upon whom or which it purports to take effect, and that it shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.34 In a still later case 5 that court said: "The constitution has not undertaken to declare that all laws shall have a uniform operation. Uniformity in that respect is made requisite only in case the law itself be one of a general nature. The nature of a given statute, as being general or special, must depend in a measure upon the legis lative purpose discernible in its enactment. We must not say that a statute, plainly special in its scope, must either have a uniform operation or not operate at all, for this were to add another to the limitations which the constitution has imposed upon the legislative power, and to hold in effect that no special act could be passed at all, at least if uniform' operation means universal operation.36 Nor are we to say that a special statute - special in its aims and in the object it has in view—is by mere construction to be converted into a general statute, because the subject with which it deals might have been made the subject of a general law. It is obvious that every law upon a general subject is not per se, nor by constitutional intendment, necessarily of a general nature. The subject may be general, but the law and the rule it prescribes may be special. Fees of officers, for instance, constitute a general subject, one which pervades the length and breadth of the state, and extends into every political subdivision of which it is composed; yet a statute may prescribe what these fees of office shall be in a particular county. And may declare that they shall differ from fees established for the same official duties performed in another county. Such a law would not be a law

37

34 French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 544; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 375. 35 People v. C. P. R. R. Co., 43 Cal. 432.

36 The provision requiring uniformity in the California constitution of 1849 is that "all laws of a

general nature shall have a uniform operation." Art. 1, sec. 11. The words “throughout the state” are omitted.

37 State ex rel. v. Judges, etc., 21 Ohio St. 1.

of a general nature involving the constitutional necessity of uniform operation; but it would be a special law upon a general subject.38

§ 196. The question has received very careful consideration in a recent case in Minnesota. In 1887 the legislature of that state passed an act creating a commission to purchase certain land in Minneapolis and to erect thereon a court-house and city hall, to issue bonds therefor and to apportion the cost between the city and county. In 1892 the constitution was amended so as to forbid special legislation in general and in particular cases, and among others regulating the affairs of any county, city, etc. In 1893 an act was passed "to provide additional means for completing and furnishing the court-house and city hall building now in process of erection in the city of Minneapolis and to authorize the issue and sale of bonds therefor." The act covered the ground indicated by the title. In a suit involving its validity, it was conceded that the act was special, but it was claimed that it did not regulate county or city affairs. The court held otherwise. On rehearing the court held the act to be a general law; that the working out of the act of 1887 had produced a unique condition of things, which existed nowhere else and could not come into existence again under the constitution; that "no legislation more general in fact than the act of 1893 would fully meet the case," and that "if that act had been general in form, it could not be made more general in fact, and still cover the situation." In discussing the general principles applicable, the court says: "The line of demarcation between general and special laws often seems indefinite and difficult to draw; but, if the principles upon which the distinction rests are kept in mind, the difficulty is not nearly so great as it might seem. A law is general in the constitutional sense, which applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places or things requiring legislation peculiar to itself in matters covered by the law; while a special law is

38 Ryan v. Johnson, 5 Cal. 86.

one which relates and applies to particular members of a class, either particularized by the express terms of the act or separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be applicable." 39

Some further definitions by the courts of what constitutes a general law are here given: "A law, therefore, is a general law, within the meaning of the constitution, when it operates in every part of the state upon every person or transaction embraced within its terms." 40 "If the law is general, and uniform in its operation upon all persons in like circumstances, it is general in a constitutional sense, but it must operate equally and uniformly upon all brought within the relation and circumstances for which it provides. On the other hand, if it is limited to a particular branch or designated portion of such persons, it is special. Although general in its character, a law may, from the nature of the case, extend only to particular classes, such as minors, married women, laborers, bankers or common carriers. Such a law is not obnoxious to the provisions of the constitution if all persons of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions, but it is not a proper application of the definition to say that a law is general because it applies uniformly to all persons in the conditions and circumstances for which it provides, although only a particular branch of a class or some particular description of persons. If an act should attempt to confer privileges only on persons of a certain stature it could be said to apply uniformly to all people answering such description, and yet it would be absurd to say that such a law would be a general one. The classification must be so general as to bring within its limits all those who are in substan

39 State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 549, 58 N. W. 150. A case quite similar in its facts arose in Pennsylvania and was differently decided. Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156

Pa. St. 539, 27 Atl. 356; Perkins v.

Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554, 27
Atl. 356.

40 Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 618, 34 S. E. 217.

tially the same situation or circumstance." 41 "A law is special in the constitutional sense when, by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would operate. The test of a special law is the appropriateness of its provision to the objects that it excludes. It is not, therefore, what a law includes that makes it special, but what it excludes. If nothing be excluded that should be contained the law is general. Within this distinction between a special and a general law the question in every case is whether an appropriate object is excluded to which the law, but for the limitations, would apply. If the only limitation contained in a law is a legitimate classification of its objects it is a general law. Hence, if the object of a law have characteristics so distinct as reasonably to form for the purpose legislated upon a class by itself, the law is general, notwithstanding it operates upon a single object only; for a law is not general because it operates upon every person in the state, but because every person that can be brought within its predicament becomes subject to its operation." 42 "A general law,' as the term is used in this constitutional provision, is a public law of universal interest to the people of the state, and embracing within its provisions all the citizens of the state, or all of a certain class or certain classes of citizens. It must relate to persons and things as a class, and not to particular persons or things of a class. It must embrace the whole subject, or a whole class, and must not be restricted to any particular locality within the state."" Additional cases deemed especially instructive on the question of general and special laws are referred to in the margin. "A special act cannot be converted into a gen

44

41 Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 51 N. E. 872.

44 Holt v. Mayor, 111 Ala. 369, 19 So. 735; Southern Express Co. v. 42 Budd v. Hancock, 66 N. J. L. Mayor, etc., 132 Ala. 326, 31 So. 460; 133, 135, 136, 48 Atl. 1023.

43 Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. D. 310, 341, 51 N. W. 386.

Gilson v. Board of Com'rs, 128 Ind. 65. 27 N. E. 235, 11 L. R. A. 835; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harliss, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 1062, 15

eral act by a declaration of the legislature that it shall be so considered." 45

§ 197. What are laws of a general nature.-Laws of a general nature are such as relate to a subject of a general nature, and a subject of a general nature is one that exists or may exist throughout the state, or which affects the people of the state generally, or in which the people generally have an interest. The supreme court of Ohio says: "But how are we to determine whether a given subject is of a general nature? One way is this: if the subject does or may exist in, and affect the people of, every county in the state, it is of a general nature. On the contrary, if the subject cannot exist in or affect the people of every county, it is local or special. A subject-matter of such general nature can be regulated and legislated upon by general laws having a uniform operation throughout the state, and a subjectmatter which cannot exist in or affect the people of every county cannot be regulated by general laws having a uniform operation throughout the state, because a law cannot operate where there can be no subject-matter to be operated upon.'

99 46

47

In State v. Powers, the court held that laws regulating the organization and management of common schools, pur

L. R. A. 505; Mattox v. Knox, 96 Ga. 403, 23 S. E. 307; State v. Johnson, 77 Minn. 453, 80 Mo. 620; Murray v. County Com'rs, 81 Minn. 359, 361, 84 N. W. 103; Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 486, 488, 84 N. W. 6; State v. Yancy, 123 Mo. 391, 27 S. W. 380; State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L. R. A. 317; Fitzgerald v. Phelps & B. Windmill Co., 42 W. Va. 570, 26 S. E. 315; Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N. W. 131, 53 L. R. A. 635.

45 People v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal. 393, 404, 23 Pac. 303.

46 Hixon v. Burson, 54 Ohio St. 470, 481, 43 N. E. 1000. See also State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St. 90, 23 N. E. 931, 21 Am. St. Rep. 372; Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St. 202, 30 N. E. 613; State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L. R. A. 317; Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284, 43 N. E. 490; Gaylord v. Hubbard, 56 Ohio St. 25, 46 N. E. 66; Pearson v. Stevens, 56 Ohio St. 126, 46 N. E. 511; State v. Brown, 60 Ohio St. 462, 54 N. E. 525; State v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77, 65 N. E. 619.

47 38 Ohio St. 54.