72

require the payment of a poll tax by all legal voters under sixty years of age," provided that the name of no person should be registered as a voter unless he should exhibit a receipt for the poll tax required by law for the current and preceding year. It was held that the object of the act was, not to require the payment of a poll tax, but to make its payment a condition of the right to vote, and that the real subject was not expressed in the title. An act to provide for the formation and government of sanitary districts provided that the sanitary trustees might determine the qualification of persons authorized to sell liquor at retail and that no license to sell liquor in the district should be effective until approved by the sanitary board. This was held to be foreign to the title. An act to create a fireman's pension fund in cities having paid fire departments provided for the fund by requiring foreign insurance companies to pay one dollar on every hundred dollars of the excess of their receipts over losses paid. The act was held void because the title gave no intimation of how the fund was to be created.74 A few additional cases are cited in the margin wherein acts or provisions were held void because not within the title.75

72 State v. Stone, 24 Nev. 308, 53 the title would be as misleading, Pac. 497. and might be as pernicious, as the 73 In re Werner, 129 Cal. 567, 62 evils sought to be obstructed (obviPac. 97.

74 Henderson v. London & L. Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 23, 34 N. E. 565, 41 Am. St. Rep. 410, 20 L. R. A. 827. The court says: ""Titles should dis tinctly recite what the particular subject of the law is.' This may often be done by language quite general; then, again, there are instances which require particular ity. If the subject is composed of two or more essential elements, the expression of one of such elements in the title would not suffice. The absence of one of such elements in

ated) by the constitution. The subject of this act, as we have indicated, is to gather funds from foreign insurance companies, and to dispose of such funds for the relief of firemen. The title expresses the first of these objects included within the subject, but wholly omits the other of such objects." p. 31.

75 Yerby v. Cochrane, 101 Ala. 541, 14 So. 355; Spier v. Baker, 120 Ca!. 370, 52 Pac. 659, 41 L. R. A. 196; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooledge, 86 Ga. 104, 12 S. E. 264; Woodruff

§ 171. Miscellaneous points as to titles. A provision for submitting an act or any question on which its operation depends to a popular vote is germane to the subject or object of such act, and is a means to facilitate its execution.* Where the title is to repeal an act, giving its title, it need not give the date of passage or approval of the act to be repealed." Where the title is to repeal a certain section, and the act repeals and re-enacts the section, it is void. Repeals by implication need not be indicated in the title." Where the question was not raised in the lower court nor in the briefs, the supreme court refused to consider it.80 Where an act, section or provision is void because not within the title, and such act, section or provision is afterwards incorporated in a code or revision, and the code or revision is duly passed under an appropriate general title, such act, section or provision will be valid from the passage of the code or revision.81 So when a territorial act is approved

v. Kellyville Coal Co., 182 Ill. 480, 55 N. E. 550; Garrigus v. Board of Com'rs, 157 Ind. 103, 60 N. E. 948; State v. Goff, 106 La. 270, 30 So. 844; Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 Atl. 56; East Jordan Lumber Co. v. East Jordan, 100 Mich. 201, 58 N. W. 1012; State v. Oftedal, 72 Minn. 498, 75 N. W. 692; Sheasley v. Keens, 48 Neb. 57, 66 N. W. 1010; Treasurer of Plainfield v. Hall, 61 N. J. L. 437, 39 Atl. 711; Brown's Estate, 152 Pa. St. 401, 25 Atl. 630; Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 539, 27 Atl. 356; Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554, 27 Atl. 356; Mansfield's Case, 22 Pa. Supr. Ct. 224; Commonwealth v. Farley, 19 Phila. 561; Gassett v. State, 2 Tenn. Ch. 546; State v. Bethel, 3 Tenn. Ch. 107; Case v. Loftus, 43 Fed. 839; Bank v. Divine Grocery Co., 97 Tenn. 603, 37 S. W. 390; Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co., 90 Md. 14, 44

Atl. 1051, 46 L. R. A. 393; Kelly v. Pratt, 14 Misc. 31, 83 N. Y. S. 636; Potter County Water Co. v. Austin, 206 Pa. St. 297; Bucks County Prison Board, 28 Pa. Co. Ct. 65; Smith's Petition, 12 Pa. Dist. Ct. 333.

76 City of Virden v. Allan, 107 IIL 505; Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Ore. 515; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447, 26 L. Ed. 405; Stuart v. Kirley, 12 S. D. 245, 81 N. W. 147.

