passed and submitted to the president on Saturday, the 19th of February, would, in case of his non-action, take effect on the 3d of March ensuing. In the absence of a positive written law excluding Sundays from a period of days prescribed for any purpose, they are counted, even though the period ends on Sunday." Where a period less than a week is prescribed by statute, it has sometimes been held that an intervening Sunday should not be counted, nor if it be the dem. Homans, 16 How. 615, 14 L. Ed. 1079; Dexter v. Cranston, 41 Mich. 448, 2 N. W. 674; Scrafford v. Gladwin Supervisors, 41 Mich. 647; Powers' Appeal, 29 Mich. 504: Bacon v. Kennedy, 56 Mich. 329, 22 N. W. 824; Isabelle v. Iron Cliffs Co., 57 Mich. 120, 23 N. W. 613. But in Ward v. Walters, 63 Wis. 44. 22 N. W. 844, Taylor, J., thus states the doctrine: "In the absence of any statutory provision governing the computation of time, the authorities are uniform that where an act is required to be done a certain number of days or weeks before a certain other day upon which another act is to be done, the day upon which the first act is to be done must be excluded from the computation and the whole number of the days or weeks must intervene before the day for doing the second act." The same court, in Wright v. Forrestal, 65 Wis. 348, 27 N. W. 52, speaking by the same learned judge, said "The language [of the statute] is: The resolution shall lie over at least four weeks after its introduction, and no action shall be taken by the common council, if within that time a remonstrance,' etc. The question was presented to the council when the four weeks expired so that they might act on the same. They evidently construed it, as men ordinarily would, that a week was the period of time. extending from Monday of one week to Monday of the next week following, and not until Tuesday of such week, and that the resolution, if introduced on Monday, had laid over four weeks when the fourth Monday thereafter had arrived, and that they were at liberty to act upon it then. We think this is the natural construction of the act, and clearly within the intention of the legis lature.” 8 See Price v. Whitman, 8 Cal. 412. 9 Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 244; Miles v. McDermott, id. 272; Chicago v. Vulcan Iron Works, 93 Ill. 222; Ex parte Dodge, 7 Cow. 147; King v. Dowdall, 2 Sandf. 131; Anonymous, 2 Hill, 375; Harrison v. Sager, 27 Mich. 476; Haley v. Young, 134 Mass. 364; Broome v. Wellington, 1 Sandf. 660; Ready v. Chamberlin, 52 How. Pr. 123; National Bank v. Williams, 46 Mo. 17; Creswell v. Green, 14 East, 537; Ex parte Simpkin, 105 Eng. C. L. 392; Peacock v. Regina, 93 id. 264; Rowberry v. Morgan, 9 Ex. 730. See Harker v. Addis, 4 Pa. St. 515; Sims v. Hampton, 1 S. & R. 411. last day of the period. This appears to be the settled rule in Massachusetts." It is not universally adhered to as to periods of more than one or two days.12 Subject to this qualification, where the last day is Sunday, any act required by statute to be done within the period must be done before that day. For such acts the period practically ends on the preceding day. In Pennsylvania a different rule prevails. There, in such case, the act may be done on Monday." In Hughes v. Griffiths,13 Erle, C. J., said: “I am of opinion that when the last of the seven days [a statutory period] happens to fall on a day which is declared to be a holiday, and on which the court cannot act, the party has until the next following day on which the court can act to issue the writ. It seems to me that a distinction between a thing which is to be done by the court and a mere act of a party is maintainable." 16 If the period is fixed by contract, or is a rule of court regulating mere practice, and it ends on Sunday, that day is excluded, and the period will be deemed to include Monday. When the time for the performance of a contract, 10 Anonymous, 2 Hill, 375; Drake v. Andrews, 2 Mich. 203; National Bank v. Williams, 46 Mo. 17; Whip ple v. Williams, 4 How. Pr. 28; Wathen v. Beaumont, 11 East, 271; Rex v. Elkins, 4 Burr. 2130; State v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 So. 565, 78 Am. St. Rep. 364; Diesing v. Reilly, 77 Mo. App. 450; Barnes v. Eddy, 12 R. I. 25; West v. West, 20 R. I. 464, 40 Atl. 6. 11 Alderman v. Phelps, 15 Mass. 225; Thayer v. Felt, 4 Pick. 354; Penniman v. Cole, 8 Met. 496; McIniffe v. Wheelock, 1 Gray, 600; Hannum v. Turtellott, 10 Allen, 494; Cunningham v. Mahan, 112 Mass. 58. 12 Harrison v. Sager, 27 Mich. 476; Simonson v. Durfee, 50 Mich. 80, 14 N. W. 706; Cressey v. Parks, 75 Me. 387; State v. Wheeler, 64 id. 532; Carvill v. Additon, 62 id. 459; Tuttle v. Gates, 24 id. 395; Hales v. Owen, 2 Salk. 625; Asmole v. Goodwin, id. 624; Creswell v. Green, 14 East, 537; Peacock v. Regina, 93 Eng. C. L. 262; Taylor v. Corbiere, 8 How. Pr. 385. 13 Ex parte Simpkin, 105 Eng. C. L. 392; Queen v. The Justices, 7 Jurist, 396; Alderman v. Phelps, 15 Mass. 225; Cressey v. Parks, 75 Me. 387. 