People ex rel. Montgomery v. Barr, Clerk, etc. ty-six dollars and forty cents, debt, and one hundred and fiftythree dollars and eighty cents, damages. We do not see any solid objection to this. The court had possession of the whole case, and it was hardly worth while to enter a judgment on the record, when a motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment was pending. Not until the latter motion had been disposed of, could the court regularly cause a judgment to be entered. The court had full power to render a perfect judgment on finding the issue for the plaintiff. The matters of the special plea could be given in evidence under the general issue, and we will presume they were in evidence. Warner v. Crane, 20 Ill. R. 151. The judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE PEOPLE, on the relation of Jehial H. Montgomery, Complainants, v. JAMES G. BARR, Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of the City of Aurora, Respondent. APPLICATION FOR MANDAMUS. The Court of Common Pleas of the city of Aurora has power to issue final process to a foreign county. Where local courts have jurisdiction to render judgment, they may issue final process, beyond the limits of their original jurisdiction, to aid in the enforcing of such judgments. THIS petition by Jehial H. Montgomery, of the county of Kane, in the State of Illinois, represents, that Lyman E. Montgomery, on the 23rd day of September, A. D. 1858, in vacation after the June térm of the Court of Common Pleas of the city of Aurora, A. D. 1858, by confession before Hon. A. C. Gibson, judge of the Court of Common Pleas of the city of Aurora, recovered a judgment against Robert Jones and Peter Jones, for the sum of three hundred and forty-one dollars and sixty-five cents, besides costs, in said court. That said judgment was regularly and legally obtained, and now remains in full force and effect, and unsatisfied. That an execution has issued to the sheriff of Kane county to serve, and has been returned by said sheriff, unsatisfied. That the defendants have property in the county of Kendall, liable to execution. That petitioner is now the owner of said judgment, the same having been assigned to him by the plaintiff in said judgment. People ex rel. Montgomery v. Barr, Clerk, etc. That on the 4th day of May, A. D. 1859, he went to the office of the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of said city of Aurora, and requested him to issue an execution upon said judgment, directed to the sheriff of Kendall county, State of Illinois, against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of said defendants in said judgment. That said James G. Barr, clerk of said court, then and there refused to issue said execution, directed to the sheriff of Kendall county, alleging as his reason for so refusing, that he had no authority by law to send an execution out of the county of Kane. By reason of which refusal to issue said execution, the petitioner is prevented from having satisfaction of the said judgment, as he is lawfully and justly entitled to have of the property of the said Robert Jones and Peter Jones, in said county of Kendall. Wherefore petitioner prays the grant of a writ of mandamus under the seal of this court, directed to the said James G. Barr, clerk, as aforesaid, commanding him as such clerk, forthwith to issue an execution against the lands and tenements, goods and chattels of the said Robert Jones and Peter Jones, in the usual form of fieri facias, directed to the sheriff of Kendall county, in said State, to be by him executed in due form of law. In this case, the parties agree that the facts stated in the foregoing petition are correctly stated, and that the same are truly and correctly stated, and shall be taken and considered by the court, the same as if they were returned by said Barr to an alternative mandamus. It was agreed that all informalities shall be waived, and if in the opinion of this court, the law authorizes an execution to be issued to a foreign county, a final order shall be made, and a peremptory mandamus shall issue. R. G. MONTONY, for Petitioner. W. T. BURGESS, for Respondent. BREESE, J. We do not understand that the case to which reference has been made by the defendant, The People ex relatione Beebe v. Evans, 18 Ill. R. 361, decides the question presented by this record, or as having any particular bearing on it, except as expressing the views of this court as to the territorial jurisdiction of such inferior courts as may be established by the General Assembly in the cities of this State, in pursuance of the first section of the fifth article of the constitution. The objection which prevailed in that case was, that by the act of the General Assembly the grant of jurisdiction was not confined to the city limits of LaSalle, but extended to the towns People ex rel. Montgomery v. Barr, Clerk, etc. of LaSalle and Salisbury. No such objection is made here, but it is objected that the jurisdiction being confined to the city limits of Aurora, final process cannot issue from the Court of Common Pleas of that city as established by the act of February 11, 1857, (Session Laws of 1857, page 375,) although in a case properly arising within its acknowledged jurisdiction. There is no question made, nor can there be, that the judgment in this case was rendered by the Court of Common Pleas of Aurora city, in a case not within the jurisdiction of that court. It is confessed, that the court had jurisdiction to render the judgment, and yet it is insisted with an appearance of earnestness, that there the power of the court ended-that although there is given to it by clear and express enactment the same power and authority and jurisdiction, and the clerk required to perform the same duties as the clerk of the Circuit Court-and all its orders, judgments and decrees to be enforced and collected in the same manner as are those of the Circuit Court, a judgment of that court cannot be enforced or collected, unless the debtor shall have real estate or goods and chattels within the city limits. This certainly cannot be the meaning of the act, for if it were so, its passage would tend but in a very slight degree, to benefit the city and its business people, or meet their wants. Designed, as those courts are, to settle and dispose of the litigation arising in the cities, they would fall far