tion cities and districts having over one hundred thousand population. The act was held valid and the court in banc says: "The constitution does not say that the title shall be as narrow as the act. What it says on this point is, that the single subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. The fact, therefore, that the title is broader than the act can be no objection, unless the title is comprehensive enough to admit of disconnected and incongruous subjects." 93 In this case the act in question expressly purported by its title to apply to all the public schools within the state and yet excepted a very important class. Like rulings were made upon the following titles and acts: An act purporting by its title to relate to the fees of county officers generally, but limited in the purview to counties of over fifty thousand inhabitants; an act entitled: "An act extending the time in which distraint and sale may be made for taxes," and limited in its operation to certain counties and to the taxes for certain years; 95 "An act to encourage and provide for a general vaccination in the state of California," which applied only to school children; an act to protect the health of domestic animals, which related to dairy cows and neat cattle only; 97 "An act to prevent the fraudulent transfer of personal property," which applied only to mortgagors of personal property. "The mere fact," says the court, "that the legislature chose a title much more compre 94 93 State v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 21 S. W. 1125. 96 general class in the state, viz., scholars of the public schools and 94 State v. Frazier, 36 Ore. 178, those who desire to become such. 39 Pac. 5. But we think, under the rules of construction above stated, that the term general,' in the title, applies to that general class specified in the act; and that neither the legislature nor the public could be misled by the manner in which the subject of the act is expressed in the title.” p. 229. 97 Commonwealth v. Cooper, 12 Pa. Dist. Ct. 199. hensive than the matter covered by the body of the act cannot be objectionable." 98 The supreme court of Alabama says: "The object of this provision of the constitution was to prevent surprise and fraud in passing laws under misleading titles. It should not, therefore, be construed so as to defeat, by too technical an application, legislation not clearly within the evil aimed at. If the title of an act is single and directs the mind to the subject of the law in a way calculated to direct the attention truly to the matter which is proposed to be legislated upon, the object of the provision is satisfied. In such case the generality of a title, not defining the particulars of the proposed legislation, would be more apt to excite general attention than otherwise, since the general words would give warning that everything within their limits might be affected and thus draw the attention of the whole body of legislators, while narrower words would only interest those concerned with the matters specially named." 99 Many cases hold that the title may be broader than the act, that an act need not cover all the ground that might be covered under its title, and need not legislate respecting all the classes, persons, objects or things embraced or comprehended by the title. "An act to prohibit book-making 98 State v. Heldenbrand, 62 Neb. 136, 142, 87 N. W. 25, 89 Am. St. Rep. 743. 99 Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 128 Ala. 335, 347, 30 So. 645, 86 Am. St. Rep. 143. 1 Mollie Gibson Consol. Min. & Mil. Co. v. Sharp, 23 Colo, 259, 47 Pac. 266; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431; Ash v. Thorp, 65 Kan. 60, 68 Pac. 1067; Davis v. State. 7 Md. 158; Baltimore v. Keeley Inst., 81 Md. 106, 31 Atl. 437, 27 L. R. A. 646; Luther v. Saylor, 8 Mo. App. 424; State v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 23 Mont. 498, 59 Pac. 854; Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L. 58; Johnson v. Asbury Park, 60 N. J. "We are and pool-selling" prohibited book-making and pool-selling on certain events to take place outside of the state and onpolitical nominations and elections wherever held. The act was held valid and, on the point in question, the court says: "But the act before the court is prohibitory in its entire scope and purpose. It does not prohibit all book-making and pool-selling on the events named, but as far as it attempts to deal with the subject it prohibits them. The act is not, it is true, as broad as its title, but it is germane to and included in it. Logically, some prohibition is included in all prohibition. Logically, the title does contain the subject of the act. The title does not give notice how the prohibition is to be effected, or to what extent, whether partially or wholly, whether by making the act prohibited a felony, or a misdemeanor; but it does give the information that the act is for the prohibition of book-making and pool-selling." Also that "the title of an act may contain a generic term, and the body of the enactment be specific, and the act be upheld, provided the enactment is germane to and included in the subject of the title." § 125. Misleading titles. The case of Anderson v. Hill' involves an act with a misleading title. The title of the act is "to provide for the straightening or otherwise deepening the channel of the Dowagiac river in Van Buren county." There were three sections in the act. They authorized either or both of the two named townships in Van Buren county to vote money to be raised by tax, and the expenditure of it "for such river improvements." It was held unconstitutional in part on the ground that "the ob full scope of appropriate legislation admissible under its title." Pow ers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 167, 178, 16 S. W. 559. And the supreme court of Michigan says that " we do not understand the body of the act must contain all the provisions it might contain under the title to save the act from being unconsti tutional." Boyer v. Grand Rapids Fire Ins. Co., 124 Mich. 455, 83 N. W. 124, 83 Am. St. Rep. 338. 