ineffective unless the act is passed by the requisite vote.30 Where the constitution provided that "No act shall take effect until three calendar months after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed," unless, etc., it was held that where the adjournment took effect on April 8 the act took effect on July 9.31 Where, in a similar constitutional provision, appropriation bills were excepted, it was held that an act to provide for the purchase, completion and furnishing of a state capitol, making an appropriation therefor, and conferring additional powers on the capitol commission, was within the exception. An act in regard to the deposit of public moneys by county treasurers provided that it should not go into effect until the expiration of the terms of the county treasurers in office at the time of the passage of the act. The constitution provided that acts should go into effect three months after the adjournment of the legislature. It was held that the act went into effect as a law at the end of the three months and then became operative upon the officers respectively as their terms expired."

32

8 177. Where the constitution requires the legislature to fix the time.- The constitution of Kansas provides that "the legislature shall prescribe the time when its acts shall be in force." It is held by the supreme court of that state that "this provision plainly requires that the legislature shall fix a single, definite time, when its act as an entirety shall become a law," and that where, by the terms of an act, different parts go into effect at different times, or where it goes into effect at different times as to several persons, places or things, it is unconstitutional and void.35 Where an act in relation to certain officers was to go into effect "after

30 Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. McGlamory, 92 Tex. 150, 41 S. W. 466.

31 McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427, 65 N. W. 46, 50 Am. St. Rep. 617, 30 L. R. A. 450.

33 Hopkins v. Scott, 38 Neb. 661, 57 N. W. 391.

34 Miami Co. Com'rs v. Hiner, 54 Kan. 334, 38 Pac. 286.

35 Id.; Finnigan v. State, 54 Kan. 420, 38 Pac. 477; State v. Deets, 54

32 State v. Rogers, 24 Wash. 417, Kan. 504, 38 Pac. 798; State v. New64 Pac. 515.

bold, 56 Kan. 71, 42 Pac. 345; Mont

the present term of the officers herein before named shall have expired," it was held to mean after all the terms had expired and so to be valid.36

39

§ 178 (109). Taking effect on publication.— Where the taking effect of an act depends on publication, required by its own terms or by the constitution, it is a condition, and the time can be fixed only by the date of compliance." The provisions of the Louisiana constitution requiring the laws to be promulgated in the English language, and in the English and French language, does not prevent the legislature from passing acts to take immediate effect.38 A joint resolution of a general nature requires the same publication as any other law. When it is provided that an act shall go into effect on publication in two newspapers, publication in one will not suffice, though officially certified to be so published." When properly published it will take effect according to its own terms, although subsequently published officially in different terms. In one instance, by the later publication, the law erroneously appeared to repeal a prohibitory section of a previous law. The erroneous publication was not allowed to avail a person who had committed the act prohibited by such prior law, which was still in force. The statute, having gone into effect on its correct publication in two newspapers, was not affected by the subsequent erroneous publication." The publication of a statute without the enacting clause was held to be altogether ineffective.42 An act was to become effective upon its publication in the Iowa State Regis

gomery Co. Com'rs v. Glass, 4 Kan. App. 286, 45 Pac. 935. While all the cases agree upon the general principle stated there seems to be some inconsistency in the application of it.

36 Board of Com'rs v. Chew, 44 Kan. 162, 24 Pac. 62.

37 Cain v. Goda, 84 Ind. 209; Welch v. Battern, 47 Iowa, 147.

38 Thomas v. Scott, 23 La. Ann.

689; Re Merchants' Bank, 2 La. Ann. 68; State v. Judge, 14 La. Ann. 486.

39 State v. School Board Fund, 4 Kan. 261.

40 Welch v. Battern, 47 Iowa, 147. 41 Hunt v. Murray, 17 Iowa, 313; State v. Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396.

42 In re Swartz, 47 Kan. 157, 27 Pac. 839.

ter and the Jefferson Souvenir. There was a Souvenir published in Jefferson, but it was not called the Jefferson Souvenir. Publication in the Iowa State Register and in the Souvenir of Jefferson was held sufficient.43 It has been held that a statute is in force from the precise time or hour of publication and that the court will take notice of and ascertain such time when important to the rights of parties." But in Wisconsin, where an act was to take effect from and after its passage and publication, the day of publication was excluded.45

46

Under a constitutional provision that "no act shall take effect until the same has been published and circulated in the several counties of this state by authority," it was held that the words "published" and "circulated" were used synonymously. And no publication or circulation is good unless done by authority." Under a general constitutional provision that "no general law shall be in force until published," publication of a general law by mistake only, in the volume of private laws, is a sufficient publication.48

