The test is, not wisdom, but good faith in the classification." 93 It is manifest from the foregoing discussion that the subject is a difficult one, and that opinions will frequently differ as to the character of a particular act. In many cases the court is divided and dissenting opinions are filed. In giving the opinion of the court in one such case in the supreme court of the United States, Mr. Justice Brewer says: "While cases on either side and far away from the dividing line are easy of disposition, the difficulty arises as the stat 93 Seabolt v. Commonwealth, 187 Pa. St. 318. 323, 41 Atl. 22. The question of classification is particularly discussed in the following cases: Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N. E. 663, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103, 47 L. R. A. 802; Union Savings Bank & T. Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 34 S. E. 217; Simard v. Sullivan, 71 Minn. 517, 74 N. W. 280; State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 75 N. W. 8; Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 486, 84 N. W. 6; Ballard v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677; Dunne v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 131 Mo. 1, 32 S. W. 641; Owen v. Baer, 154 Mo. 434, 55 S. W. 644; State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735; Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970, 14 L. R. A. 725; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L. R. A. 589; Clark v. Finley, 93 Tex. 171, 54 S. W. 343; Julien v. Model B. L. & I. Ass'n, 116 Wis. 79, 92 N. W. 561. In the latter case the court says: "Legislative discretion to classify persons for the purposes of legislation is substantially the same under the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution as under the state constitutional provision prohibiting special legislation. The rules on the subject which generally prevail, and which have received the sanction of this court, are as follows: (1) All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. (2) The classifi cation adopted must be germane to the purposes of the law. (3) The classification must not be based upon existing conditions only; it must not be so constituted as to prevent additions to the number included within the class. (4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof. Whether any particular classification made by the legislature satisfies those requisites is primarily a legislative question. The field covered by its discretionary power in the matter is very broad. It is, of course, not above judicial control, but is safe from restraint so long as any reasonable ground can be discovered to support it. The court can apply no test to the matter except a constitutional test. That of the mere wisdom of the measure is exclusively for legisla tive consideration." ute in question comes near the line of separation. Is the classification prescribed thereby purely arbitrary, or has it some basis in that which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished? It is not at all to be wondered at that as these doubtful cases come before this court the justices have often divided in opinion. To some the statute presented seemed a mere arbitrary selection; to others it appeared that there was some reasonable basis of classification." 94 § 204. Classification of municipalities according to population - California.- In this state the constitution permits of the classification of cities for the purpose of incorporation and organization, and it is held that this classification must be made by a general law, and that subsequent legislation must have reference to the classification so made. The supreme court says: "I think it was intended that the classification there authorized was to be by a general law in the same sense and in the same way in which it was necessary to provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and towns. Legislation in regard to such corporations would thereafter be made by reference to the classes thus made. The special authority to thus classify cities and towns would also seem、 to imply that they cannot be otherwise classified for purposes of legislation. If they may be, and new classes created whenever it is desired by any one to procure legislation which shall apply to only a few cities of the class, the limitations of the constitution, so carefully made, and so often repeated, can be easily defeated. "I think a law made in conformity with this special permission in the constitution must be a law classifying all cities in the state, or a law amendatory of such a law. It must leave all the municipal corporations classified." 95 94 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 105, 19 S. C. Rep. 609, 43 L. Ed. 909. 95 Darcy v. San Jose. 104 Cal. 642, 38 Pac. 500. This case has been ap proved in Denman v. Broderick, 111 Cal. 96, 43 Pac. 516, and Ex parte Giambonini, 117 Cal. 573, 49 Pac. 733. A general classification law to be valid must be based upor substantial differences of population, such as may rationally be deemed to call for, or at least to justify, diversity of or ganization.96 In the cases cited it is held that laws which make new classes for particular purposes connected with the organization of the municipality are void, but that new classes may be made for other purposes, if the classification is reasonable and appropriate to the purpose of the act. A law applicable to cities of the fifth and sixth classes of municipalities and regulating the mode of exercising the eminent domain power was held special and void, because this is not a part of municipal organization and may be regulated by general laws applicable to all alike.98 § 205. Same- Minnesota.-Municipalities may be classified in this state according to population where there is a natural connection between the subject-matter of the proposed legislation and the number of inhabitants.99 In 1899 the constitution was amended so as to divide cities into classes according to population and to authorize the legis lature to pass general laws relating to municipal affairs and to limit their application to one class only.1 This amendment was held not to repeal prior provisions in regard to special legislation, but simply to permit legislation confined to one of the classes without regard to any relation between the subject-matter of the law and the number of inhabitants.2 $206. Same-Missouri.