CITIES.

1. A judgment for an assessment against lots or lands within a city, should be special, and a precept should issue against the lots or lands assessed. A gen

eral judgment and execution would be wrong. Brown v. City of Joliet, 123. 2. On an appeal from the County to the Circuit Court, in matters of assessment, the trial is de novo, and the Circuit Court does not acquire, by appeal, any jurisdiction beyond that of the County Court. Ibid. 123.

3. Before a court can render judgment for an assessment, the amount assessed should appear in dollars and cents; but the return of the commissioners appointed to make the assessment, may be amended under the statute of Jeofails. Ibid. 123.

CITY OF CHICAGO.

1. The Common Council of the city of Chicago had authority to appoint special collectors, under the charter of 1851, and whether they had this power or not, the collector elected was not justified in withholding monies, upon the ground that the fees received by such collectors belonged to him. Russell et al. v. City of Chicago, 283.

2. The law raises a presumption in favor of the regularity of all proceedings levying assessments, which must be rebutted by showing affirmatively, that something was omitted or improperly done, if they are to be defeated. McAuley v. The Same, 563.

3. An additional notice to parties interested, is not required, where an assessment is postponed from one meeting of the Common Council to another. Ibid. 563. 4. In making assessments for public improvements, in the city of Chicago, the costs of engineering, superintending and collecting, may be included. Gibson v. The Same, 566.

5. The Common Pleas Court, has the same authority to continue a case for assessments, that it has to continue any other case. Ibid. 566.

6. In showing an assessment, there must be something to indicate clearly what the figures used, stand for, or are intended to represent. Ibid. 566.

7. The charter of the city of Chicago does not permit any property to be burthened exceeding three per cent. in any year, for improvements on streets, etc. Morrison v. The Same, 573.

8. Equity will not interfere to correct proceedings on the part of the city of Chicago in collecting an assessment; a party should take his appeal, or resort to a writ of certiorari. McBride v. The Same, 574.

9. If the assessment was vitiated by fraud, or the party assessed was likely to sustain an irreparable injury, equity might relieve. Mere irregularities in making an assessment, will not be regarded in equity. Ibid. 574.

10. Assessments for improvements already made, by parties other than the city, are illegal. Peck v. The Same, 578.

11. Proceedings under special assessment for the city of Chicago, prior to the passage of the law of 1857, were limited to time, both as to the order of sale and the sale of property, and the sale was required to be within two years from the date of the order confirming the assessment; unless it was delayed by legal proceedings. Hamilton v. The Same, 580.

12. The collector for the city of Chicago is required to state in his report, asking for a judgment against delinquent lots, etc., the amount of taxes and assessments which remain unpaid, after the first Tuesday of January, but not the particular object for which the assessment was levied, nor the value of the property upon which it has been levied. Bristol v. The Same, 587.

13. The collector's report is prima facie evidence of the amount due, if the owner of the land is in default, and upon this, judgment may be rendered. The report does not prejudice any party, by any statement in it, beyond what the law requires shall be stated. Nothing beyond is evidence. Ibid. 587.

14. A party may appear and rebut a presumption, arising from the report of the collector. Ibid. 587.

15. No piece of property can be assessed exceeding three per cent., in one year, for any improvement specified in the first section of the charter; and if it is shown that a greater sum has been levied, judgment should be refused. Ibid.

587.

16. Ten per cent. may be collected in addition to the assessment and costs. Ibid.

587.

17. Where it is stipulated that a judgment shall be rendered as if by default, upon certain conditions, the judgment will stand; all that part of the report not required by the law, being disregarded. Ogden v. The Same, 592. See COURTS. PRACTICE IN COOK COUNTY.

CLAIM AND COLOR OF TITLE.

1. The payment of taxes by any person extinguishes them, and if a voluntary attempt is made to pay them a second time, the last will be considered a gratuity to the taxing power. Morrison v. Kelly, 610.

2. Possession is actual, when there is an occupancy, according to its adaptation to use; constructive, when there is a paramount title to it; and adverse, when there is such an appropriation of it as will inform the vicinage that it is in the exclusive use and enjoyment of some known person. Ibid. 610.

3. The second grantee will be affected by a notice to his grantor, if, with the exercise of ordinary prudence and caution, he could have ascertained the fact of such notice. Ibid. 610.

4. An open and visible occupation of land, is notice, to put a party on inquiry. Ibid. 610.

See TAXES.

COMMON CARRIERS.

See LOST BAGGAGE. RAILROADS.

CONSIGNOR, CONSIGNEE.

Where goods are erroneously shipped to a fictitious person, and after remaining unclaimed, are sold by the warehousemen, the surplus proceeds, after paying charges, belong to the shipper. Boilvin et al. v. Moore et al. 318.

CONSTABLES' BONDS.

See BONDS.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

See STATUTES CONSTRUED.

CONTINUANCE.

