So the question is to be determined not from the title but the body of the act. An act was entitled "An act to make the register of deeds' office of Milwaukee county a salaried office." The body of the act, as construed by the court, applied to all counties having a population of 150,000 or upwards, and was held to be a general act, though the title indicated it was local and special.68

§ 201. Acts whose operation is dependent upon local adoption Effect of limit of time for adoption.— An act, which is otherwise general, is not rendered local or special by a provision that it should only operate in such local subdivisions, municipal or other public corporations, as may adopt it by popular vote or otherwise.69 But it seems manifest that such a rule must lead to diversity, and some courts hold such acts void for that reason, when they relate to a subject as to which special legislation is prohibited. A Pennsylvania statute of 1874 divided all cities into three classes and provided a scheme of government for each class. A supplementary act of 1889, applicable to cities of the third class, provided a method for the control and maintenance of schools, different from the act of 1874, but it was not to apply to any city of the third class theretofore or

68 Verges v. Milwaukee County, 116 Wis. 191, 93 N. W. 44.

69 People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229; People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175; Brown v. Holland, 97 Ky. 249, 30 S. W. 629; Maysville & Lexington T. Road Co. v. Wiggins, 104 Ky. 540, 47 S. W. 434; State v. Copeland, 66 Minn. 315, 69 N. W. 27, 61 Am. St. Rep. 410; Lum v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 950, 18 So. 476; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W. 469; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo. 44, 9 S. W. 10; State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78, 16 S. W. 937; State v. Wingfield, 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. 363; In re Petition of Cleve land, 52 N. J. L. 188, 19 Atl. 17, 7 L.

R. A. 431; State v. Hudson County, 52 N. J. L. 398, 20 Atl. 255; Lloyd v. Dollisin, 13 Ohio C. D. 571; Adam v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363, 81 N. W. 869, 47 L. R. A. 441. See contra, Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172, 22 Atl. 820.

70 Owen v. Baer, 154 Mo. 434, 55 S. W. 644; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 137 Pa. St. 389, 20 Atl. 1011; Ward v. Boyd Paving & C. Co., 79 Fed. 390; Boyd Paving & C. Co. v. Ward, 85 Fed. 27, 28 C. C. A. 667. And see Meredith v. Perth Amboy, 60 N. J. L. 134, 36 Atl. 779; State v. Copeland, 66 Minn. 315, 69 N. W. 27, 61 Am. St. Rep. 410.

ganized unless adopted in the manner provided. The supreme court held that the act was void and say: "If the act of 1889 is sustained, we are liable to have cities of the third class: (1) By special charter as before; (2) by special charter and under the act of 1889; (3) under the general act of 1874; and (4) under the acts of 1874 and 1889. Another such statute would double these possibilities, and each succeeding similar enactment would double the possibilities then existing. This diversity, thus increasing in a geometrical ratio, would result in a confusion and disorder with which the evils of undisguised special legislation cannot be compared. In order to procure special legislation upon any subject relating to the government of cities, it would only be necessary to procure the passage of a law, general in form, with the specific and special features desired, with a provision that it should apply only to such cities as might accept it; and it would be possible, in this form of legislation, for each city in the third class in the state to have, to some extent, its own peculiar system, with like effect as if enacted by special law.” 71

The courts which uphold the validity of such acts also hold that, when the time for adoption is limited, the act is thereby rendered special and void. An act of New Jersey provided that a district court should be established in every city of the state having a population of twenty thousand or less, which should, by resolution of its city council, adopt the act within three months from the date of its passage. The court of errors and appeals held that the limitation rendered the act special and void and said: "After the expiration of the three months the law remains, but applicable only to those cities of the class indicated that have adopted it. Its benefit is denied to then existing cities. whose necessity may at any time after the three months have demanded, or may hereafter demand, a district court, and as well to all cities that may have come into being after the expiration of the three months' limitation or may here

71 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 137 Pa. St. 389, 404, 405, 20 Atl. 1011.

after come into being. The effect of the limitation is a restriction of the class to which the law may be applied. It has not been suggested, and it is not perceived, that the restriction has any reasonable relation to the purpose of the enactment. On the contrary, it is impossible to consider the restrictive clause without feeling that it is illusive. To sustain it as a proper basis of classification in the present case would be to overthrow the principle so often enunciated in our courts, that it must be a characteristic which in some reasonable degree, at least, will justify the restriction, and not that alone, but also to encourage a course of legislation that could, in effect, be used to nullify the constitutional provision considered, for if the limit be three months, why not, as well, three days or three hours? " 72

In another case in the same state an act relating to county boards was not to apply in any county unless adopted by popular vote, nor unless certain steps for its submission were taken within twenty-two days after its passage. In holding the act to be special and void the court suggests a general rule, "that if the legislature selects a group of places for the possible operation of a statute, and makes its actual operation, in any member of the group, conditional upon the expression therein of a sentiment favorable to the statute, such expression becomes a substantial element in the basis of classification, and the class must be kept open for the admission of any member of the group wherein the sentiment shall at any time be appropriately expressed." 73 Similar rulings have been made where the adoption was to be made at the next municipal election after the passage of the act,74 or within one year after its passage. But where an act was only to operate in such counties as should adopt it by popular vote and required that it should be submitted at the next election for local officers, it was held that the pro

72 De Hart v. Atlantic City, 63 N.

J. L. 223, 43 Atl. 742.

73 State v. Holmes, 68 N. J. L. 192, 197, 53 Atl. 76.

74 Christie v. Bayonne, 64 N. J.

L. 181, 44 Atl. 887.

75 Ross v. Passaic City, 64 N. J. L 488, 45 Atl. 817.

vision as to time of submission was directory and the act valid.76

Enabling acts or acts conferring powers are not special because, practically, they may be availed of or acted upon in some localities and not in others." But here again the right to avail of the act must not be limited in time. Thus an act to provide for the annexation of territory to cities of the second class, of which there were ten, contained a provision that it should not apply to cities of less than six thousand inhabitants, and contained other provisions the effect of which was that the act could not be availed of unless a certain notice was given within fourteen days after the passage of the act, nor unless the annexation was completed within fifty-eight days after such passage. The act was held special and void.78 But it is held that such limitation of time is valid in a remedial act passed to relieve certain existing and temporary conditions.79

§ 202. Class legislation. The provision that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation does not alone prevent special legislation, except where, upon a subject of general concern, it would have the effect to make unjust discriminations between people or places in the same condition and circumstances; in other words, have the effect to grant to certain persons or classes privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, are not made available to all, or which impose liabilities and burdens upon some but not upon all in the same class or condition. Legislation

76 Albright v. Sussex Co. Lake & Park Commission, 68 N. J. L. 523, 53 Atl. 612.

77 Hellman v. Shoalters, 114 Cal. 136, 45 Pac. 1068; State v. King, 37 Iowa, 462; Zumstein v. Mullen, 67 Ohio St. 382, 66 N. E. 140; Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Appeal, 164 Pa. St. 44, 30 Atl. 210; Middletown Road, 15 Pa. Supr. 167; Jermyn v. Scranton, 186 Pa. St. 595, 40 Atl. 972.

78 Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4 Pac. 800. And see Burnham v. Milwaukee, 98 Wis. 128, 73 N. W. 1018.

79 Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623; State v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91 N. W. 18. And see State v. Guttenberg, 62 N. J. L. 605, 43 Atl. 703; Herman v. Guttenberg. 63 N. J. L. 616, 44 Atl. 758.

80 In McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St.

of the latter description is known as "class legislation." st In most cases, whether an act is a general law or not depends upon a question of classification. So whether an act is class legislation or not depends upon a question of classi