W. 83; Trea 39 Budd v. Hancock, 66 N. J. L. nor v. Eichhorn, 74 Hun, 58, 26 N. 133, 48 Atl. 1023. 40 West Chicago Park Com'rs v. McMullen, 134 Ill. 170, 25 N. E. 676, 10 L. R. A. 215. "If because only Y. S. 314; Condon v. Maloney, 108 A unique condition of things, existing in a single city and arising out of prior valid special laws, enacted when the constitution did not forbid such legislation, and which cannot arise again under existing constitutional provisions, may make a case constituting a class by itself and be dealt with by appropriate legislation applicable expressly to such condition.43 § 216 (120). Evasive classification - Examples.— In respect to the enumerated subjects as to which legislation is required to be general, and special acts prohibited, though such subjects may be divided into classes distinguished by substantial differences for the purpose of legislation appropriate to such conditions as spring from these differences, there must nevertheless be a limit to such division, even founded on substantial differences. Within certain limits subjects may be grouped on the basis of such differences for general legislation; beyond those limits such differences would not be the basis of classification, but the ground of segregation by which each individual would be distinguished for special enactments." The prohibition is in the way of Milwaukee, 98 Wis. 128. 73 N. W. 1018; State v. Smith, 48 Ohio St. 211, 31 N. E. 743; Mott v. Hubbard, 59 Ohio St. 199, 53 N. E. 47; Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N. E. 594: State v. Cowles, 64 Ohio St. 162, 59 N. E. 895; Blankenburg v. Block, 200 Pa. St. 629, 50 Atl. 198. 43 State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150. The facts of this case are stated ante, § 196. A parallel case existed in Philadelphia and was decided differently, but the decision was also put upon other grounds. Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 539, 27 Atl. 356; Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554, 27 Atl. 356. 44 Devine v. Board of Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590; Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125; 45 legislation for individual cases. It is equally fatal to such legislation though it be general in form. If a statute is plainly intended for a particular case, and looks to no broader application in the future, it is special or local, and, if such laws are prohibited on the subject to which it relates, is unconstitutional. The lineaments by which such cases are to be distinguished are usually so special that a law confined thereto would be anticipated to have no effect from the antecedent improbability of such a case arising. When, therefore, it is found to fit such a special case, it is deemed to have been enacted solely for it.47 An act came in question which gave the right to file a mechanic's lien in certain cases, but contained a proviso excluding from its operation counties having a population of over two hundred thousand inhabitants. It was held void as a local and special law, and therefore within the constitutional inhibition of such laws "authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens." 48 The classification of counties by population and the passage of laws applicable to a certain class only have within reasonable limits and for some purposes been admitted upon the assumption that counties having a small population may ultimately have one visors, 67 Iowa, 199, 25 N. W. 128, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 223; Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 24 Am. Rep. 421; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381. See Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 242; Earle v. Board of Education, id. 489. 45 Nevil v. Clifford, 63 Wis. 435, 24 N. W. 65; Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68; Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125; Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill. 267. 46 State ex rel. v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592; State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340; McCarthy v. Common wealth, 110 Pa. St. 243, 2 Atl. 423, 14 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 271; Hammer v. State, 44 N. J. L. 667; Devine v. Board of Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377; Commonwealth v. Patten, 88 Pa. St. 258; Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill. 267; Hallock v. Hollingshead, 49 N. J. L. 64; Hudson Co. Freeholders v. Buck, id. 228, 7 Atl. 860; State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735; Adams v. Smith, 6 Dak. 94, 50 N. W. 720;. Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4 Pac. 800; State v. Downs, 60 Kan. 788, 57 Pac. 962; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L. R. A. 589. 