acts confined in their operation to one or more of these classes will be valid. But it is held that the legislature is not confined to the classes so established, but that it may in each act establish a new and different class, appropriate to the particular act. Thus an act to provide for the construction of water-works in municipalities of not more than 15,000 inhabitants, nor less than 500, was held valid. So of acts relating to cities of the second class having 50,000 inhabitants or more, or to all cities having a population of 55,000 to 100,000. This would seem to open the door to any number of overlapping or interlacing classes, and to an infinite diversity of organization and powers. 36 35 34 It also appears that there have long existed in this state municipalities under the names, respectively, of cities, boroughs, towns, townships and villages, and that the existence of municipalities under these different names is recognized in the constitution. In the later cases, soon to be cited, they are referred to as common-law classes of municipalities. There is no uniformity as to the structure and powers of those under one name, but towns with substantially the same charters are sometimes called cities and sometimes boroughs, towns or villages. The latter are generally smaller and have a less complicated government, but not always. It is held by the highest court "that, as incorporated cities, boroughs, towns and villages, as well as townships, are recognized by the constitution as classes for legislation, laws limited to either of such classes will not violate 33 In re Haynes, 54 N. J. L. 6, 22 Atl. 923; In re Sewer Assessment for Passaic, 54 N. J. L. 156, 23 Atl. 517; State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 298, 30 Atl. 543; McArdle v. Jersey City, 66 N. J. L. 590, 49 Atl. 1013, 88 Am. St. Rep. 496. 34 State v. Moore, 54 N. J. L. 121, 22 Atl. 993. 35 State v. Caminade, 55 N. J. L 4, 25 Atl. 933; State v. Gibson, 55 N. J. L. 11, 25 Atl. 935; State v. Delaney, 55 N. J. L. 9, 25 Atl. 936; State v. Ridgeway, 55 N. J. L. 10, 25 Atl. 936; State v. Wescott, 55 N. J. L. 78, 25 Atl. 269; State v. Fury, 55 N. J. L. 1, 25 Atl. 934. 36 State v. Kremer, 62 N. J. L 483, 41 Atl. 711. the prohibition of private, local or special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties." 37 3 208. Same-Ohio.- Classification based upon substantial differences in population, and so defined as to include cities which afterwards attain the requisite population, are valid.38 Originally municipalities were divided into five classes, three of cities and two of villages. But as time went on the classes were increased until they became very numerous, and the eleven largest cities were provided for in as many different classes. At last this classification was cut up by the roots by the supreme court, which held that it was not based upon differences of population or upon any other real or supposed differences in local requirements. "Its real basis," says the court, "is found in the differing views or interests of those who promote legislation for the different municipalities of the state." 39 The court further says in the case referred to: "The body of legislation relating to this subject shows the legislative intent to substitute isolation for classification, so that all the municipalities of the state which are large enough to attract attention shall be denied the protection intended to be afforded by this section of the constitution. The provisions of the section could not be more clear or imperative, and relief from the present confusion of municipal acts and the burdens which they impose would not be afforded by its amendment. Since we cannot hold that legislative power is in its nature illimitable, we must conclude that this provision of the paramount law annuls the 37 Hermann v. Guttenberg, 63 N. J. L. 616, 623, 44 Atl. 758, affirming S. C., 62 N. J. L. 605, 43 Atl. 703. To same effect, State v. Wright, 54 N. J. L. 130, 23 Atl. 116; State v. Asbury Park, 58 N. J. L. 604, 33 Atl. 850; Drew v. West Orange, 64 N. J. L. 481, 45 Atl. 787: Flock v. Smith, 65 N. J. L. 224, 47 Atl. 442; Allison v. Crocker, 67 N. J. L. 596, 52 Atl. 362. 38 State v. Baker, 55 Ohio St. 1, 44 N. E. 516; State v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N. E. 424, 90 Am. St. Rep. 592. 39 State v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N. E. 424, 90 Am. St. Rep. 592; State v. Beacon, 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N. E. 427, 90 Am. St. Rep. 599. acts relating to Cleveland and Toledo, if they confer corporate power." The acts in question were conceded to confer corporate power, and were held void. 40 Laws making a class of all cities between certain narrow limits of population, such as all cities of the fourth grade, second class, having not less than 5,550 and not more than 5,560 inhabitants, are evasive and void. An act relating to elections, which applied to cities of certain classes but excepted Mansfield and cities of the fourth grade in the first class, was held to be local and special by reason of the exception. An act authorized any city of the third grade of the first class to construct and repair bridges over any navigable river in the city. Toledo was the only one of the class which had such a river and the only city to which it could apply. It was held special and void.12 43 § 209. Same- Pennsylvania.