1. If a party relies upon the promise of a witness to be present at a trial, he cannot obtain a continuance if the witness does not attend. Day v. Gelston, 102.

2. A party is entitled to a continuance if a plaintiff does not file an account ten days before the term, if he has common counts in his declaration. Hawthorn v. Cooper, 225.

3. If the plaintiff desires to avoid a continuance, he can stipulate against using the common counts, or enter a nolle prosequi as to them. Ibid. 225.

4. To justify the continuance of a cause by reason of the absence of a witness, something more than the writing of letters and making inquiries is required. Stevenson v. Sherwood, 238.

5. An application for a continuance, on account of the absence of a witness, should not only show diligence, but that there are no others to prove the same facts, and that the witness may be in attendance at another term. A delay of six

months, without serving process on a witness, is a want of diligence. Eames
v. Hennessy, 628.

CONTRACT.

1. If money is advanced to a sub-contractor, the principal contractor will only be
held for the amount advanced by his authority. Mineral Point Railroad Co.
v. Keep, 9.

2. Where an executory contract is in question, alleged to have been founded in
fraud, the court will not aid either party. Winston v. McFarland, 38.

3. Where the parties to a building contract agree that the superintendent shall pass
upon the work, and certify as to the payments to be made, his decision is bind-
ing, unless fraud or mistake on his part shall be shown. McAuley v. Carter
et al., 53.

4. Notice need not be given of the certificate obtained from the superintendent,
where the contract does not require it. Ibid. 53.

5. Executory contracts are avoided by the statute of frauds; executed contracts
are not. Swanzey v. Moore, 63.

6. If a laborer contracts verbally, to work an entire year, he is entitled to the wages
agreed upon; and to the same proportionate compensation, for any period of
time he labors, less than a year. Ibid. 63.

7. A parol contract, which is required by the statute to be in writing, is as binding
as any, when performed, or while being performed. Ibid. 63.

8. If a party agrees to labor for a year for a certain sum, he must labor for that
time to be entitled to any compensation. He is not bound to labor longer than
he pleases, but if he abandons the contract voluntarily, he need not be paid for
the time he does labor. Ibid. 63.

9. If a party agrees to labor for a fixed period, and quits before that period has
elapsed, without any sufficient cause, or for any cause he has provoked, he can-
not recover for the time he has labored. Ibid. 63.

10. At law, time is of the essence of a contract to convey land, and if the vendor
is not able to perform on the day, the vendee may consider the contract at an
end. Conway v. Case, 127.

11. Where a party sold merchandise, receiving part pay in real estate, the residue
to be paid by indorsed notes, if the vendor takes notes without an indorsement,
and expresses satisfaction with them, the vendor cannot afterwards recover of
the purchaser the amount paid by said notes. Stevens v. Bradley, 244.

12. If any recovery could be had, it would only be upon a cancellation of or return
to the purchaser, at or before trial, of the notes given; the return after the trial
would be too late. Ibid. 244.

13. A verbal contract, not to be performed within a year, will not sustain an action.
Comstock v. Ward, 248.

14. A mechanics' lien cannot be sustained on a contract, which does not contain a
provision, that the work shall be completed within three years. Senior v.
Brebnor et al. 252.

15. An action on a contract must be in the name of the party in whom the legal
interest is vested. Dix v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 272.

16. A party suing, who shows he has not any interest in the cause of action, cannot
recover. Ibid. 272.

17. Where one of the three partners who had effected an insurance, afterwards and
before a loss, assigns his interest to the other two, without any notice to, or
consent by the insurers; the two cannot recover on the policy, especially where
they so declare in their declaration, and the policy forbids such an assignment.
Ibid. 272.

18. A subsequent agreement under seal, written upon and referring to a former
agreement not under seal, which imposes a penalty in case the original contract
should not be performed, does not convert such original contract into a deed.
Waughop v. Weeks et al. 350.

19. A party who engages to labor for another for a specified time, cannot recover
for his services unless he performs his contract, or is excused by his employer,
or is justified in leaving the service. Angle v. Hanna, 429.

20. That he is called upon to do severe, or unpleasant labor, does not excuse him
for leaving his work. Ibid. 429.

21. In an action to recover damages for work improperly performed by a plasterer,
it is erroneous to refuse to instruct the jury, that a warranty might exist in a
contract, without the use of any particular word, if such was the intention;
and that if the plastering fell off, it may be inferred the work was not well
done, unless it be shown that the plasterer was not in fault. Van Buskirk v.
Murden, 446.

22. A party who has accepted work, is not held to have waived defects in it, if,
like plastering, it may have latent defects, which are not open to inspection.
Ibid. 446.

23. Where the same proof may be offered under the issues in a case, as might be
offered under an unanswered plea, it is not ground for a reversal, that a plea is
so unanswered. Atlantic Insurance Company v. Wright, 462.

