The supreme court of Indiana says: "To express the subject of a statute in the title, in compliance with the requirement of the constitution, no particular form or terms are exacted, nor is it essential that such subject be expressed with precision. The title will sufficiently conform to the command of the constitution if it be so framed and worded as fairly to apprise the legislators, and the public in general, of the subject-matter of the legislation, so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill. The constitutional requirement may be interpreted to mean that the act and its title must correspond, not literally but substantially, and such correspondence is to be determined in view of the subject-matter to which the legislation relates." 99 78

Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 525; St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 50, 90 Am. Dec. 278; State v. Daniel, 28 La. Ann. 38; McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc., 8 N. Y. 241; Conner v. Mayor, etc., 5 N. Y. 285; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 200; Luehrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea, 425; Township of Union v. Rader, 39 N. J. L. 507; Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; State v. Lasater, 9 Baxt. 584; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Hammond v. Lesseps, 31 La. Ann. 337; Peachee v. State, 63 Ind. 399; Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224; Luther v, Saylor, 8 Mo. App. 424; Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21, 50 Am. Dec. 306; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223; State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 325, 21 Am. Rep. 765; State v. County Com'rs, 13 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 203, 17 Nev. 96; Goldsmith v. Rome R. R.

Co., 62 Ga. 473; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; Gabbert v. Jefferson R. R. Co., 11 Ind. 365, 71 Am. Dec. 358; State v. Winter, 118 Ala. 1, 24 So. 89; McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 616, 10 S. E. 441; Hronek v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 861, 8 L. R. A. 837; Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862; Wilson v. Herink, 64 Kan. 607, 68 Pac. 72; State v. Madson, 43 Minn. 438, 45 N. W. 856; Philadel phia v. Ridge Ave. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. St. 484, 21 Atl. 982, 24 Am. St. Rep. 512; State v. Morgan, 2 S. D. 32, 48 N. W. 314; Memphis v. Am. Express Co., 102 Tenn. 336, 52 S. W. 172; Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. E. 357; Lancy v. King Co., 15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817; State v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447, 50 Pac. 119.

78 Maule Coal Co. v. Parthenheimer, 155 Ind. 100, 106, 55 N. E. 751. And see Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, 119 N. Y. 204, 23 N. E. 542.

79

§ 122 (89). Effect of "etc.," "and so forth," "and for other purposes" in title. It has been decided in Tennessee that" etc." added to a title has force in extending the enumeration which precedes it. The question arose as to the validity of provisions in an act having this title: "An act to punish as felons all parties who may engage in keeping or conducting halls or houses for conduct of games of keno, faro, three-card monte and mustang, etc." Turney, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The 'etc.' used at the end and as part of the title may not be rejected; it has a meaning. Webster defines it, 'et cetera,' and others,' and so forth.' This definition applied here makes it import ' and the rest of the games,' or 'other games.' It gives the members of the legislature notice that the subject of the title is drawn or elaborated in the body of the act; that the reformatory force of the act is not to be confined to houses, or to persons keeping houses for playing the four games recited, but is extended to other games. It has a significant and pointed conclusion which could not escape the attention of any member of the legislature who has regard to his obligations and duties. It said to him in terms, other games are leveled at besides the four mentioned in the title, and you are invited to look at them. It admonished him, the act is not made to cover a legislation incongruous in itself. By fair intendment, the bill had a necessary and proper connection with the act.

It cannot be objected that the title upon the subject is broader than the act under it. The title notified the legislature of a thoroughly comprehensive thrust at all parties engaged in conducting gambling houses; the act confines the thrust to parties conducting houses in the playing of nine games. The record shows there are a great many other games which are played everywhere, besides these mentioned in the act, of which, however, we presume the draftsman of the act was uninformed, but which might have been embraced under the title to his act. It is now insisted the abbreviation etc.' has no meaning at all, or, at most, means

79 Garvin v. State, 13 Lea, 162.

'and for other purposes.'

The abbreviation may no

longer be called such. It is thoroughly incorporated into our language, is defined by our lexicographers, and is a perfect English word in almost common use.

"It cannot mean 'and for other purposes,' for the reason that such definitions would include any and all purposes, however foreign to the object of the legislation, one of the inconveniences and inconsistencies intended to be remedied by the present constitution." 80 In Virginia the words "and so forth" were held not to extend the scope of the title. The act in question was entitled: "An act to prevent pool selling, and so forth, upon the results of any trials of speed of any animals or beasts taking place without the limits of the commonwealth." The act made unlawful almost every conceivable form of making bets or wagers upon such trials of speed. It was held that as to all except pool-selling the act was invalid, because not embraced in the title.81

The phrase, "and for other purposes," expresses no specific purpose, and imports indefinitely something different from that which precedes it in the title. It is therefore universally rejected as having no force or effect, wherever this constitutional restriction operates.82

80 To the same effect: Commonwealth v. Clark, 3 Pa. Supr. Ct. 141. In this case the title was, "An act to protect fruit, gardens, growing crops, grass, et cetera, and punish trespass." The court said: "The words 'et cetera' in the title under consideration refer to things generically the same as those particuJarly specified, and therefore embrace trees, plants, flowers and the like."