-The constitution of 1873 forbade the passage of local or special laws "regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts," or "incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters." In 1874 the legislature passed a classification act, declaring that "for the exercise of certain corporate powers, and having respect to the number, character, powers and duties of certain officers thereof, the cities now in existence or hereafter to be created in this commonwealth are divided into three classes." The first embraced all having 300,000 population or more, the second, all having 100,000 and less than 300,000, and the third, all under 100,000. A scheme of government was provided for each class but the act did not operate upon existing cities until adopted by them. At the time the act was passed Philadelphia constituted the first class and Pittsburgh the second. This act and its classification have been 40 Kenton v. State, 52 Ohio St. 59, 38 N. E. 885; Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 53 Ohio St. 356, 41 N. E. 690; Carr v. Carrollton, 8 Ohio C. C. 1. 41 State v. Buckley, 60 Ohio St. 273, 54 N. E. 272. 42 Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N. E. 594. 43 Art. 3, sec. 7. sustained in numerous cases.44 In 1876 the classes were increased to five, and in 1887 to seven. In Ayars v. Westfield,45 these acts were held to be an evasion of the constitution and void. After reviewing cases the court says: "Some of the cases above cited have been quoted at considerable length for the purpose of showing that this court never intended to sanction classification as a pretext for local or special legislation. On the contrary, the underlying principle of all the cases is that classification with the view of legislating for either class separately is essentially unconstitutional unless a necessity therefor exists; a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each class separately that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws enacted in pursuance of such classification, and for such purposes, are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They are general laws, because they apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities. All legislation is necessarily based on a classification of its subjects, and when such classification is fairly made, laws enacted in conformity thereto cannot be properly characterized as either local or special." And referring to the act of 1874 the court further says: "As to the number of classes created, that act appears to have covered the entire ground of classification. It provided for all existing as well as every conceivable prospective necessity. It is impossible to suggest any legislation that has or may hereafter become necessary for any member of either class, that cannot without detriment to other members of the same class be made applicable to all of them. If classification had stopped where the act of 1874 left it, it would have been well, but 44 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401. 45 122 Pa. St. 266, 16 Atl. 366, 2 L. R. A. 577. Also Lackawana Tp. v. Harris Tp., 160 Pa. St. 494, 28 Atl 927; Commonwealth v. Hanley, 15 Pa. Supr. Ct. 271; Commonwealth v. Mintz, 19 Pa. Supr. Ct. 283. it did not. Without the slightest foundation in necessity the number of classes was soon increased to five, and afterwards to seven; and, if the vicious principle on which this was done be recognized by the courts, the number may at any time be further increased until it equals the number of cities in the commonwealth. The only possible purpose of such classification is evasion of the constitutional limitation; and, as such, it ought to be unhesitatingly condemned." The necessity for classification and the extent thereof, and whether a law is local or special, are held to be judicial questions. Acts not relating to municipal purposes are invalid if limited in their operation to a class of cities.46 An act relating to the collection of taxes of all kinds, municipal and otherwise, and limited in its operation to cities of the third class, was held local and special. The court says: "Classi fication has been upheld for municipal purposes only. Legis lation for a class of cities is only general and valid under our constitution when it relates to some municipal purpose. If it does not affect the exercise of some municipal power, or the number, character, powers and duties of municipal officers, or the regulation of some subject within the appropriate range of municipal control, the legislation is local and unconstitutional." So long as the classes are not made so numerous as to be evasive of the constitution, it is for the legislature to say where the lines shall be drawn and what differences shall exist between the schemes of government for the several classes.48 The act of 1874, heretofore referred to, provided that 46 Ruan St. Opening, 132 Pa. St. 257, 19 Atl. 219, 7 L. R. A. 193; Wyoming St., 137 Pa. St. 494, 21 Atl. 74; Pittsburgh's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Atl. 761; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Fricke, 152 Pa. St. 231, 25 Atl. 530; McKay v. Trainor, 152 Pa. St. 242, 25 Atl. 534; Philadelphia v. Pepper, 18 Phila. 47 Van Loon v. Engle, 171 Pa. St. 48 Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. St. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 85 Am. St. |