effect upon another, but we think the general rule is that a statute speaks from the time it becomes a law, and that what has occurred between the date of its passage and the time it took effect is deemed with respect to the statute a past transaction. This is in analogy to the rule for the construction of wills. This rule should not be applied when the language of the act shows a contrary intention." 77

The bankrupt law enacted on the 19th day of August, 1841, was provided to take effect only from and after February 1, 1842. This was equivalent to declaring that it should have no effect until that day, and hence it did not suspend the operation of the state insolvent laws until that day. The exception of injuries "already sustained" in a statute is to be construed as spoken when it took effect.79 So of the words "prior to the passage of this act," 80 and "after the passage of this act."8

The Illinois corporation act of 1872 permitted the consolidation of corporations of the same kind engaged in the same business in the same vicinity, but provided that "no more than two corporations now existing shall be consolidated into one under the provisions hereof." The section containing these provisions was amended and re-enacted in 1889, but the words quoted continued unchanged. It was held that the words "now existing" in the amended sec tion related to 1872 and not to 1889.82 An act of 1891 relating to fees and salaries was held invalid as to county treasurers because it excepted one county from its operation. In 1893 the act was amended so as to remove this objection.

77 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. R. Co. v. State, 81 Tex. 572, 598, 17 S. W. 67. And see Scales v. Marshall, 96 Tex. 140, 70 S. W. 945.

78 Larrabee v. Talbott, 5 Gill, 426. 79 Jackman v. Garland, 64 Me. 133.

80 Thompson V. Independent School District, 102 Iowa, 94, 70 N. W. 1093; Charless v. Lamberson, 1

Iowa, 442; Rogers v. Vass, 6 Iowa, 408.

81 Schneider v. Hussey, 2 Idaho, 8, 1 Pac. 343; Matter of Howe, 48 Hun, 235.

82 Barrows v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 75 Fed. 794. To same effect, Fischer v. Simon, 95 Tex. 234, 66 S. W. 447.

The original act provided that it should not apply to county treasurers elected before the taking effect of the act, and this provision remained in the act after amendment. It was held that it had reference to the time when the original act would have taken effect if valid, and that it applied to treasurers elected after the act of 1892 would have been effective, and prior to the passage of the act of 1893.83 An act of the state of Maryland, passed in 1868, in regard to corporations, provided that any corporation "heretofore formed " might re-incorporate under the act. This act was incorporated into the code of 1868 and the same language was retained. It was held that the words "heretofore formed' in the code did not refer to the passage of the act of 1868, but to the passage of the code, and that a corporation organized in 1869 under the act of 1868 could re-incorporate under the code of 1888.84

§ 184 (111). Computation of time when an act is to take effect in a specified number of days.- Such a computation must be made when by constitutional or statutory provision a statute is to go into operation in a specified number of days after its passage, or after the adjournment of the legislature, or is to take effect in a given time after its passage by the two houses, in the absence of executive action upon it. Periods of time are prescribed in statutes, or fixed by the common law, for three purposes: First, to limit the time within which only something may be done; second, to limit the time after which only something may be done; third, to fix a precise time at which only something may be done or commenced. The precise future time at which an act is appointed to be done or take effect, determinable by computation from a date or event, is in general the last point of the period; if a period of days, the last day. No fractions of a day being recognized, a period of days may for all purposes be computed by one uniform rule, unless there is, in a particular case, a different intention indicated.

83 Sudbury v. Board of Com❜rs, 157 Ind. 446, 62 N. E. 45.

84 Erb v. Grimes, 94 Md. 92, 50 Atl. 397.

85

The rule now supported by nearly all of the modern cases is that the time should be computed by excluding the day or the day of the event from which the time is to be computed and including the last day of the number constituting the specified period. Thus, if an act is to take effect in thirty days from and after its passage, passing on the 1st day of March, it would go into operation on the 31st day of that month. It would commence to operate at the first moment of the last day of the thirty, ascertained by adding that number to the number of the date of passage.

86

It is the general rule for computing time consisting of days, weeks, months or years. In such a computation days are entire days, fractions of a day being disregarded; and whether the computation is from an act done, or from a day or the day of a date, the day of such act, or the day or date mentioned, is to be excluded. Where a session of the leg

85 Simmons v. Jacobs, 52 Me. 147; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502; Stebbins v. Anthony, 5 Colo. 356; Garner v. Johnson, 22 Ala. 494; Hall v. Cassidy, 25 Miss. 48; Mitchell v. Woodson, 37 id. 567; Ex parte Dillard, 68 Ala. 594; Hollis v. Francois, 1 Tex. 118; Sindall v. Baltimore, 93 Md. 526, 49 Atl. 645; Coe v. Caledonia, etc. R. R. Co., 27 Minn. 197, 6 N. W. 621; Spencer v. Hang, 45 Minn. 231, 47 N. W. 794; Brady v. Moulton, 61 Minn. 185, 63 N. W. 489; Frazier v. Draper, 51 Mo. App. 163; O'Connor v. Fond du Lac, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327, 53 L. R. A. 831; Williams v. Burgess, 13 A. & E. 635; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603; Radcliffe v. Bartholomew, L. R. (1892) 1 Q. B. 161.