47 Id. 48 Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377. much larger. In the case under consideration, however, two counties had, at the time the law in question was passed, a greater population than two hundred thousand. As it could not be assumed that their population would ever fall below that limit they were permanently excluded from the operation of the act. The court say: "It was not then a general act. It did apply to a great number of counties; but there is no dividing line between a local and a general statute. It must be either one or the other. If it apply to the whole state, it is general. If to a part, it is local. As a legal principle it is as effectually local when it applies to sixty-five counties out of sixty-seven as if it applied to one county only. The exclusion of a single county from the operation of the act makes it local." 50 Where an act provided exceptionally for the holding of courts in all counties of more than sixty thousand inhabitants, adding restrictively, "in which there shall be any city incorporated, at the time of the passage of this act, with a population exceeding three thousand inhabitants, situate at a distance from the county seat of more than twenty-seven miles by the usually traveled road," the court held the act local; that it applied and was intended to apply to only one county. A law to authorize the taking of public burial places for school purposes, which was so hedged about and qualified by conditions as to evidently be intended to fit one particular place and which could in any event apply to but few, was held special and void.52 An act of Wisconsin to authorize the building of viaducts across gullies, running streams or railroad tracks by the counties of the state, and the issuing of county bonds therefor, conferred the authority upon all counties, but pro 49 Post, § 217. 50 Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125; Devine v. Board of Commissioners. 84 Ill. 590; McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. St. 243; Matter of Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, 50 N. E. 61, 42 L. R. A. 132. 51 51 Commonwealth v. Patten, 88 Pa. St. 258; State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340; Weinman v. Wilkinsburg, etc. Ry. Co., 118 Pa. St. 192, 12 Atl. 288. 52 York School District's Appeal, 169 Pa. St. 70, 32 Atl. 92. vided that the viaduct should not be less than one thousand feet long, sixty feet wide and eighteen feet high, and should cost not less than $80,000, and the bonds should not exceed one-fifth of one per cent. of the taxable property of the county. By reason of these limitations the act could only apply in Milwaukee county and was held void. So of an act authorizing counties, which had entered into a contract for building a court-bouse, incurred obligations thereunder prior to the passage of the act and had expended at least $7,000 thereunder, to issue bonds to an amount not exceeding $35,000, to meet such obligations." $217. Classification of counties and legislation in respect thereto.-Counties may be classified according to population on the same principles as apply to municipalities for the purpose of legislation having a necessary relation to population. The supreme court of Pennsylvania, after referring to the principles applicable to the classification of cities, says: "The same principle must make classification constitutional as to the other political and municipal divis 53 Wagner v Milwaukee County, 112 Wis. 601, 88 N. W. 577. 54 Hetland v. County Commissioners, 89 Minn. 492, 95 N. W. 305. 55 People v. Onahan, 170 Ill. 449, 48 N. E. 1003; Burton Stock Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 Ill. 10. 58 N. E. 418; Koester v. Board of Com'rs, 44 Kan. 141, 24 Pac. 65; Stone v. Wilson, 19 Ky. L. R. 126, 39 S. W. 49; State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 75 N. W.8; Murray v. Board of County Com'rs. 81 Minn. 359, 84 N. W. 103, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379, 51 L. R. A. 828; State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571; Dunne v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 131 Mo. 1, 32 S. W. 641; Coombs Commission Co. v. Block, 130 Mo. 668, 32 S. W. 1139; Sherwood v. Grand Ave. Ry Co., 132 Mo. 339, 33 S. W. 774; State v. Slover, 134 Mo. 607, 36 S. W. 50; State v. Frank, 60 Neb. 327, 83 N. W. 74; State v. Frank, 61 Neb. 679, 85 N. W. 956; Mortland v. State, 52 N. J. L. 521, 20 Atl. 673; State v. Taylor, 68 N. J. L. 276, 53 Atl. 392; People v. Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528, 52 N. E. 572, 43 L. R. A. 247; Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. St. 213, 35 Atl. 199; Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 Pa. St. 171, 35 Atl. 632; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 18 Phila. 646; Morrison v. Bachert, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 153; State v. Berkeley, 64 S. C. 194. 41 S. E. 961; Minnehaha County v. Thorne, 6 S. D. 449, 61 N. W. 688: Peterson v. State, 104 Tenn. 127, 56 S. W. 834; Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 65 S. W. 871. |