tion, limited to a class of municipalities, is held to be special and void. An act which permitted the formation of companies to construct and maintain sewerage systems, on consent of one-half the owners of real estate in the municipality and the consent of the municipality, was amended so as to permit such companies to operate in cities of the third class on consent of the municipality alone. The amendment was held special and void. The same ruling was made upon an act which permitted cities of the second class to defray the cost of repaving streets by an issue of bonds to be paid by a general tax.70 The following acts, limited in operation to a class of cities, were held valid: For the regulation of undertakers;" for the regulation of junk and second-hand dealers; respecting licenses; " fixing the number of school directors and providing for their election;" for dividing cities into wards and election districts; " establishing a police court; " authorizing an extension of boundaries; " authorizing the issue of bonds to refund indebtedness; to establish an excise department; " regulating the liquor traffic; 50 relating 79 68 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604; Waln v. Beverley, 55 N. J. L. 544, 26 Atl. 709; WyoIning Street, 137 Pa. St. 494, 21 Atl. 74; Pittsburgh's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Atl. 761. 69 State v. Plainfield, 54 N. J. L 529, 24 Atl. 494. 70 Foley v. Hoboken, 61 N. J. L 478, 38 Atl. 833. 75 80 76 75 State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L 298, 30 Atl. 543; State v. Atlantic City, 56 N. J. L. 232, 28 Atl. 427. 76 State v. Caminade, 55 N. J. L 4, 25 Atl. 933; State v. Wescott, 55 N. J. L. 78, 25 Atl. 269. 77 Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417, 29 S. W. 281. 78 Waite v. Santa Cruz, 75 Fed. 967; Waite v. Santa Cruz, 89 Fed. 71 Commonwealth v. Hanley, 15 619. Pa. Supr. Ct. 271. 79 McArdle v. Jersey City, 66 N. 72 Commonwealth v. Mintz, 19 Pa. J. L. 590, 49 Atl. 1013, 88 Am. St. Supr. Ct. 283. 73 Johnson v. Asbury Park, 58 N. J. L. 604. 33 Atl. 850; S. C., affirmed, 60 N. J. L. 427, 39 Atl. 693. Rep. 496; State v. Guttenberg. 62 N. J. L. 605, 43 Atl. 703; S. C., affirmed, 63 N. J. L. 616, 44 Atl. 758. 80 State v. Glenn, 47 N. J. L. 105; 74 State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 State v. Staats, 54 N. J. L. 286, 23 82 to the use of streets by railroad companies; 81 exempting cities of the first class from giving bond in case of appeal; providing for disincorporation.s 86 84 On the other hand the following acts, limited in like manner, were held local, or special and void, because of the limitation: Relating to the collection of debts and enforcing of judgments; 4 limiting the time for commencing suit in certain cases; 85 requiring fire-escapes on certain classes of buildings; relating to liens and the collection of debts; $7 providing a special mode for the construction and repair of high school buildings; 88 providing for the collection of taxes of all kinds; providing for a board of equalization and assessment for purposes of taxation; " regulating the manner of receiving and paying fees for official services and designed to protect the municipality from loss; " relating to notaries; fixing the term of office of clerk and collector of taxes; fixing the punishment for election frauds; "forbidding the establishment of a cemetery within one mile of the city limits, the drainage of which is into a stream from 92 93 89 81 Burlington v. Penn. R. R. Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 259, 38 Atl. 849; S. C., affirmed, Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Burlington, 58 N. J. Eq. 547, 43 Atl. 700. 90 91 87 Philadelphia v. Haddington, 115 Pa. St. 291, 8 Atl. 241; Philadelphia v. Pepper, 18 Phila. 419. 88 State v. Trenton, 61 N. J. L. 484, 40 Atl. 442; S. C., affirmed, 62 82 McClay v. Lincoln, 32 Neb. 412, N. J. L. 795, 44 Atl. 755. 49 N. W. 282. 89 Van Loon v. Engle, 171 Pa. St. 83 Mintzer v. Schilling, 117 Cal. 157, 33 Atl. 77. 361, 49 Pac. 209. 90 Gaylor v. Hubbard, 56 Ohio 84 Betz v. Philadelphia, 19 Phila. St. 25, 46 N. E. 66. But see In re 452. 85 Gorley v. Louisville, 104 Ky. 372, 47 S. W. 263; Louisville v. Kuntz, 104 Ky. 584, 47 S. W. 592; Louisville v. Hegan, 20 Ky. L. R. 1532, 49 S. W. 532. 86 Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284, 43 N. E. 490. Contra, Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 9 Ohio C. C. 178. Sewer Assessment for Passaic, 54 91 Rauer v. Williams, 118 Cal. 401, 50 Pac. 691. 92 State v. Hermann, 75 Mo. 340. 93 Canfield v. Davies, 61 N. J. L 26, 39 Atl. 357. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600, 94 State v. which a water supply is obtained; providing for the protection of life and property." § 212. Municipalities under special charters.- An act providing in substance that all cities and towns theretofore incorporated under special acts and charters, and which did not then possess the power to sell personal and real property for taxes, should thereafter have and possess such power, was held general and constitutional. Though it did not apply to all cities and towns in the state, it was not therefore unconstitutional; other cities and towns possessed that power, and the act in question brought the class to which it applied into harmony with them. As the act applied to all cities and towns in the state falling within the class specified, not to make an exceptional rule, but to remove an exception, it was not local or special, but of uniform operation.97 Whether municipalities under special charters may constitute a class for legislative purposes is a question upon which there seems to be a difference of opinion. In New Jersey it is held that a classification of cities. based upon previous local legislation is vicious. The court says: "The recognition of such local legislation by relying upon it as a foundation for new legislation which only changes, perpetuates or perhaps increases the previous local or special features created by special charters, is as inimical to the constitutional provision as if the last legislation created the diversity which it perpetuates."" The contrary has been held in Wisconsin. A statute permitting any city or 95 Philadelphia v. Westminster Cem. Co., 162 Pa. St. 105, 29 Atl. 349. 