77 Moore v. Burdett, 62 N. J. L 163, 40 Atl. 631.

75 State v. Benzinger, 83 Md. 481, 35 Atl. 173.

79 Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 Ill. 146, 27 N. E. 24.

80 North River Boom Co. v. Smith, 15 Wash. 138, 45 Pac. 750.

81 Parks v. State, 110 Ga. 760, 36 S. E. 73; Daniel v. State, 114 Ga. 533, 40 S. E. 707: McFarland v. Don

83

by congress. And where a law has been duly passed with a sufficient title, it may be placed in a code or revision under any head or division the legislature choose. A provision conferring a civil right or remedy is not void because found in a penal code.

The constitution of Louisiana makes provision for a general appropriation bill and requires that "all other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject." 85 An act entitled "An act making appropriations to pay deficiencies due by the state for the years 1885, 1886 and 1887," made appropriations of money to pay: (1) for the congressional election of 1887, (2) for the expense of troops in the labor strikes of 1887, (3) for the special election of June, 1885, and (4) for the special election of August, 1885. These were held to be four subjects within the constitution, and the act was held void.96

aldson, 115 Ga. 567, 41 S. E. 1000; Newgass v. Atl. & D. Ry. Co., 56 Fed. 676.

subject. Therefore, clear enactments of substantive law establishing rights-like section 294

82 Karasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, are not to be held inoperative be61 Pac. 33, 50 L. R. A. 345.

cause found in any particular code.

83 Hennig v. Slaed, 138 Mo. 430, If a provision in one code were in 40 S. W. 95.

84 Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170, 82 Am. St. Rep. 330, 53 L. R. A. 221. In this case the court says: "We have here a code system which is for convenience and partial classification divided into four codes, to each of which a name is given; but they are inseparably in terwoven with each other, and no one of them is complete in itself, or absolutely confined to a particular

conflict with a provision on the same subject in another code, perhaps a consideration of the general purpose of each of the codes might afford some aid in solving the difficulty; but there is no such difficulty here, for there is no provision in any of the other codes touching the question here involved." p. 72. 85 Art. 53.

86 Klein v. State Treasurer, 42 La. Ann. 174, 7 So. 230.

CHAPTER V.

TIME OF TAKING EFFECT.

§ 172 (104). When silent as to commencement - Date of passage. When no other time is fixed a statute takes effect from the date of its passage- - from the date of the last act necessary to complete the process of legislation and to give a bill the force of law. When approved by the executive the act of approval is the last act, and the date of it is the date of passage of the act. If passed after a veto,

the date of the final vote is the date of passage. When a bill becomes a law by the non-action of the executive, under constitutional regulations, the non-action of the executive is a quasi approval, not complete until the lapse of the time prescribed for his affirmative action under the given conditions.

"4

In the absence of evidence of the precise time when approved, an act operates during the whole of the day of approval. The constitution of Tennessee provides that no act shall become a law until, among other things which are legislative, it "be signed by the respective speakers." This signing, though thus made essential, is held not to fix the date of passage; not being legislative but ministerial in its nature, when it has been performed, the act by relation takes effect from the conclusion of the proceeding which is legislative."

When no future date is fixed, the act takes effect immediately; no time is allowed for publication. There would be hardship if all acts were left so to take effect. The reason of the rule was well stated by Mr. Doddridge, of counsel, in Matthews v. Zane: "It being practically impossible actually to notify every person in the community of the passage of a law, whatever day might be appointed for its taking effect, no general rule could be adopted less excep

uniform practice of long standing for the president of the senate in signing bills to affix the date preceded by the word "passed," thus: "passed, April 1, 1890," and it is held that when the "passage" of an act is referred to in legislation this date will be deemed to be the one intended. "This may be regarded," says the court, "as a legislative interpretation of the term 'passage,' when used with reference to the time when an act shall take effect; and, hence, when it is provided in a statute that it shall

take effect from and after its passage, the time of the passage of the act as fixed by the president of the senate, when he signs the same, is intended." State v. O Brien, 47 Ohio St. 464, 475, 476, 25 N. E. 121.

3 Croven v. Atlantic An. R. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 225, 44 N. E. 968; Pooley v. Buffalo, 122 N. Y. 592, 26 N. E. 16; Mallory v. Hiles, 4 Met. (Ky.) 53; Matter of Carrier, 13 Bankr. Reg. 208; Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99. 4 Art. II, sec. 18.

5 Lewis v. Woodfolk, 58 Tenn. 25. 67 Wheat. 179, 2 L. Ed. 654.