14 Edmundson v. Wragg, 104 Pa. St. 500, 502, 49 Am. Rep. 590. 15 108 Eng. C. L. 332. 16 See Harrison v. Sager, 27 Mich. 476. 17 Cock v. Bunn, 6 John. 326; Borst according to its terms, expires on Sunday, a performance on the following Monday is good.18 There is, however, an important exception to this rule. Where days of grace are allowed by the law merchant, and the last day of grace falls on Sunday, the act for which such days are allowed must be done on Saturday.19 v. Griffin, 5 Wend. 84; Bissell v. Bissell, 11 Barb. 96; Anonymous, 1 Strange, 86; Bullock v. Lincoln, 2 id. 914; Studley v. Sturt, id. 782; Lee v. Carlton, 3 T. R. 642; Solomons v. Freeman, 4 id. 557; Harbord v. Perigal, 5 id. 210; Asmole v. Goodwin, 2 Salk. 624; Shadwell v. Angel, 1 Burr. 56; Simonson v. Durfee, 50 Mich. 80, 14 N. W. 706; Morris v. Barrett, 97 Eng. C. L. 139; Mark's Ex'r v. Russell, 40 Pa. St. 372; Lewis v. Calor, 1 Fost. & Fin. 306; Muir v. Galloway, 61 Cal. 498. 22 See Hughes v. Griffiths, 106 Eng. 18 Hammond v. American Ins. Co., 10 Gray, 306; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205, 32 Am. Dec. 530; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69, 7 Am. Dec. 240; Post v. Garrow, 18 Neb. 682, 26 N. W. 580. But see Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & J. 268. 19 Anonymous, 2 Hill, 375; Campbell v. International Life, 4 Bosw. 317; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205, 32 Am. Dec. 530. CHAPTER VI. REQUIREMENT OF GENERAL LAWS AND THAT THEY BE OF § 189 (116). The constitutional requirements. It is the aim of the government to provide just and equal laws, and to prevent, as far as possible, enactments which are not such. The accomplishment of this purpose is in part intended to be secured by the framers of the constitutions by adopting therein certain provisions, mandatory to the legislature, prohibiting special or local laws on certain enumerated subjects, and as to all others, either where general laws exist, or where they can be made applicable. Another provision adopted in several states requires that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state. This requirement is not confined to the subjects enumerated in the prohibition of special or local laws; nor is it a mere repetition in substance of the general injunction to pass general laws where they can be made applicable. Laws of a general nature are those which relate to subjects of that nature, and deal generally with them. The requirement involves the question what is such a subject, and how comprehensively it must be treated in legislative acts. Laws to which the requirement is applicable must be so framed as to have a uniform operation throughout the state. § 190 (117). The constitutional provisions mandatory.— They are mandatory to the legislature; and a compliance. with them is necessary to the validity of legislation.' 1 State v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77, 65 N. E. 619. See Stuart v. Kirley, 12 S. D. 245, 81 N. W. 147. 1 Whether a particular act is conformable or not is a judicial question; that is, the courts have power to determine it, and they will hold any act void which violates either of these regulations,2 with one exception. This exception is the question whether on a non-enumerated subject, not of a general nature, a general law can be made applicable. That is a legislative question. When a special act has been passed, in such a case, it implies that in the legislative judgment a general act could not be made applicable. It is a conclusive implication, and that judgment is final; the courts will not enter at all upon the inquiry; they will accept the judgment of the legislature as exercised within its exclusive legislative domain, and give it effect.3 These re 2 Falk, Ex parte, 42 Ohio St. 683; State v. Powers, 38 id. 54; State ex rel. v. Supervisors, 25 Wis. 339; State ex rel. v. Riordan. 24 id. 484. 3 Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; Marks v. Trustees of Purdue University, 37 id. 161; Kelly, Treasarer, v. State, 92 id. 236; State v. fucker, 46 id. 355; State v. County Court, 50 Mo. 317, 11 Am. Rep. 415; State v. County Court, 51 Mo. 82; Hall v. Bray, id. 288; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 id. 247; Brown v. Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 630; State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178; Jones v. Jones, 95 Ala. 443, 10 Bo. 89, 18 L. R. A. 95; Powell v. Durden, 61 Ark. 21, 31 S. W. 740; People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, 22 Pac. 851, 15 Am. St. Rep. 66; People v. Mullender, 132 Cal. 217, 64 Pac. 299; Wilson v. Sanitary Trustees, 133 Ill. 443, 27 N. E. 203; Knopf v. People, 185 Ill. 20, 57 N. E. 22, 76 Am. St. Rep. 17; Sanitary District v. Ray, 199 Ill. 63, 64 N. E. 1048, 93 Am. St. Rep. 102; Mt. Vernon v. Evans & H. Fire Brick Co., 204 Ill. 32, 68 N. E. 208; State v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 29 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A. |