proved or provable in this manner. The legislature may make a law take effect on the happening of an event which has to be ascertained otherwise than by the "recorded proceedings in passing it." The validity of a statute cannot be judicially determined by the court's judgment of what is safe and fit.

The law takes notice of fractions of a day when necessary. The general principle declared by Lord Mansfield is believed to be sound and established by the weight of authority, that where it is necessary to justice and it can be done, the law takes notice of the parts of a day; then the precise time when an act is done may be shown.58 This necessity exists when an act is done on the same day that a legislative act is passed, if that statute being passed afterwards should not affect such act, or, being passed before, should do so.

It was said in Grosvenor v. Magill: 59 "It is true that for many purposes the law knows no divisions of a day; but whenever it becomes important to the ends of justice, or in order to decide upon conflicting interests, the law will look into fractions of a day as readily as into the fractions of any other unit of time.60 The rule is purely one of convenience, which must give way whenever the rights of parties require it. There is no indivisible unity about a day which forbids one, in legal proceedings, to consider its component hours, any more than about a month which restrains us from regarding its constituent days. The law is not made of such unreasonable and arbitrary rules." The weight of American authority is that a statute which is to go into effect immediately is operative from the instant of its passage.

61

58 Wells v. Bright, 4 Dev. & Batt. L. 173; Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 469, 26 L. Ed. 775; Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 970; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485; Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb. 117; Lang v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 311: Clawson v. Eichbaum, 2 Grant's Cas 150, Grosvenor v. Magill, 37 Ill.

239; Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381, 24 L. Ed. 1104; Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; Brainard v. Bushnell, 11 Conn. 17.

59 37 Ill. 239.

60 2 Black. Com. 140 and notes. 61 Matter of Richardson, 2 Story, 571, Fed. Cas. No. 11,777; Gardner v.

In Ohio it is held that where an act is to take effect from its passage, it means the date of signing by the president of the senate. By a uniform custom the president of the senate, in signing acts, gives the date, preceded by the word

The Collector, 6 Wall. 499, 18 L. Ed. 890; Strauss v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292; Berry v. Railroad Co., 41 id. 464, 20 Am. Rep. 69; Legg v. Mayor, etc., 42 Md. 211; Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 469, 26 L. Ed. 775; People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Parkinson v. Brandenburg, 35 Minn. 294, 59 Am. Rep. 326; Grosvenor v. Magill, 37 111. 239; Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381, 24 L. Ed. 1104; Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; Fairchild v. Gwynne, 14 Abb. Pr. 121; Re Wynne, Chase's Dec. 227, Fed. Cas. No. 18,117; Osborne v. Huger, 1 Bay, 176. See King v. Moore, Jeff. (Va.) 8; Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Barber, 47 Kan. 29, 27 Pac. 114; Ottman v. Hoffman, 7 - Misc. 714, 28 N. Y. S. 28; Galveston, II. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 336, 55 S. W. 389.

In the Matter of Richardson, 2 Story, 571, Story, J., said: "It may not, indeed, be easy in all cases to ascertain the very punctum temporis; but that ought not to deprive the citizens of any rights created by antecedent laws and vesting rights in them. In cases of doubt, the time should be construed favor ably for citizens. The legislature have it in their power to prescribe the very moment in futuro after the approval when a law shall have effect; and if it does not choose to do so, I can perceive no ground why a court of justice should be called on to supply the defect. But

when the time can be and is fully ascertained when a bill was approved, I confess I am not bold enough to say that it became a law at any antecedent period of the same day."

In Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104. 3 L. Ed. 671, it was held that an act takes effect from its passage; on the day of its passage; that it affected a transaction of that day, on the rule, that "when a computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included."

In Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 469, 478, 26 L. Ed. 775, the court, by Harlan, J., said: "In view of the authorities it cannot be doubted that the courts may, when substantial justice requires it, ascertain the precise hour when a statute took effect by the approval of the executive. But it may be argued that the rule does not apply where the inquiry is as to the time when constitutional provisions become operative by popular vote; that a popular vote, given at an election covering many hours of the same day, should be deemed an indivisible act, effectual, by relation, from the moment the electors entered upon the performance of that act, to wit: from the opening of the polls. But we are of opinion that no such distinction can be maintained. In determining when a statute took effect, no account is taken of the time it re

"passed." And where the final vote on such an act was taken on March 26th, and it was signed by the speaker of the house on March 31st, and sent to the senate on the same day and signed by the president of the senate on April 1st, it was held that it was not in effect until April 1st, and that acts done in pursuance of the act between March 26th and April 1st were unauthorized and void.62

63

§ 180. Acts approved on the same day.— Where two acts are approved on the same day the presumption is that they were approved in numerical order; but the court will take judicial notice of the facts and ascertain the actual order of approval, and, if the two acts are inconsistent, the one last approved will prevail, though it may have been the first to pass the legislature.65

