or not by an award of damages in a lump sum, we insist still that we should have done what was right in submitting to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and that the case would not be altogether beyond the reach of remedy. Arbitration, as between private persons and between Sovereign States, differs in this essential particular, that in the case of the latter there is no power in the court to enforce its award, whilst at the same time there is no court of appeal to which the State can appeal against a wrongful decision. A Sovereign State knows no superior under heaven, and, at the same time, would have the right, and the duty, to resist an award in arbitration, not only such as a private person might appeal against, but such as in its discretion, and its sense of duty to its subjects —and this is paramount above all other considerations-it ought not to submit to. For instance, again quoting Calvo, who is here in accord with other authorities, a Sovereign amongst other grounds, would be bound, appealing to his own conscience, to repudiate an award which "bore upon questions not pertinent," or was "absolutely contrary to the rules of justice."

It would be an awkward alternative to have to recur to, no doubt; but still it would be open to us, should the necessity arise; and of course the expediency of resorting to it, or not, the occasion arising, would depend in great measure upon the amount of the damage to be avoided.

As it is, through the unskilfulness of our Government, we have drifted into a very absurd and discreditable position before the Court of Arbitration

at Geneva, which, according to the terms of the Treaty, commenced its sittings on the 15th June. After three or four attempts, at the dictation of General Schenck, Lord Granville at length succeeded in framing a Supplemental Article, which the American Government consented to submit for the approval of the Senate. The Senate sanctioned it, subject, however, to certain modifications which the British Government thought it their duty not to consent to; and proposed to modify the modifications.

The chief alterations proposed by the United States were in the enactive part, which they proposed should run as follows:-"Both Governments adopt for the future the principle that claims for remote or indirect losses should not be admitted as the result of failure to observe neutral obligations." Lord Granville, in his reply, held that the passage so worded was "so vague that it is impossible to state to what it is or is not applicable," and as such would only lead to "misunderstanding." He proposed to substitute the words "of a like nature," instead of "for remote or indirect losses," and the words, "such want of due diligence on the part of a neutral," instead of "for the failure to observe neutral obligations."

We confess we do not see a very clear-certainly not a broad-distinction between the two phrases; but Lord Granville, having been "once bit," was particularly "shy" of taking anything at the suggestion of the Washington Government. It appears to us that whatever form of words had been adopted, "misunderstanding" must have come out of them

whenever they came to be acted upon; and in this we have ample and convincing illustration of the dangers attendant upon all pretences to repeal or modify old-established principles of public law, which carry their own interpretation on their face, and in the precedents in which they have been applied.

Well, the American Government obstinately rejected Lord Granville's proposals-refused, indeed, to offer, or entertain, any further suggestions in the matter, and the Supplemental Article, from which so much was hoped, fell to the ground.

In this new dilemma, driven absolutely up into a corner, Lord Granville had to look about him to gain -that last hope of a bankrupt concern-a little time; aye, even if ever so little!—a week, a day, an hour! In the first instance, he communicated, May 28th, his impressions to the American Government that the Court of Arbitration would not have the power to adjourn its proceedings without the sanction of a short treaty between the two contracting parties. But Mr. Fish would not sign a treaty for the purpose, nor even agree to a joint application to the arbitrators for an adjournment. But this he was prepared to do, viz :-provided Lord Granville put in his "argument showing the points, and referring to the evidence upon which his Government relies," which it was, by Article V of the Treaty, his " duty" to do, on or before the 15th June, the American Government would assent to a proposal for adjournment if made by Great Britain. Lord Granville, with the usual fatuity which attends the habitually unfortunate, did not attach any importance to this

proposition; he has not put in his "argument.' but he has applied to the Court of Arbitration to adjourn, say for eight months, in order to afford time for the two Governments to come to an "understanding. But, indeed, is he not already out of court, by his neglect to comply with the requirement of Article V; or, at any rate, has he not precluded himself from putting in any "argument" at any future time?

THE TREATY SAVED!

WE had written thus far when the news arrived, that, after two or three adjournments of the Geneva Tribunal, made with a view of affording the contracting parties a last chance of coming to some sort of agreement, the arbitrators, acting on their own discretion, interfered, and "saved the treaty." The complication of Gordian knots which the diplomatic wisdom of the two high contracting parties could not untie though both were desirous to do so, the arbitrators have cut, by the trenchant argument of common sense.

On the 19th June, these gentlemen who have throughout shown great consideration for the unfortunate and misguided litigants before them, propounded a long statement, in which, after refering to the avowed purpose with which a long adjournment had been applied for by the British Government, they proceeded to express the opinion that there was no use in making any such delay in the hope of the parties coming to an "understanding," upon a matter upon which they (the

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arbitrators) had already made up their minds. They stated that "after the most careful perusal of all that has been urged on the part of the Government of the United States in respect of these (the indirect) claims, they have arrived individually and collectively at the conclusion that these claims do not constitute, upon the principles of international law applicable to such cases, good foundation for an award of compensation, or computation of damages between nations, and would upon such principles be wholly excluded from the consideration of the Tribunal in making its award, if there were no disagreements between the two Governments as to the competency of the Tribunal to decide them." This was a happy deliverance to both parties; the United States was satisfied at having carried their point, that the Tribunal of Arbitration should give a decision of some sort on their claims; and the British Government, although it had utterly repudiated any deliberative authority in the arbitrators in this matter, were content to accept their decision when it proved to be in their favour; and by permission put in their summary of argument, which they had hitherto withheld. But supposing America had dissented from the dictum of the arbitrators-the inevitable result would have been a collapse. As it is, it will be observed that the dictum of the arbitrators was based upon "the principles of international law," the arbitrators having, in a previous passage in this important statement, studiously guarded themselves against "expressing or implying any opinion upon the