referring more particularly to "the duties which Great Britain, as a neutral, should have observed toward the United States," lays down principles for the most part inconsistent with, and repugnant to the principles of international law regarding the rights and duties of neutrals, as they have existed from the earliest times down to our day. It is insisted also that the "new rules" adopted at Washington were part and parcel of the old established international law, notwithstanding the reservation adopted in regard to them by the British Government, in the following unmistakeable terms:

"It is true that it was thought essential by the British negociators to insert a declaration on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that they could not consent to those rules as a statement of the principles of international law which were in force at the time when the claims now under considera

tion arose. But the United States were then, and are still, of opinion, and they confidently think, that the Tribunal of Arbitration will agree with them, not only that those rules were then in force, but that there were also other rules of international law then in force not inconsistent with them, defining with still greater strictness the duties of a neutral in time of war."

The obvious intention of this statement is to impugn the candour and good faith of the British Government and its Commissioners in making the reservations referred to; the words "it was thought essential" having an unmistakable significance. But apart from this it would lead to most momentous

results if the Tribunal of Arbitration were to give its sanction to the position that the "new rules," were indeed ancient rules of international law, and that beyond them "there were other rules" of ancient standing, "defining with still greater strictness the the duties of a neutral in time of war." Such sanction would, so far as the authority of the tribunal might be held to have weight, virtually establish the American code of neutral obligations not only as against the United Kingdom, but as against neutrals generally. At present, by the terms of the Treaty, the contracting parties only agree to observe the 66 new rules" as between themselves for the future, and "to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to agree to them." The American "Case" would go further, and add to the invitation to agree to the " new rules" something like the moral pressure of authority, and that, as we shall see, in respect of a still larger and more stringent scheme of international law. This would involve most serious results to the comity of nations; it not being too much to say that the general adoption of the new code would render the position of neutrality more perilous than that of belligerency itself; if indeed it did not abolish neutrality altogether, in the sense of exemption from the operations and consequences of the war. Such conditions would be most onerous and costly to large maritime States, and might be fatal to the very existence of the smaller. It would, indeed, effect a recurrence to the old times of ruthless violence, when the term neutral was not even known, (it

is not as much as mentioned by Grotius), and when no State was held to be neutral if either belligerent thought proper to attack it.

The new scheme of international law, which the American "Case" formulates, for the occasion, "as against Great Britain," is set forth not under three, but twelve distinct heads, with an additional one elsewhere, making thirteen in all. We repeat that the British Government would have been perfectly justified, and would have exercised a sound discretion, if, in its Counter-case, it had declined to discuss this "Résumé of Principles," as it is called, contenting itself by referring to the special conditions laid down in the Treaty, and submitting to have the case tried by the "new rules," three in number, and by "such principles of international law, not inconsistent therewith, as the arbitrators shall determine to be applicable to the case." Unfortunately they have not so acted, but have been tempted to cite the American "Résumé," with occasional comments, in which, far from expressing the emphatic denunciation which so much groundless pretension called for, they sometimes make admissions which will, inevitably, whenever they are brought in question, lead to confusion and error. We will pass in review this "bakers' dozen" of propositions, making such remarks on them as may seem necessary.

The first of the propositions advanced by the American Goverment is as follows: "That it is the duty of a neutral to preserve strict and impartial neutrality as to both belligerents

during hostilities." The British Government, in its Counter-case, willingly assents to this proposition," as though it considered that it amounted to a truism, and goes on, in an almost sarcastic humour, to remark, "no one, indeed, has yet been found to deny that it is the duty of a neutral power to be neutral," etc.

The second American proposition is: "That this (the first-named) obligation is independent of municipal law," upon which, the Counter-case remarks, "The British Government accepts this proposition also."

Is the British Government quite sure of its ground, in acquiescing, as it has done, in these two propositions? May there not possibly arise another case of mischief "growing out of" a too facile acceptance of a position put in language, doubtless very carefully prepared by the adversary? To arrive at a true understanding of the position, it is necessary to take the two propositions together, for the second depends upon the first. Be it remarked then, in the first place, that the word "preserve" is new, as applied to the position voluntarily assumed by a Statę in remaining neutral pending a war between other states," observe," being the word used for the purpose by all jurists. Martens, for instance, in his 'Précis des Droits des Gens,' says of a Sovereign so circumstanced," Provided he observes that which an exact neutrality requires of him," etc.;-and again, "In order to observe a complete neutrality, he must abstain from all participation in expeditions of war." Again, our proclamation of neutrality declares the

Royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality;" and "strictly charges and commands all our loving subjects to observe a strict neutrality." So, also, the proclamations of the Emperor of the French, and of the Queen of Spain, in the case of this very war, state that the Sovereign in his discretion has "resolved to maintain a strict neutrality." The difference between declaring the "Royal determination" or "resolve" to "maintain" neutrality, and it being "the duty" of the Sovereign to "preserve" neutrality is very plain ;—the former implying an act of freewill, the latter the conforming to an obligation. Had the American proposition been to the effect, "that it is the duty of a neutral to observe strict and impartial neutrality," no one, indeed, could have disputed the palpable truism. But if that were the intended meaning of the proposition, what can have been the object of appending to it another, that "this obligation is independent of municipal law ?" A State cannot limit its sovereign rights and functions by a municipal law, which is only applicable to its subjects. The British Counter-case admits that it is "the duty of a neutral power to be neutral,” but that is not what the American proposition contemplates it involves this, that a neutral power must "preserve" neutrality amongst its subjects, and that this "obligation" is independent of any powers it may have for the purpose under any existing municipal law.*

* It were perhaps needless to point out the difference in import of the two terms, as contained in the dictionaries. To observe is "to keep religiously," "to keep or adhere to in