64

66

§ 181. Time of taking effect - Miscellaneous points and cases.— If a particular day is named for an act to take effect, but it is not approved until after that day, its provisions, in terms prospective, will not have effect until after the date of approval. And if the main and principal clause of an act is to come into operation from a day named, the other subsidiary clauses may also be held to commence from that day, though it be not so expressed, if it would be inconvenient that they should commence from the passing of

ceived the sanction of the two branches of the legislative depart ment, which sanction is as essential to the validity of the statute as the approval of the executive. We look to the final act of approval by the executive to find when the statute took effect, and, when necessary, inquire as to the hour of the day when that approval was in fact given. So we perceive no sound reason why the courts may not, in proper cases, inquire as to the hour when such approval became effectual, to wit: as to the time when, by the closing of the

polls, the people had adopted such provision." See Welch v. Hannibal, etc. Ry. Co., 26 Mo. App. 358.

62 State v. O'Brien, 47 Ohio St. 464, 25 N. E. 121.

63 State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237, 16 Atl. 529; Ottman v. Hoffman, 7 Misc. 714, 28 N. Y. S. 28.

64 Davis v. Whidden, 117 Cal. 618, 49 Pac. 766; Ottman v. Hoffman, 7 Misc. 714, 28 N. Y. S. 28.

65 Davis v. Whidden, 117 Cal. 618, 49 Pac. 766; State v. Halliday, 63 Ohio St. 165, 57 N. E. 1097. 66 Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Nev. & M. 893.

the act.67 Where an act passed May 16, 1894, provided that it should be in effect from May 14, 1894, it was held to be in effect from its passage.68 It was claimed that the fixing of an impossible date was the same as fixing no date, and, therefore, that the general law would apply, fixing the date of July 4. A city charter provided that it should go into immediate effect. A general law provided that, if an act was silent on the subject, it should take effect twenty days after its approval by the governor. The charter in question was amended by substituting a new section for an old one and the amendatory act was silent as to its taking effect. It was held that the new section became subject to the provision in the charter and went into immediate effect.69 An act may provide that some provisions shall go into effect at one time and others at another time. An act was passed in 1893 to change the compensation of the clerk of Onondaga county from fees to a salary. The term of the clerk then in office expired December 31, 1894. The act provided: "This act shall take effect on the first day of January, 1895." It required the board of supervisors of the county to fix the salary prior to the election of every such clerk which occurred in the fall. The court held that it was the plain intent of the legislature that the act should apply to the clerk who took office on January 1, 1895, and that the provisions as to fixing the salary of the office were in effect before the election."1

§ 182. Where act provides for things to be done before it takes effect. An act can have no force until it becomes a law or takes effect. By reason of inadvertence and unexpected delay in passing an act, a date which was prospective when a bill was introduced may become retrospective

67 Whitborn v. Evans, 2 East, 135. G8 State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 298, 30 Atl. 543.

69 Anderson v. O'Donnell, 29 S. C. 355, 7 S. E. 523, 13 Am. St. Rep. 728, 1 L. R. A. 632.

Judge, 114 Mich. 655, 72 N. W. 982; Gusthal v. Strong, 23 App. Div. 315, 48 N. Y. S. 652.

71 People v. Butler, 147 N. Y. 164, 41 N. E. 416.

72 Evans v. Lumber Co., 21 Ohio

70 Osborn V. Charlevoix Circ. C. C. 80.

by the time it is passed. Under an existing law a city treasurer was elected annually on the first Tuesday in April. Prior to the election of 1897 the legislature passed an act with an emergency clause, providing that on the first Tuesday of April, 1897, and every two years thereafter, a treasurer should be elected for a term of two years. The act was not approved until after the election of 1897. It was held that the act was merely inoperative as to the election of 1897 and that its effect was to provide for a two-year term and elections in odd years, and that the first election under the act would take place in 1899. An act of congress in effect August 28, 1894, provided that certain duties. should be collected on and after August 1. In course of the passage of the act, which was pending many months, this date was changed from June 1 to June 30 and then to August 1. The court reasons from this that the evident intent of congress was to give the public an opportunity to adjust their affairs to the provisions of the law and to make it prospective, and held that the meaning was that the duties should be collected from August 1 or as soon thereafter as the bill became a law.

§ 183. Meaning of words "now," "heretofore," "hereafter," "from and after the passage of this act," etc.-An act speaks from the time it takes effect." The words "heretofore" and "hereafter" in an act are construed as having reference to the date of taking effect and not to the date of passage, unless the act itself plainly shows a contrary intent. The supreme court of Texas says: "We apprehend that no universal rule of construction can be adopted when a statute which makes a distinction between future and past transactions is passed upon one day to take

73 Sipe v. People, 26 Colo. 127, 56

Pac. 571.

74 United States v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78, 15 S. C. Rep. 1002, 40 L. Ed. 82. And see Commonwealth v. Holliday, 98 Ky. 616, 33 S. W. 943.

75 Grant v. Alpena, 107 Mich. 335,. 65 N. W. 230.

76 Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Barbee, 59 Ind. 592; 74 id. 171.