96 State v. Ketler, 65 Ohio St. 558, 63 N. E. 1135. 97 Haskel v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232; Iowa Land Co. v. Soper, 39 id. 112; Bumsted v. Govern, 47 N. J. L. 368, 1 Atl. 835; affirmed, 48 id. 612, 9 Atl. 577. See also State v. Sullivan, 62 Minn. 283, 64 N. W. 813. 98 State v. New Brunswick, 47 N. J. L. 479, 1 Atl. 496; State v. Dor 98 land, 56 N. J. L. 364, 28 Atl. 599; State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 83, 30 Atl. 186; Grey v. Union, 67 N. J. L. 363, 51 Atl. 482. 99 State v. New Brunswick, 47 N. J. L. 479, 484, 485, 1 Atl. 496. 1 Johnson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis 383, 60 N. W. 270; Appleton W. W. Co. v. Appleton, 116 Wis. 363, 93 N. W. 262; Schintgen v. La Crosse, 117 Wis. 158. ganized under a special charter to adopt and be governed by any section or part of the general law was held valid.2 An act which in effect adopts and perpetuates the provision of special charters, and which is dependent upon them for its meaning and effect, is special and void. In one of the cases cited an act, applicable to cities of over 100,000 and not exceeding 165,000 population, authorized the common council to fix the salaries of all city officers and employees, but provided that it should not fix a greater sum than was then paid for such purposes. The only city embraced by the act was under a special charter and the cities that might come into the class were also under special charters. The act was held special because the maximum could only be ascertained by reference to the charter, and, if other cities came into the class, each might have a different maximum.* An act which permitted municipalities organized under special charters to adopt the general law and retain certain provisions of their charters relating to liquor licenses was held void as an attempt to create a class of municipalities not founded on any valid distinctions." § 213. Other classification of municipalities or for municipal purposes.- Cities abutting on the ocean may constitute a class for certain purposes. An act legalizing the 2 Adams v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363, special laws. A general law can81 N. W. 869, 47 L. R. A. 441. 3 Alexander v. Duluth, 57 Minn. 47, 58 N. W. 866; Bowe v. St. Paul, 70 Minn. 341, 73 N. W. 184; State v. Johnson. 77 Minn. 453, 80 N. W. 620. Compare State v. Minor, 79 Minn. 201, 81 N. W. 912. 4 Bowe v. St. Paul, 70 Minn. 341, 73 N. W. 184. The court says: "It must appear that the act will always, by the force of its own terms, continue to be a general law. Again, this act might become special in its operation and effect by the future repeal of some of these not be based on special laws, even though its operation is general when passed, if the legislature by the future repeal of any or all of the special laws may render the so-called general law special in its operation and effect. The act cannot be constitutional to-day and unconstitutional to-morrow. If it may in the future become unconstitutional it is so when passed." 5 People v. Normal, 170 Ill. 468, 48 N. E. 901. 6 State v. Wright, 54 N. J. L. 130 23 Atl. 116. incorporation of towns or cities which have attempted to organize under an invalid law is valid. Such communities constitute a class for such purposes. An act dividing townships into two classes according to density of population, those having three hundred or more to the square mile forming one class and all others a second class, was held valid.' Townships containing unincorporated villages of a certain population were held to constitute a distinct class for receiving additional powers. An act provided that, in townships which contained a city of eight hundred or more population, the part outside the city might organize as a school district. The act was held special because it excluded townships containing an incorporated town or village having the same population.10 An act that in cities where the of fice of treasurer was for an indefinite term the council should have power to fix a definite term, not exceeding five years, was held special and void." An act in regard to local improvements was held special and void because it applied only to municipalities governed by commissioners.12 Boroughs may not be classified according to the manner in which licenses are granted therein.13 An act fixing the term of office of city physician at three years in all cities. 7 State v. Thief River Falls, 76 Minn. 15, 78 N. W. 867; Winneconne v. Winneconne, 111 Wis. 13, 86 N. W. 590; Pullman v. Hungate, 8 Wash. 519, 36 Pac. 483. In the latter case the court says: "The fact that the inhabitants of a certain locality, by their own action, have assumed to act in a particular capacity distinguished from that of the people at large, so separates them as a class from the rest of the people of the state that the legis lature may properly deal therewith in a different manner than with the rest of the people without its action being special legislation." See Denver v. Spokane Falls, 7 8 Commonwealth v. Blackley, 198 Pa. St. 372, 47 Atl. 1104; Philadel phia & R. Coal & I. Co.'s Petition, 200 Pa. St. 352, 49 Atl. 797. 9 Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 291, 40 N. W. 482. 10 Plummer v. Borsheim, 8 N. D. 565, 80 N. W. 690. 11 Uffert v. Vogt, 65 N. J. L. 377, 47 Atl. 225; S. C. affirmed, 65 N. J. L. 621, 48 Atl. 574. 12 State v. Long Branch Com'rs, 59 N. J. L. 146, 36 Atl. 482. 13 State v. Hoover, 58 N. J. L. 334, 33 Atl. 217. |