24. A verdict which finds the issue for the plaintiff, and assesses his damages, is
sufficient. Ibid. 462.

25. Where the representatives of an insurance company, express satisfaction with
the preliminary proofs of a loss, as offered by the insured, they cannot subse-
quently withdraw that approval, but will be bound by it. Ibid. 462.

26. If the agent of an insurance company is informed of all the facts connected
with the interest of the assured in the property described in the policy, and
does not require a statement thereof, the company will be bound by his acts,
and cannot avoid the policy because the interest of the insured varies from the
conditions stated in the policy, but will be estopped by the acts of the agent.
Ibid. 462.

27. Time may be of the essence of a contract, and where that is made clearly to
appear, the court will enforce a forfeiture, unless there are circumstances
which will relieve against it. Steele et al. v. Biggs et al. 643.

28. A payment of a considerable part of the purchase money will not excuse the
purchaser for non-performance. Ibid. 643.

29. In contracts for the sale of land to A. B., his representatives or assigns, a cove-
nant for the payment of money, which is broken, is assignable after the breach,
and may run with the land, so as to have a forfeiture declared, if the assignee
is by the contract vested with the option of so doing. Ibid. 643.

30. A forfeiture may be produced by a reasonable notice of the intention to do so,
if a strict performance is not made. Ibid. 643.

31. A simple inquiry, as to whether a party will take money, is not a tender. The
money must be in the power or within immediate control of the party offer-
ing it. Ibid. 643.

See ACTION.

CONVEYANCES.

1. Although an absolute conveyance may be shown by parol testimony to have
been given as a security only, yet such evidence must be so strong as to over-
come all doubts, before the court will so decree. Hartnett v. Ball, 43.

2. It is competent for a party to show that the consideration expressed in a deed
applied only to a part of the land described in it, the vendor not pretending to
have a title to some of the land referred to in the deed. Sidders v. Riley, 109.
3. A party who contracts to give a deed with a covenant against incumbrances,
does not meet his obligation, by offering such a deed, if the property is actually
incumbered. Conway v. Case, 127.

4. The word "also," in a deed, expressing what is granted thereby, means like-
wise, in like manner, in addition to, denoting that something is added to what
precedes it. Panton v. Tefft, 366.

5. The proof of notice of an unrecorded deed, may be established like any other
fact. Morrison v. Kelly, 610.

6. The delivery of a deed to a stranger, if ratified by the grantee, is good. Ibid.

610.

7. The delivery of a deed to one other than the grantee, having an interest in the land, is good. Ibid. 610.

See DEEDS. EJECTMENT, 6. FRAUDS.

CORPORATIONS.

1. Corporations are included in the word “person,” used in the Attachment Law. Mineral Point Railroad Company v. Keep, 9.

2. The question of liability of a corporation for committing a trespass, would depend upon a fact, as to the orders and directions of the company to commit or not the act complained of, and a certioriari, therefore, was not a proper remedy to authorize a review of the judgment of a justice of the peace, in a case of trespass. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Company v. Fell, 333.

3. The service of a process upon any agent, other than the law agent of a corporation, is sufficient, if properly made and returned. Ibid. 333.

See CITIES. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. RAILROADS. TOWNS AND CITIES.

COSTS.

See ADMINISTRATOR, 4. OFFICE OFFICER. SECURITY FOR COSTS.

CO-TENANTS.

See ACTION.

COUNTIES, COUNTY COURTS AND COMMISSIONERS.

1. On a judgment against a county, it is erroneous to award an execution. County of Knox v. Arms, 175.

2. Counties should pay for printed blanks, such as summons, subpoenas, etc., furnished by the clerk of the Circuit Court for the use of his office. Ibid. 175. 3. County Courts can establish rules of practice. Holloway v. Freeman, 197.

COURTS.

1. The Common Pleas should not assess damages, as if by default, while a plea of the general issue is on file, though verified by an insufficient affidavit. The plea should first be struck from the files. McDonnell v. Harter, 28.

2. In Cook county, where a note is the cause of action, and the declaration besides special, contains the common counts, the affidavit of merits to a plea, may be general, and go only to a part of the damages claimed. Former decisions reviewed. Hurd v. Burr et al. 29.

3. If a plaintiff shall abandon the common counts, and the defendant shall then refuse to swear that he has a meritorious defense, the plaintiff will be entitled to a judgment. Ibid. 29.

4. If the plaintiff, after a plea filed, shall limit his demand, and the defendant refuses to make a further affidavit, judgment may pass as by default. Ibid. 29. 5. Judgment against several cannot go, upon service of notice, etc., on one; nor does filing notice, in the office of the clerk of Cook County Court, meet the exigency of the statute. Ibid. 29.

6. An affidavit of merits to a plea is part of the plea, and is preserved in the record without a bill of exceptions. This is the case also, where a plea is stricken from the files. Whiting v. Fuller, 33.

7. Persons sued jointly, who plead the general issue, may sustain it by an affidavit of merits, made by one of the defendants. If separate pleas are filed, each plea must be sustained by an affidavit of merits. Ibid. 33.