86 Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194; Jacobs v. Graham, 1 Blackf. 392; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio, 12; Griffin v. Forrest, 49 Mich. 309, 13 N. W. 603; Dousman v. O'Malley, 1

$7

Doug. (Mich.) 450; Blake v. Crowningshield, 9 N. H. 304; Portland Bank v. Maine Bank, 11 Mass. 204; Murfree v. Carmack, 4 Yerg. 270, 26 Am. Dec. 232; Berry v. Clements, 9 Humph. 312; S. C., 11 How. 398. See Cook v. Moore, 95 N. C. 1; White v. Hinton, 3 Wyo. 753, 30 Pac. 953, 17 L. R. A. 66.

87 Rand v. Rand, 4 N. H. 267; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502; Wiggin v. Peters, 1 Met. 127; Seekonk v. Rehoboth, 8 Cush. 371; Goode v. Webb, 52 Ala. 452; White v. Haworth, 21 Mo. App. 439; Pyle v. Maulding, 7 J. J. Marsh. 202; Brackett v. Brackett, 61 Mo. 223; Hart v. Walker, 31 id. 26; Walsh v. Boyle, 30 Md. 262; Small v. Edrick, 5 Wend. 137; Doyle v. Mizner, 41 Mich. 549; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M. & W. 473; Ex parte Fallon, 5 T. R. 283; Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 49; Protection Life v. Palmer,

islature was limited to forty days, it was held that, at the very least, it would include forty days of twenty-four hours each, computed from the hour of convening, and where the session convened at noon on November 6, the forty days was held not to expire until December 16 at noon. Where a notice is to be published for a certain period, it is held to mean during such period, and the full period must intervene between the first publication and the event, computed by excluding the day of publication and including the day of the event.89 When a statute requires that a certain num

ber of days shall intervene, elapse or expire after notice is given and before action is taken, it is complied with by excluding the day of notice and including the day on which the action is taken.90

92

§ 185 (112). Some cases, both English and American, make a distinction between computations from an act done and those from the date or day of the date, including the day of the act done in the former and excluding the day of the date in the latter." But that distinction is not now recognized in England, and in but few of the states in this country. The rule is not so absolute, however, but that the day of the act done may be included where it is necessary to give effect to the obvious intention; and some cases assert it will be included or excluded, as occasion may require, to prevent an estoppel or save a forfeiture."4

93

90 Logsdon v. Logsdon, 109 Ill. App. 194; Forsyth v. Warren, 62 Ill. 68; Brown v. Chicago, 117 Ill. 21, 7 N. E. 108.

91 King v. Adderley, 2 Doug. 463; Norris v. Hundred of Gawtry, Hob. 139; Castle v. Burditt, 3 T. R. 623; Glassington v. Rawlins, 3 East, 407; Clayton's Case, 5 Coke, 1; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104, 3 L. Ed. 671; Jacobs v. Graham, 1 Blackf. 392; White v. Crutcher, 1 Bush, 472; Chiles v. Smith's Heirs, 13 B. Mon. 460; Wood v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 220.

92 Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; Webb v. Fairmaner, 2 M. & W. 474; Ex parte Fallon, 5 T. R. 283; Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 49; Mercer v. Ogilvy, 3 Paton, 434; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 Barn. & Cr. 603; Pellew v. Inhab. of Wonsford, id. 134; Rex v. Justices, 4 Nev. & M. 378; Robinson v. Waddington, 13 Ad. & El. (N. S.)

753.

Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 177, 17 L. Ed. 822; Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 551, 72 Am. Dec. 745; Elder, Adm'r, v. Bradley, 2 Sneed, 252; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502; Sims v. Hampton, 1 S. & R. 411; Kimm v. Osgood, 19 Mo. 60; Pyle v. Maulding, 7 J. J. Marsh. 202. In Kentucky the courts include the terminus a quo when the computation is from an act or event. Chiles v. Smith's Heirs, 13 B. Mon. 460; Batman v. Megowan, 1 Met. (Ky.) 548; White v. Crutcher, 1 Bush, 473; Wood v. Commonwealth, 11 id. 220; Handley v. Cunningham, 12 id. 402; Mooar v. Covington City Nat. Bank, 80 Ky. 305; Commonwealth v. Shelton, 99 Ky. 120, 35 S. W. 128.

94 Windsor v. China, 4 Greenlf. 298; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193; Williamson v. Farrow, 1 Bailey, 611; Steamboat Mary Blane v. Beehler, 12 Mo. 477; Pugh v. Duke

93 Calvert v. Williams, 34 Md. 672; of Leeds, 2 Cowp. 714; Price v.