short of the object, if a successful suitor in that court must stop on the recovery of his judgment. We hold, the court having proceeded to judgment in a case properly arising within its jurisdiction, can never be deprived of that jurisdiction. When jurisdiction has once attached, it continues necessarily, and all the powers requisite to give it full and complete effect, can be exercised, until the end of the law shall be attained. We do not wish to be understood as saying that this court, has jurisdiction to issue original process to be executed without the limits of the city, but we do say, where such process has been regularly issued and executed within those limits, the court cannot pause or be arrested in carrying out its jurisdiction to judgment and execution, and the clerk can and should on application being made, issue that process to any county in the State, the same, in all respects, as the clerk of the Circuit Court. This power accorded to that court, local though it be, by no means takes from it its character as a court of inferior jurisdiction. It is such a court, but in the exercise of its admitted and conceded jurisdiction, it has all the power the Circuit Court of Kane county has, for the exercise of the jurisdiction con Stevens v. Bradley. ferred upon that court. Its power to issue final process to a foreign county is not denied, neither can it be denied to the Court of Common Pleas of the city of Aurora. A peremptory mandamus will be awarded. Peremptory mandamus awarded. 24a 462 2222 TALMADGE STEVENS, Appellant, v. LEONIDAS C. Bradley, for the use of B. T. Hunt, Appellee. 22 244 76a 493 22 244 j202 2523 244 22 1112a1483 APPEAL FROM COOK. Where a party sold merchandise, receiving part pay in real estate, the residue to be paid by indorsed notes, if the vendor takes notes without an indorsement, and expresses satisfaction with them, the vendor cannot afterwards recover of the purchaser the amount paid by said notes. If any recovery could be had, it would only be upon a cancellation of or return to the purchaser, at or before trial, of the notes given; the return after the trial would be too late. THIS action was assumpsit, commenced in the Cook Circuit Court by attachment. The declaration contains two counts upon a special executory contract for the sale of goods, and the common counts. The first special count was, in substance, that on the 29th day of December, 1856, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of defendant, would sell and deliver to defendant a certain quantity of goods, viz. :-all and singular the entire stock of boots and shoes, then being in a certain building, occupied by plaintiff, in the city of Chicago, at a price then agreed upon, of six thousand eight hundred and forty-one dollars, and seven cents, the said defendant undertook, etc., to pay for said goods by forthwith conveying to plaintiff his (defendant's) interest in certain real estate, situate in Chicago, with a certain building thereon, for five thousand dollars of the price of said goods, and by also making and procuring within one week from that time, nine promissory notes, dated the 25th December, 1856, made by defendant, and indorsed by one A. M. Tucker of Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, payable to the order of plaintiff-the first of said notes to be for two hundred dollars, payable in two months from date; the second for the same sum in three months; the third for the same sum in four months; the fourth for the same sum in five months; the fifth for the same sum in six months; the sixth for the same sum in seven months; the seventh for the same sum in eight months; the eighth for the same sum in nine Stevens v. Bradley. months; the ninth for the sum of two hundred and forty-one dollars and seven cents, payable in ten months from said date. That on the 29th December, 1856, the plaintiff, under said agreement delivered the said goods to defendant, and defendant conveyed to plaintiff said real estate and building. That after the lapse of one week the plaintiff requested the defendant to make and procure to be indorsed, and deliver to plaintiff said nine promissory notes; that defendant refused, and did not then or at any other time deliver said notes, or any or similar notes to plaintiff, and by reason thereof plaintiff had been deprived of the use and benefit of said notes. The second count is like the first, except that it is averred that the said nine promissory notes were to be delivered to plaintiff on or before the 29th day of December, 1856, and that it was thereafter agreed that if plaintiff would deliver the possession of said goods, that defendant would procure and deliver said notes indorsed by Tucker within one week: breach the same as first count. The defendant pleaded the general issue and a plea of set-off. To which last mentioned plea the plaintiff replied by traversing the indebtedness. On the 9th day of January, 1858, the cause was tried before the court and a jury, MANIERRE, Judge, presiding. The court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave the following instructions to the jury: 1st. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the sale of goods mentioned in the declaration, was made as agreed in the declaration, and that the nine notes were by the terms of that contract of sale, to be made and delivered in one week alleged in the declaration, and that said contract was broken on the part of the defendant, and that said notes were not made and delivered as agreed upon, nor any of them, within the period agreed upon, then the jury are to find for the plaintiff, and the sale is to be treated as a cash sale, and the measure of damages is the sum total of all the notes so agreed to be delivered, with interest from and after the lapse of the day when the contract was to have been performed. 2nd. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that Stevens was to give his own notes indorsed by Tucker, within the time stated in the declaration, for $1,841.07, to Bradley, that Stevens failed to give these notes as agreed, the jury must find for the plaintiff and treat the sale as a cash sale, and assess the plaintiff's damages at the amount for which the notes were to be given, with interest on that amount from the time when the contract was broken. 3rd. If the jury find, from the evidence, that the notes given |