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notwithstanding this scandalous juggle, and breach of faith, we rashly ventured to concur in the appointment of the Joint High Commission of Washington, in 1871, the mischievous blundering work of which is now before us.

LORD REDESDALE'S PUZZLE. ITS OMINOUS SOLUTION. ONE of the most curious out-growths of the present disputes, is the proposition put forward by Lord Redesdale, early last year, and repeated again by him in the course of the recent discussions. In the abstract, his lordship suggests that, as the wrongful acts of which the United States complain were committed by the Southern States, which are now restored to amity, and form a common corporation with them, it would be unfair to mulct a neutral state for these acts, in damages, of which the Southern States, as part of the United States, would partake; thus profiting by their own wrong.

Lord Granville, when the suggestion was first made, declined to offer any opinion on the subject, and as late as the 14th June in the present year, he repeated that "he had no opinion for, or against, the argument." It is strange that upon so important a suggestion, he should not, in the course of a whole twelvemonth, have thought it worth his while to consult the law-officers of the crown, or even Sir Roundel Palmer, who is the counsel specially retained by the Government in this matter. It is, also, no less strange, that without any opinion as to the merits or bearings of the theory propounded, his lordship should have instructed the authors of

the British Counter-case to include an argument based upon it in the summary of general principles with which that document concludes. It must be obvious that if Lord Redesdale's theory is well founded, it would amount to a plea against all payments on account of the Alabama Claims; but as that would be repugnant to the conditions of the Treaty, why adduce it in the pleadings which are based upon that treaty? The fact is, Lord Granville was unable to form any opinion upon the subject, from the simple fact that there are no authorities, nor precedents, possibly to be brought to bear upon it. Under the established principles of international law, as they stood at the time these acts took place, no wrong was committed by any one, and consequently no claim for damages was possible against any one, as between State and State. The "new rules" have created the wrong and the remedy, which did not exist before; and hence the confusion and doubt as to where they should apply, involved in Lord Redesdale's argument, and in the plea based upon it, included in the British Countercase. It is a mistake, however, to impute that by these acts the Confederate States "violated" our neutrality, and that "wrong was done by them to Great Britain, in the very infraction of her laws, which constitutes the foundation of the present claims." The "neutrality" of Great Britain as a state was not violated or even imperilled, by any of these acts; and the people of the Confederate States not being amenable to our municipal laws, could not be guilty of any "infraction" of them.

British subjects may have offended against our municipal law, and if they did, were open to punishment for so doing; but there is no penalty enforcecible against a belligerent state for having received from the subjects of a neutral, contraband of war, nor indeed has a belligerent any remedy against the latter for having supplied them; his only remedy being the right to seize and confiscate them, on the way for the purpose of delivery.

The corollary to all this is to suggest a very grave reflection as to what may possibly-nay, will almost certainly arise out of these unfortunate 66 new rules," on any future occasion of war. It will be observed that they only impose obligations and penalties upon neutrals,—none upon belligerents. Well! suppose a case: Great Britain, France, and the United States, in common with other powers, have accepted the "new rules." France and the United States are at war, Great Britain is neutral; either or both belligerents may in spite of "due diligence" on the part of the United Kingdom, succeed in obtaining from her subjects the material aids prohibited by the "new rules" and by the Foreign Enlistment Act, and either or both may afterwards make claims, and enforce compensation against us, who will have no remedy against the offending belligerent or belligerents.

THE ARBITRATION-FAILURE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL ARTICLE APPEAL FOR TIME.

It was a great mistake in principle, in the first instance, to consent to refer to arbitration matters

which we ought to have settled by the mere exercise of our own judgment, and deliberative will. Calvo in his 'Le Droit' International Théorique et Pratique,' (2nd edition, Paris, 1870), states briefly and well what all jurists concur in, that arbitration, though a useful aid in some cases, should not be resorted to "in those in which the honour and dignity of the country are directly involved." And are not the honour and dignity of the British Crown involved, when we are charged with having "failed to fulfil our duties as neutrals," and that to such an extent that, besides making an "apology" for our conduct, we are to submit ourselves to penalties before a Court of Arbitration? Are our honour and dignity not involved, when the flag which waves over part of our possessions is menaced and put upon trial?

Nevertheless, arbitration having been adopted, we hold to the opinion already expressed, in concurrence with the position of the United States Government, that the arbitrators had full power and discretion to decide as to what properly fell within their province, under the terms of the Treaty. We think, also, with respect to the Indirect Claims, that upon the face of the Treaty, more especially the preamble, taken in connection with the protocols relating to it, the evidence is so strong that the arbitrators, guided by the well-known rules for the interpretation oftreaties, would have had no hesitation in giving a decision against them. We need not go at length into the principles which hold in these matters, but with regard to promises may mention

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two principal canons. In the first place, when a promise is made it is to be interpreted in the way in which the promiser intended it, and had reason to believe that the promisee understood it to be made; evidence of which may be had by reference to the document itself, and other documents relating to it, or of a similar kind. Secondly, national law recognizes two kinds of contracts, those which are "favourable and those which are "odious; " "favourable" contracts being those in which there is a mutuality of advantage, "odious " being those where the advantage is all on one side, and also those by which anything in the nature of a penalty is incurred. In "favourable" contracts, according to Grotius," the words are to be taken in their full propriety, and, if ambiguous, in their largest sense; whereas in "odious" contracts, "the words are to be taken in a more restricted sense." Vattel observes, further, that when a great injury is likely to be inflicted by the application of the wording of an "odious" contract, a "figurative interpretation" may be adopted in the interests of substantial justice; and adds this remarkable maxim, which is peculiarly applicable to the present unfortunate case, that in the interpretation of treaties which bear the character of one-sidedness, "the cause of him who seeks to avoid a loss, is more favourable than that of him who seeks to procure a gain.”

Supposing it to be possible, however, that in spite of all arguments of the kind suggested, and others too voluminous to go into here, the arbitrators should have given a decision against us, accompanied

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