-The constitution of 1875 contains the following: "The general assembly shall provide, by general laws, for the organization and classification of 96 Id. Electric & W. Co., 74 Minn. 180, 77 97 Rauer v. Williams, 118 Cal. 401, N. W. 180. 50 Pac. 691. 98 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604. 99 State v. District Court. 61 Minn. 542, 64 N. W. 190; McCormick v. West Duluth, 47 Minn. 272, 50 N. W. 128; Flynn v. Little Falls 1 Const., art. 4, sec. 36. 2 Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623. See generally, State v. Johnson, 77 Minn. 453, 80 N. W. 620; State v. Minor, 79 Minn. 201, 81 N. W. 912. cities and towns. The number of such classes shall not exceed four; and the power of each class shall be defined by general laws, so that all such municipal corporations of the same class shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions." Pursuant to this provision the legislature divided the cities and towns into four classes, as follows: 1. Those having a population of 100,000 or over; 2. Those having 30,000 to 100,000; 3. Those having 3,000 to 30,000; 4. Those having 500 to 3,000. The constitution also made provision by which St. Louis was authorized to frame its own charter, and also provided that all cities of 100,000 population might frame and adopt their own charters. These provisions were held in effect to make two additional classes." Acts relating to St. Louis by name have been held valid. 3 Art. 9, sec. 7. 4 Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479, 27 S. W. 711. 5 Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189, 52 S. W. 723. The court says: "Again, we think it is plain that the framers of the constitution ex vi termini excluded from its legislative classification the city of St. Louis, which it expressly authorized to adopt its own scheme and charter, and all such cities as it authorized by section 16, article IX, to frame and adopt their own charters. These cities constitute two constitutional classes distinct from those chartered and classified by the legislature." "It follows that the legislature may legislate directly for these constitutional cities without infringing the constitution, and in legis lating therefor it does not create a new class but simply provides for a class created by the constitution. Having expressly provided for these constitutional cities, and having also provided in section 15 of the schedule of the constitution, that the general assembly shall pass such laws as may be necessary to carry this constitution into full effect,' it has become a settled rule of decision in this court that no law can be either local or special within the meaning of the constitution which has for its object and purpose the carrying out of the constitutional command. It was. and is apparent that these exceptional cities were not to be left without necessary legislation to govern them with respect to their relations and obligations to the state at large. As to subjects which bear upon their relation to the state government the general assembly can by general law provide for their government." p. 204. 6 State v. Walton, 69 Mo. 556; Kenefick v. St. Louis, 127 Mo. 1, 29 S. W. 838; Walser v. Wear, 128 So acts have been sustained which were limited in their operation to cities of 100,000 or 300,000 inhabitants, St. Louis being the only one; but others limited in like manner have been held invalid. As there would seem to be some conflict in these decisions, they are referred to more in detail. The following were held valid, either as general laws or as in compliance with a command of the constitution: An act to provide for official stenographers in criminal courts having jurisdiction of felony in cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more; an act fixing the number of directors in public school boards and providing for their election; an act to provide for a board of police commissioners and the appointment and government of a police force; an act to provide for the registration of voters; 10 an act to provide for the elec tion, jurisdiction and compensation of justices of the peace."1 On the other hand the following were held to be local or special and void: An act in relation to notaries; 12 an act re Mo. 652, 31 S. W. 37. In the case first cited an act to divide St. Louis into districts and to provide for the election of justices of the peace therein was held valid, and the court says: "While the act in question, when viewed simply with reference to the territory in which it is to operate, may in strictness be classed as a local law, yet when it is considered that other provisions of the constitution have so separated the city of St. Louis from other territorial divisions of the state as to give it an organization different from that of any county or other city, thus necessitating legislation applicable to it alone and which cannot be made applicable by a general law, we are forced to the conclusion that the act of 1877, providing for the election of justices of the peace in said city, is not such a local law as 9 8 falls within the prohibitions of sections 53 and 54, supra." pp. 558, 559. 7 State v. Wofford, 121 Mo. 61, 25 S. W. 851. The ground is thus stated: "A statute applicable to all cities of a certain population is a general law when it prescribes a rule for future government in all such cities as may, in the course of time, reach the requisite popula tion, and is not restricted by its provisions to a state of facts then existing, and not applicable to any other city which may in future attain that population." pp. 68, 69. 8 State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677. 9 State v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S. W. 524. 10 State v. Mason, 155 Mo. 486, 55 S. W. 636. 11 State v. Higgins, 125 Mo. 364, 28 S. W. 638.` 12 State v. Herrman, 75 Mo. 340. |