Edwards v. Edwards.

and transfer a good title to them, from Farnum to the purchaser.
It is true, that Farnum's regular business was not dealing in
safes, yet the broad language in these powers of attorney, was
sufficient to authorize him to dispose of a desk, or chair, or safe,
which had been procured for the use of the store, but for which
there was no longer occasion for the accommodation of the
business. There was no appearance of fraud or unfairness in
the transaction. It was evidently conducted in good faith and
with a view to promote the interest of his principal. But if
there were doubts, as to the extent of the original authority to
make the sale, the evidence offered should have been admitted,
to prove a subsequent ratification of it by Farnum. Upon his
return he was advised of the sale, and he made no objection to
This of itself, afforded strong evidence that he approved of
what Page had done, and thus ratified it.

The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

JAMES O. EDWARDS, Appellant, . GEORGE J. EDWARDS,

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM ROCK ISLAND.

The award of a new trial in a first ejectment suit, wipes out the verdict; no judg ment can be rendered on it, nor is it a bar to any proceeding.

THIS was an action of ejectment to recover the seizin and possession of north-east quarter of section nine, and the east half of the north-west quarter of section nine, township thirteen north, range two west, fourth principal meridian.

Plea: Not guilty.

The plaintiff, to maintain the issue on his part, introduced and read in evidence a duly authenticated copy of patent from United States, granting to William Edwards the land in question, dated 6th day of July, A. D. 1818.

Next, a deed from William Edwards to George J. Edwards, dated 25th day of October, A. D. 1845, duly acknowledged, conveying said land. Recorded November 12th, 1845, in St. Clair county. Recorded July 9th, in Mercer county. The defendant below admitted himself in possession of said premises; whereupon the plaintiff rested.

The defendant then offered, and read in evidence, the original patent from the United States to William Edwards, dated 6th July, 1818, granting to him the land in controversy.

22 121

161 627

Edwards v. Edwards.

Next, a deed from said William Edwards to James O. Edwards, defendant, dated 17th June, A. D. 1851, conveying the premises in question, and recorded July 19th, 1851.

Defendant next offered in evidence a duly authenticated copy of record of the Circuit Court of Mercer county, the substance whereof is as follows:

Said record shows, that at the October term of the Circuit Court of Mercer county, A. D. 1853, the plaintiff in this suit filed his declaration in ejectment, in the manner prescribed by statute, against this defendant and William Edwards, whereby he sought to recover the seizin and possession of the same premises sought to be recovered in this suit, and therein alleging his seizin and ouster on the first day of July, A. D. 1853.

That at said term, the defendants in said suit filed their plea of not guilty in due form.

That at the April term of said court, A. D. 1854, a trial of said cause was had, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendants.

That at the same term of said court, the plaintiff made his motion for a new trial, according to the statute in such case provided, and, after having made proof of payment of costs, the court granted a new trial therein, according to the statute in that behalf.

That afterwards, and at the same term of court, the said plaintiff moved to dismiss his said suit, which by the court was done, agreeable to said motion; whereupon it was ordered by the court that said defendants have and recover their costs of said plaintiff.

To the introduction of which said record in evidence in this case, the plaintiff objected (waiving all objection to the informality of the certificate attached to and authenticating such record); and the court sustained such objection, and refused to permit said record to be read in evidence to the jury; to which decision of said court, excluding said record as evidence, the defendant excepted.

BEARDSLEY & SMITH, and T. L. DICKEY, for Appellant.

B. C. Cook, for Appellee.

BREESE, J. The ground assumed by the appellant's counsel is not tenable. The award of a new trial in the first ejectment suit, wiped out the verdict, and no judgment was or could be rendered on it. It is not a bar to anything. It might well happen that a plaintiff with a perfect title might fail in his suit, by failing to prove possession by defendant at the time of suit

Brown v. City of Joliet.

brought, and a verdict pass for the defendant. In such case, or in any case, if the verdict be set aside, it could not bar another action.

Setting aside the verdict is, as if it had never been, and cannot be used anywhere, for any purpose. Followed up by a voluntary non-suit, the whole action and all its parts are null. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

J. H. BROWN, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF JOLIET,

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM WILL.

A judgment for an assessment against lots or lands within a city, should be special, and a precept should issue against the lots or lands assessed. A general judgment and execution would be wrong.

On an appeal from the County to the Circuit Court, in matters of assessment, the trial is de novo, and the Circuit Court does not acquire by appeal any jurisdiction beyond that of the County Court.

Before a court can render judgment for an assessment, the amount assessed should appear in dollars and cents; but the return of the commissioners appointed to make the assessment, may be amended under the statute of Jeofails.

