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suant to the provisions of the constitution to "secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state," were laws of a general nature; that if the constitution declares a given subject for legislation to be one of a general nature, all laws in relation thereto must have a uniform operation. The court expressed some diffidence in laying down any general rule for determining subjects for legislation of a general nature, but suggested as such marriage and divorce, and the descent and distribution of estates, and others of like common and general interest to all the citizens of the state. Two provisions, however, were said to be settled: 1. That the general form of a statute is not the criterion by which its general nature is to be determined. 2. That whether a law be of a general nature or not depends upon the character of its subject-matter.49 It was admitted that on subjects concerning which uniformity was required, judicious classification and discrimination between classes were admissible. In State v. Brown,50 the same. court says: "If it is not true that all subjects are general which may be completely comprehended within legislation which operates uniformly throughout the state, it would be difficult indeed, and hitherto it seems to have been impossi ble, to state any other rule which would be consistent with the language employed by those who framed these and kindred limitations upon the exercise of legislative power, and with the purposes for which those limitations were fixed. The language employed does not suggest, if indeed it permits, a narrower rule." Taxation for county purposes is a subject of a general nature and a law relating thereto must be of uniform operation throughout the state.51

§ 198 (124). The uniform operation of laws of a general nature. Where the subject-matter of an act is of a general

48 Art. 6, sec. 2.

49 Citing Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 272; McGill v. State, 34 id. 228. 50 60 Ohio St. 462, 469, 54 N. E. 525. To same effect, State v. Spell

mire, 67 Ohio St. 77, 82, 65 N. E. 619.

51 Pump v. Lucas County, 69 Ohio St. 448.

nature, and a law deals with it by provisions which are designed for the whole state, and every part thereof, such act has a uniform operation throughout the state though the condition and circumstances of the state may be such as not to give the act any actual or practical operation in every part.52 The purpose of this provision requiring a uniform operation of general laws is satisfied when a statute has the same operation in all parts of the state under the same circumstances and conditions. The number of persons upon whom the law shall have any direct effect may be very few by reason of the subject to which it relates, but it must operate equally and uniformly upon all brought within the relations and circumstances for which it provides.54

"The uniform operation required by this provision," says the supreme court of North Dakota, "does not mean universal operation. A general law may be constitutional and yet operate in fact only on a very limited number of persons, or things, or within a limited territory. But, so far as it is operative, its burdens and its benefits must bear alike upon all persons and things upon which it does operate; and the statute must contain no provision that would exclude or impede this uniform operation upon all citizens, or all subjects and places, within the state, provided they were brought within the relations and circumstances specified in the act." 55

52 Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479; In re De Vaucene, 31 How. Pr. 337; Gilson v. Board of Com'rs, 128 Ind. 65, 27 N. E. 235, 11 L. R. A. 835; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 1062, 15 L. R. A. 505; Lloyd v. Dollison, 13 Ohio C. D. 571.

53 Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547; Heanley v. State, 74 Ind. 99; Elder v. State, 96 id. 162; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.

54 People ex rel. v. Wright, 70 Ill. 398; People ex rel. v. Cooper, 83 id. 585.

55 Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. D. 310, 341, 51 N. W. 836. In State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 98, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L. R. A. 317, the court says: "This section of the constitution requires that laws of a general nature shall have not only an operation, but a uniform opera tion, throughout the state: that is, the whole state, and not only in one or more counties. The operation must be uniform upon the subjectmatter of the statute. It cannot operate upon the named subject in one part of the state differently

In Indiana local laws in regard to fees and salaries are forbidden, and general laws required on that and other enumerated subjects, as well as upon all subjects on which general laws could be made applicable; and these were required to have a uniform operation throughout the state. An act gave certain officers different salaries and made such difference depend on the question of population. This legislation was held to be neither local nor special; it operates uniformly and alike in all parts of the state under like facts. It gives the same increase of compensation in all counties where there is the same excess of population.56

In Tennessee there are constitutional provisions in a different form, which, by judicial construction, forbid partial laws; and, as part of the law of the land, require that general and public laws shall be equally binding upon every member of the community." This requirement is satisfied if an act extends to and embraces all persons who are or who may come into the like situation and circumstances.5 The requirement of general laws, and that they have a uniform operation, is an implied prohibition of special or local laws; so the express prohibition of local or special laws is an implied requirement that legislation shall be general.

from what it operates upon it in other parts of the state. That is, the law must operate uniformly upon the named subject-matter in every part of the state, and when it does that it complies with this section of the constitution."