Though going into effect only on publication, the act of record in the office of the secretary of state is the law, when different from the published copy.49 A law would probably not be deemed to be published, so as to give it effect, if the publication materially differed from the act of record, but a slight error would be disregarded.50 The date of the certificate of the secretary of state, appended to a published volume of laws, will, in the absence of any suggestion which may lead to more accurate inquiry, be taken to be the date of their publication."1

43 Franklin v. Wiggins, 110 Iowa, Ind. 13; McCool v. State, id. 379; 702, 80 N. W. 432. State v. Dunning, 9 id. 20.

44 Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Barber, 47 Kan. 29, 27 Pac. 114.

45 O'Connor v. Fond du Lac, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327, 53 L. R. A. 831.

46 Jones v. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305.

48 Re Boyle, 9 Wis. 264.

49 Clare v. State, 5 Iowa, 509. See State v. Donehey, 8 id. 396.

50 Mead v. Bagnall, 15 Wis. 156; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 id. 252.

51 State v. Foote, 11 Wis. 14;

47 Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Boyle's Case, 9 Wis. 264; Berliner

v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378.

In the constitution of Wisconsin 52 it is provided that "no general law shall be in force until published." The words "general law," here used, have the same meaning as public acts in their ordinary acceptation, as distinguished from private acts. The object of the prohibition was the protection of the people, by preventing their rights and interests from being affected by laws which they had no means of knowing. But all are bound by and are to take notice of public statutes.53

§ 179 (110). The precise time of taking effect-Fractions of a day. At what precise time does a statute go into operation, and first have force as law, when it takes immedi ate effect? Passing over the fiction of relation to the first day of the session which has been mentioned, there is still to be answered the question whether it takes effect at the beginning of the day of its passage, at the beginning of the next day, or at the precise moment of the last essential act in its enactment.

The maxim that the law takes no notice of the fractions of a day is not of universal application. The legal quality of an act may depend on when it was done with reference to other acts or events occurring not merely on the same day but in the same hour. Instances, in great variety, will at once occur to the professional mind. The sequence of such related facts may always be inquired into, unless the inquiry under consideration is an exception. What shall be accepted as the commencement of a period of a given number of days is an inquiry presently to be considered. That is another and different inquiry; such a period need not necessarily be computed upon fractions of a day. Any general rule as to commencement of a period of several days might operate justly. An act which is made to operate six hours before the time when it was actually enacted and passed is liable to the same objection, except in degree, as when it has a commencement six days or six years before its enact52 Sec. 21, art. VII. State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis.

53 Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; 284, 285.

ment. Hardship is sometimes the result of an act taking immediate effect, and every consideration of humanity and justice is opposed to any retroaction. A statute commands only from the time it has the force of law; it should not be accorded a beginning a moment earlier than the actual time of its enactment than the actual time of the last act in the legislative process. No person is required to anticipate the enactment of a law, though he may be charged with a knowledge of it from the moment of its adoption if it at once goes into operation.

Lord Mansfield said in Combe v. Pitt: "Though the law does not in general allow of the fractions of a day, yet it admits it in cases where it is necessary to distinguish; and I do not see why the very hour may not be so too, where it is necessary and can be done."

In Minnesota the day of the passage is excluded where the act provides that it shall take effect "from and after its passage." 55 So in Wisconsin, where an act takes effect from and after its passage and publication, the day of pub lication is excluded.56

There are cases which hold that acts taking immediate effect take effect from the first moment of the day on which they were passed.57 They proceeded, however, on unsatisfactory reasons. Prentiss, J., said, in the Matter of Welman, "It would be as unsafe as it would be unfit to allow the commencement of a public law, whenever the question may arise, whether at a near or distant time, to depend upon the uncertainty of parol proof, or upon anything extrinsic to the law, and the authenticated recorded proceedings in passing it." It cannot be laid down as constitutional law that the commencement of public laws must be

54 3 Burr. 1423.

55 Parkinson v. Brandenburg, 35 Minn. 294, 28 N. W. 919. See State v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 163, 174.

56 O'Connor v. Fond du Lac, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327, 53 L. R. A.

57 Tomlinson v. Bullock, L. R. 4 Q. B. Div. 230; Matter of Howes, 21 Vt. 619; Matter of Welman, 20 id. 653; State v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. 271, 65 Pac. 183.