2 State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 27, 28, 17 S. W. 646. 854 Mich. 477. ject was not sufficiently stated in the title. The court say: "The state having the right to engage in and carry on works of internal improvement by the expenditure of grants to the state of lands, the obvious inference from the language of the title would be that the state proposed to provide for the straightening or deepening of the channel of the Dowagiac river by doing what they constitutionally could do, namely, by appropriating land for that purpose. This is the method she has provided for making her internal improvements since 1850. In view of the constitutional restriction, and the long course of practice pursued by the state in making internal improvements, would any one be justified in assuming that the language in the title of this act was intended to embrace the object of permitting the legal voters of the township of Decatur to vote a tax upon the taxable property of the township to aid the state in carrying on the work of straightening and deepening the channel of the Dowagiac river? Yet such was the real as well as the principal object of the act. Without this legislation the state possessed full power, acting under its state board of control of swamp lands, to make the improvement named in the title of the act. The state has never acted and has no occasion to act under the provisions of act No. 323 [the act in question]. The circuit court, however, finds as a fact that the Dowagiac state ditch mentioned in the contract [for work on the ditch entered into with the state] was the same improvement as that contemplated by the special act No. 323. If this be true, then clearly the object of the act was not expressed in the title and could not be otherwise than in some manner indicating that the object of the law was to authorize or enable the townships of Decatur and Hamilton to aid the state in straightening or deepening the channel of the Dowagiac river in the county of Van Buren. As well might an act to authorize. the construction of a railroad from one point to another include provisions for municipalities along its route to vote. aid in its construction, without violating the constitution." + When the title is misleading and deceptive the act is void. § 126 (91). The title should accompany a bill in its passage through the legislature. It is during the passage of a bill that its title is intended by the constitution to impart information to the public and to members of the legislature of the general subject of legislation. To effectuate that intent the title should accompany the bill in all its stages through the process of enactment. As stated by Simonton, P. J.: "If a bill can be passed with a title which. does not denote its subject, and after its passage the title can be amended so as for the first time to express its purpose, the constitutional provision is of little value." Only 4 See Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273, 42 N. W. 1122; State v. Com'rs, 41 Kan. 630, 21 Pac. 601. 5 State v. Sholl, 58 Kan. 507, 49 Pac. 668; Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273, 43 N. W. 1122; New York & Greenwood Lake Ry. Co. v. Montclair, 47 N. J. Eq. 591, 21 Atl. 493; Sneath v. Mayer, 64 N. J. L. 94, 44 Atl. 983; In re Carbondale, etc. Road Co., 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 460; Little Equemunk, etc. Turnpike Co., 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 632; Blader v. Water Com'rs, 122 Mich. 366, 81 N. W. 271. 6 Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. St. 185. In Attorney-General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, 31 N. W. 203, it appeared that to an act to organize the township of Ironwood, in the county of Ontonagon, it was objected that it had been substituted after the time for introducing new bills had expired for a skeleton bill entitled "An act to or ganize the township of Au Train; " that therefore the title of the bill as introduced did not express the object of the act as passed. The court say: "We cannot extend the provisions of the constitution beyond its express terms in this respect. If the object of the act as passed is fully expressed in its title, the form or status of such title at its introduction, or during any of the stages of legislation before it becomes a law, is immaterial. To hold otherwise would, in many cases, prevent any alteration or amendment of a bill after its introduction, as, in legislative practice, it frequently becomes necessary to amend the title as introduced in order to conform to changes in the bill. The title to a bill is usually adopted after it has passed the house, and it is not an essential part of a bill, although it is of a law. Larrison v. Peoria, etc. R. R. Co., 77 Ill. 17." The facts stated in the contention were not accepted by the court, and it was held that the journals not showing the facts. parol evidence was not admissible. People v. McElroy, 72 Mich. 446, 40 N. W. 750; Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273, 42 N. W. 1122. |