58 Pa. St. 233; Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659, 41 L. R. A. 196; County Com'rs v. Aspen Min. & C. Co., Colo. App. 223, 32 Pac. 717. The early constitution of Georgia forbade the passage of a law containing matter different from that expressed in the title. Under this provision it was held that the words "and for other purposes," would authorize legislation upon any subject with which the legislature

81 Lacey v. Palmer, 93 Va. 159, 24 could constitutionally deal." MarS. E. 930, 57 Am. St. Rep. 795.

82 City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. 637; Commonwealth v. Green,

tin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21, 50 Am. Dec. 306, and cases cited ante, § 110. "Since 1861 these words will not authorize legislation upon any sub

84

§ 123 (90). Title misleading by reason of generality.A title so general as practically to conceal the subject of the statute, or a false or delusive title, will be treated as not constitutionally framed, and the act held void. An act "to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and assessments" was held void for undue generality in not mentioning the place where it was intended to operate. It was a local act, and yet it did not name the city to which it applied. So an act "to regulate a road in the town of Palatine, Montgomery county," was held to conceal its true subject and to be false and delusive. The following acts, as entitled, received the same construction: An act to fix the salaries of the officers of a particular city, and confined to that city in its provisions, but entitled "An act to fix and regulate the salaries of city officers in cities of this state; " 86 an act legalizing by its provisions a lottery scheme for a private partnership, under the title of "An act to establish the Mobile Charitable Association for the benefit of the common school fund of Mobile county, without distinction of color; " 87 a supplement to a railroad charter providing for extension of its track into a new territory under a clause in the title "to lay additional tracks." 8

ject save one which is germane to the subject embraced in the title." Macon v. Hughes, 110 Ga. 795, 36 S. E. 247; Blair v. State, 90 Ga. 326, 17 S. E. 96, 35 Am. St. Rep. 206; Butner v. Boifeuillet, 100 Ga. 743, 28 S. E. 464; Hart v. State, 113 Ga. 939, 39 S. E. 321. Practically, therefore, such words do not extend the scope of the title under the later constitutions. See also Sasser v. State, 99 Ga. 54, 25 S. E. 619; Burns v. State, 104 Ga. 544, 30 S. E. 815.

83 People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 404. 84 Durkee v. City of Janesville, 26 Wis. 697. In Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 N. Y. 557, 25 Am. Rep. 235, an act by its provisions local to New

York city was general in its title: "An act to preserve the public peace and order on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday."

It was held sufficient to cover provisions prohibiting dramatic performances on that day, since the cessation of such entertainments was one of the particu lars going to make up the public peace and good order.

85 People v. Com'rs of Highways, 53 Barb. 70.

86 Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L. 58.

87 Moses v. Mayor, etc., 52 Ala. 198. 88 Union Passenger Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91; West Phila. R.

89

An act entitled "An act to protect the planting and cultivating of oysters in the tidewaters of this state," which excluded certain waters from its operation, was held void, because the title indicated an intent to legislate as to all tidewaters, and hence was misleading. So "An act relating to the cost of improving sidewalks in the cities of this state," which, in the body of the act, was made to apply only to cities of the third class, was held void for a similar reason. In giving their decision in this case the court of errors and appeals of New Jersey say: "The title states that the object is to legislate for the cities of the state as a class. The act excludes from its operation all of these cities except those of the third class. No one, on reading the title, could reasonably understand that the body of the act was to have so limited an effect." 90

Upon like grounds the following acts were held invalid: "An act to authorize the city of Milwaukee to change the grade of streets," which applied only to a limited district of forty-nine blocks; 9 "An act making it a misdemeanor to issue trading stamps and other devices," which, while purporting to apply to all classes, exempted certain classes from its operation.92

These decisions have been referred to in detail because no general rule on the subject can safely be formulated. This will be manifest when the cases cited in this section are compared with those cited in the following section.

§ 124. The title may be broader and more compre hensive than the act.- An act of Missouri entitled "An act to establish and maintain a uniform course of text books to be used in all the public schools within this state, and to reduce the price thereof," excluded from its opera

R. Co. v. Union R. R. Co., 9 Phila. 495.

89 State v. Steelman, 66 N. J. L 518, 49 Atl. 978.

91 Anderton v. Milwaukee, 82 Wis. 279, 52 N. W. 95, 15 L. R. A. 830.

92 State v. Walker, 105 La. 492, 29 So. 973. See also Allardt v. People,

90 Beverly v. Waln, 57 N. J. L. 197 Ill. 501, 64 N. E. 533. 143, 144, 30 Atl. 545.