THIS was an appeal from County Court of Will County to the Circuit Court, showing appeal to be from a judgment rendered on a special assessment of taxes on real estate of appellant by the city of Joliet, for improvement on Jefferson street.

Philip Filer, as city collector of the city of Joliet, filed with the clerk of Will County Court, a list of real estate, upon which he alleges he has been unable to collect special taxes due thereon, with his petition for a judgment, and order of sale.

The city collector applied for judgment in Will County Court, against real estate on which special taxes have been levied, lying on both sides of Jefferson street, to improve said street from Chicago street to the river bridge.

Description of the property of Brown, appellant, against which the collector applies for judgment, with the different items of taxes, amounts, etc., as follows:

Names of Owners. Part of Lot. Lot. Block. Sidewalk Grading. Crossing and Costs. Total

Sewerage Tax.

Tax.

11.11

7.58

22 123 123 633

22 123

172 399

Brown v. City of Joliet.

Affidavit of city collector appended to the above return. A hearing was had on said petition, the exceptions overruled, and judgment "entered against the aforesaid lots and blocks and parts of lots and blocks in favor of the city of Joliet," for the sum annexed to each lot and block, and parts of lots and parts of blocks, being the amount of taxes or assessments and costs due severally thereon, and order for sale of same.

Appeal prayed by Brown to Circuit Court of Will county, and granted.

At May term of Circuit Court, 1857, a jury was waived and agreement was made to submit case to court, DAVIS, Judge of the eighth circuit, presiding.

A judgment was rendered against Brown, for $172.89 and costs, no judgment being against the lots specifically.

Assignment of errors, as follows:

1st. That the court below allowed improper evidence to be given on the trial, by defendant in error.

2nd. That the evidence introduced in the case in the court below, was wholly insufficient to authorize the rendition of the judgment therein.

3rd. That the transcript of the County Court of Will county and evidence in the case, given in the Circuit Court on the trial of the case, showed conclusively that the County Court, from which the appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, had no jurisdiction to enter judgment, and the suit should have been dismissed in the Circuit Court, and judgment entered against the appellees for costs.

4th. That the return of Philip Filer as city collector, and his collector's warrant and delinquent list, were entirely insufficient to authorize the rendition of any judgment against the said appellant, or the property returned, and no evidence was given or offered, on the trial, supplying the defects therein, sufficient to authorize the rendition of the judgment against the appellant Brown, in said suit, and the Circuit Court was not authorized to take jurisdiction in the case.

5th. That no assessment or valuation of the property, on which a tax or assessment was purported to be levied, was ever made, and no evidence introduced showing any amount of taxes or assessments made in dollars and cents, and no characters used showing or denoting that any tax or assessments were made in dollars and cents.

6th. That the judgment was improperly and erroneously rendered against the appellant Brown, and directing execution to be issued against him, when the judgment should have been rendered against the city of Joliet for costs.

Brown v. City of Joliet.

7th. That the said judgment rendered is contrary to the evidence and the law, and contrary to the constitution of the State of Illinois and of the United States, and the court had no jurisdiction to render such judgment, and other errors, etc.

U. OSGOOD, for Appellant.

J. E. STREETER, for Appellee.

WALKER, J. It is urged that this is a special proceeding authorized only by statute, and by its provisions no authority is conferred upon the court to render a general judgment with award of execution against the goods and chattels, of defend

The second section of the act approved March 1, 1854, (Scates' Comp. 202), authorizing the levy and collection of special assessments for improving streets, etc., in cities and towns, provides, that in case such assessments are not paid within the time fixed by the order, resolution, or ordinance making the assessment, the corporate authorities of the town or city may apply to the County Court of the proper county for judgment against such lot or real estate, for the amount of such assessment and costs; and the County Court on such application being made, shall render judgment against such lot or real estate for the amount of the assessment and costs, and shall issue its precept to the sheriff of the proper county commanding him to sell such lot or real estate, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the judgment and costs, in the manner and with the like effect as if sold on execution at law." By the provisions of this section authority is only conferred upon the County Court to render judgment against the land, and to issue a precept for its sale. It cannot be insisted that the court has any jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties beyond that conferred by this section. No such general jurisdiction is incident to County Courts as organized in this State. And when the case comes before the Circuit Court for a trial on appeal, the trial is to be de novo, and the court by the appeal acquired no other or different jurisdiction of either the person or subject matter, than that possessed by the County Court. The trial in the Circuit Court, and its judgment should have been that authorized and required to have been rendered by the County Court. The statute only authorizes the rendition of a judgment against the property, and the proceeding is in rem, and it was error to render a general judgment and to award a fieri facias

execution.

It was likewise insisted that neither the return of the commissioners, the order of confirmation, or judgment of the County