56 Hanlon v. Board of Commissioners, 53 Ind. 123; State v. Reitz, 62 id. 159; Clem v. State, 33 id. 418. 57 State v. Burnett, 6 Heisk. 186; Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 260; Memphis v. Fisher, 9 Baxt. 239; Paducah & M. R. R. Co. v. Stovall, 12 Heisk. 1; McKinney v. Memphis Overton Hotel Co., 12 Heisk. 104; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483, 39

Am. Dec. 189; Sheppard v. Johnson, 2 Humph. 296; Pope v. Phiter, 3 Heisk. 701; Brown v. Haywood, 4 id. 357; Burkholtz v. State, 16 Lea, 71; Caruthers v. Andrews, 2 Cold. 378; Woodard v. Brian, 14 Lea, 520; Daly v. State, 13 id. 228; McCallie v. Chattanooga, 3 Head, 321; Hazen v. Union Bank, 1 Sneed, 115; Burton v. School Commissioners. Meigs. 589; Taylor, McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349; Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S. W. 401. See art. XI, sec. 8, of Const. Tenn.

58 Mayor, etc. v. Dearmon. 2 Sneed. 121; Davis v. State, 3 Lea, 376: State v. Rauscher, 1 id. 96.

Individual cases of the enumerated class cannot be provided for. These are converse forms of similar constitutional reg. ulation. The principal discussion, however, has occurred on the varied inhibitions of special or local enactment.

§ 199 (127). Special and local laws.-Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class re quiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and cir cumstances; local laws are special as to place." When prohibited they are severally objectionable for not extending to the whole subject to which their provisions would be equally applicable, and thus permitting a diversity of laws relating to the same subject. The object of the prohibition of special or local laws is to prevent this diversity. Each subject as to which such laws are prohibited is by such inhi bition designated as a subject of only general legislation which shall have a uniform operation. Generality in scope and uniformity of operation are both essential. A law which embraces a whole subject would still be special if not framed to have a uniform operation.]

"Every subject of legislation," says the supreme court of Ohio, "is either of a general nature on the one hand, or local and special on the other. It cannot be in its nature both general and special, because the two are inconsistent." 60

$ 200. Whether act general or special - General principles-Not a question of form. It seems impossible to fix any definite rule by which to solve the question whether a law is local or general, and it has been found expedient to leave the matter to a considerable extent open, to be determined upon the special circumstances of each case.' "If its operation and effect must necessarily be special, the act is special, whatever may be its form. If, on the other hand, the act has room within its terms to operate upon all

59 State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Territory v. School District, 10 Okl. 556, 64 Pac. 241.

60 State v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77, 81, 65 N. E. 619. To same effect,

99 61

Fitzgerald v. Phelps & B. Windmill
Co., 42 W. Va. 570, 26 S. E. 315.

61 Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954; Bruch v. Colombet, 104 Cal. 347, 352, 38 Pac. 45.

63

of a class of things, present and prospective, and not merely upon one particular thing, or upon a particular class of things existing at the time of its passage, the act is general." That the question is not one of form is expressly held as necessarily implied in all the cases, and, if this were not so, then the constitution could be easily evaded" by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes."64 But while in most of the adjudicated cases the laws under consideration were general in form, but were assailed as special in fact, yet in some cases laws special in form have been held to be general in fact, and the test is the same in both cases.6 65

The question must be determined from the act itself and from facts of which the court will take judicial notice. An act requiring every electric street car to be provided with a screen for the protection of the motorman was claimed to be special because it did not apply to all street cars, but the court held otherwise and refused to hear evidence to show that there was the same need of protection on one kind as on another.67 The court says: "While a statute must stand or fall by its operation, rather than by its mere form, yet in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, a court can judge of its operation only through facts of which it can take judicial notice. A court cannot take testimony to determine the operation of a statute, and thereby declare it unconstitutional. Neither can a court judicially know that a cable car, or a horse car, is so constructed and operated as to require the same means of protection for the operatives as is required on electric cars."

62 Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, leans, 49 La. Ann. 114, 21 So. 179; 436, 4 Pac. 800.

63 Duffy v. New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 114, 21 So. 179; State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L. R. A. 317.

64 State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340. 65 State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540,

58 N. W. 150; Duffy v. New Or

Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 27
N. E. 954; Verges v. Milwaukee
County, 116 Wis. 191, 93 N. W. 44.
And see post, § 215.

66 Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771.

67 State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L. R. A. 317.

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