neither can a tribunal of arbitration composed of sovereign states enforce its judgments, in the way of civil courts of judicature, against recusant parties. But there is still some respect due to the good offices of mediating states, the denial of which they are entitled to resent under penalties only limited by their own discretion, and their power to enforce them.

Putting it in the mildest form, it would be entirely a matter of option with the Italian, Brazilian and Swiss Governments, in the case of our ultimate repudiation of their functions as arbitrators, whether they should, or should not, treat the occurrence as one calling for the interruption of friendly relations. Moreover, as such a breach would destroy the whole Treaty, the Emperor of Germany might equally, in such case, be at liberty to treat as he thought proper the breach of good faith incurrred in the withdrawal from his arbitration of that troublesome question of the North-Western Boundary, which has been referred to him. We may, perhaps, have good reason to hope that there are no combinations of policy which might induce the several Foreign States referred to thus to resent our withdrawal from our treaty obligations, but the eventuality is one of such serious character and import, that we ought not to leave it possible at the discretion of others. As to the action open to the United States in such a contingency, it might assume the form of war. There would be little probability, perhaps, of such a result immediately occurring in the present case; but the option would be in the hands of our

opponents, and might be held in reserve till the arrival of any favouring occasion; and in the meantime, perhaps to all time, we should stand before the world branded with the charge of bad faith, which ranks amongst the most odious crimes known to nations.

With such reflections on our mind, we approach the consideration of the merits of this lamentable controversy, and the negociations of the Treaty of Washington generally, as set forth in the official documents before us, with no very cheerful or confident prepossessions. Restricting ourselves, still, to the Alabama Claims, it will be observed, in reference to the protocols, that the American Commissioners made no suggestion, expressed or implied, that, in agreeing to the proposal of the British Commissioners for an arbitration, accompanied by the concessions made by the latter, including the "apology apology" and the acceptance of the "new rules," in lieu of the payment of a lump sum, as they had at first proposed, they looked upon the modification of the proceedings aimed at as in any way militating against their "amicable" character; and it may be added, that if they had given any hint of the kind the British Commissioners would probably have had the prudence and the firmness at once to refuse completing the transaction. Yet in their "Case" the American Government has the coolness to assert that "the British Commissioners declined to make the 'amicable settlement' which was proposed on the part of the United States," and that thereupon followed other negociations which led to "an arrange

ment" which they would have the world to understand was distinct from all idea of amicableness. The preamble to the Treaty speaks of it as being framed as the means to "an amicable settlement ;" and it is remarkable, and to be regretted, that neither of the Governments in citing the Treaty in their "Cases," thought it of importance to quote this preamble.

CHARGE OF UNFRIENDLINESS AGAINST THE BRITISH

GOVERNMENT.

BUT, alas !-too certain it is that whatever friendly and generous sentiments may have animated the two Governments, as represented by their Commissioners on the signing of the Treaty in May, 1871, very little of these feelings long survived on the side of our opponents. The American Government open their "Case" by declaring that "they purpose to show that from the outbreak of the insurrection of the Southern States of the United States there was on the part of the British Government a studied unfriendliness, or fixed predisposition adverse to the United States, which furnished a constant motive for the several acts of omission and commission hereinafter complained of as inconsistent with its duty as a neutral." Not to comment on the infinitely bad taste of such a remark, it might, in strict reason, be asked whether under the provisions of the Treaty it could properly be introduced in any proceedings based upon it. The claims "growing out" of the acts of the escaped cruisers is the only matter referred to the Court of Arbitration, the first of which escaped in the spring

of 1862, whilst the outbreak of the insurrection took place early in December, 1860, nearly a year and a half previously. With nothing that occurred between these two periods has the Court of Arbitration any concern, and the reference to the occurrences and discussions which may have taken place during that interval, can only have been made with the object of showing an evil animus on the part of Great Britain, and thereby of aggravating against her any damages accruing for specific acts which occurred after its expiring. In ordinary judicial procedure the interpolation of such allegations would be denounced as "impertinent," and might vitiate the whole case as for "uncertainty," that is, as rendering it impossible to define the portion of damage properly attributable to the conduct of the respondent before, and after, the date at which the matters under reference commenced.

Of such materials, nevertheless, is more than the half of this" Case" composed. The British Government, in its Counter-case, very properly "distinctly refuses to enter upon the discussion of these charges," as being "inconsistent with the selfrespect which every Government is bound to feel," and also, "because the matter in dispute is action, and not motive, and therefore the discussion is irrelevant." If in these pages we refer briefly to one or two of these complaints, it will be purely as a matter of history, and not as having any import upon the merits of the questions in dispute.

The first ground of complaint against us is the promptitude with which the Southern States were

recognized as belligerents, and the Queen's proclamation thereon, issued on the 13th May, 1861, after the declaration of blockade by the United States Government. It is not pretended to deny our Sovereign right to make that recognition, and to issue that proclamation, but it is declared that "in making this matter part of this "Case" (which we maintain cannot properly be done), 'the United States Government, with deep and unfeigned regret, have been forced to conclude, from all the circumstances, that Her Majesty's Government was actuated at that time by a conscious unfriendly purpose towards the United States."

In answer to this whining appeal, it may be remarked that without belligerency there could be no neutrality, and consequently no application of the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The Queen's Proclamation accompanying the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, gave solemn notice of the fact, and recognized the Blockade proclaimed by the United States, enjoining her subjects to respect it; and Her Majesty's Government continued to recognize such blockade afterwards, notwithstanding that it was commonly known that through the weakness or inefficiency, or both, of the United States Marine, that blockade, as states the British Counter-case, was "very imperfectly maintained," and that the British Government was in consequence "frequently urged to disregard it, both by the Confederate States, and by persons desirous of trading with them." But, as the British the British Counter-case points out,