is applicable to explosions of gaseous mixtures as well as to those of ordinary explosive substances and can be employed in the study of the pressures occurring in internal combustion engines as well as those in mines or guns.

An unexpected feature was the reduction in the cost of explosives in the United States as the war progressed. This is statistically shown in Bulletin No. 56 of the War Industries Board by C. L. Fry, and it was due to the exercise of good management and to improvements in plan and methods which resulted in increased economies in operation and greater outputs in the face of rising prices for labor and materials. It was also due to the relatively small loss from explosions in manufacture, storage, or transportation. It is true that there did occur explosions of unparalleled magnitude at Black Tom Island, London, Halifax, N. S., where 2367 tons of picric acid, 250 tons of TNT and 62 tons of nitrocellulose, or 2679 tons in all, exploded on the S.S. Mt. Blanc; and at Morgan, N. J., where 4225 tons of ammonium nitrate, 370 tons of smokeless powder and 187 tons of TNT were involved; and it is also true a large number of explosions occurred in the industry during the period of the war. But accidental explosions are a feature of this extra-hazardous industry and no true idea can be had of war-time experiences except through a statistical comparison with peace-time data. This cannot be done in this matter for the United States, since until the declaration of the war the National Government had not exercised any supervision over the explosives industry. But Great Britain has done so in its domain since 1875, and H. M. Inspectors of Explosives in the last annual report give a statement of conditions from Aug. 4, 1914, to Nov. 11, 1918. In this report it appears that there were produced during this time 445,559 tons of explosives and 11,725,000,000 pieces of ammunition and that the average number of persons employed was 61,807, with a maximum of 86,555. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that work was carried on under high pressure, that most of the employees were inexperienced, and that they were supervised largely by

equally inexperienced officials, there were but 1.25 per 1000 killed per annum during this period, while for the last previous five-year period in peace time the killed were I per 1000 per

annum.

Some data as to the extent to which explosives were used may be of interest. Naturally since magazine rifles, machine guns and rapid fire cannon were used extensively and large caliber guns, of greater caliber, more numerously than ever before, the expenditure of ammunition exceeded that ever known. All calibers above small arms used high explosive shell. High explosives were also used in mines and torpedoes, which attained dimensions greater than in former use, in depth bombs devised for attack on submarines, and in drop bombs designed for use from airplanes and airships.

Data for small arm ammunition is not at hand but of artillery it may be said that while the total number of rounds fired by the Union Army at the battle of Gettysburg was 32,781, the British Army at the battle of the Somme in 1916 fired 4,000,000 rounds; and that while the total number of rounds fired by the Union Army throughout the Civil War from 1861 to 1865 was 5,000,000, the United States, British and French armies in 1918 fired 160,615,000 rounds. Of high explosives it may be said that the 75-mm. shell originally designed for one-half pound of black powder, in 1918 contained 1.76 pounds of high explosive. The United States naval mine carried 300 pounds of TNT and there were 70,000 of them anchored in the North Sea mine field. The charge used in blowing up the Messines Ridge is stated to have been 466.6 tons in weight, consisting principally of TNT. The largest single charge previously recorded was 141 tons, principally rackarock, used in blowing up Flood Rock at Hell Gate, N. Y.

C

X

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CLARENCE J. WEST

HEMISTS have always played a certain rôle in modern warfare. This rôle, however, was always more or less superficial. It consisted simply in an attempt to perfect gun powder and to suggest new and more powerful explosives, not to make war more horrible but to shorten, if possible, its duration. The chemist was buried in his laboratory, in Government arsenals or in the plants of privately owned ammunition companies. He played no prominent part, as did the engineer or the medical man. The introduction of poison gas and the flaming liquid gun by the Germans during the year 1915 changed this relationship and as the war progressed the chemist came to play one of the leading rôles. It is not fair to the other scientific men to call the late war a chemist's war," but we must admit that his was no mean part and that it was very largely due to the tremendous advances in chemical knowledge and the extensive gas program laid down by the Allies that the war terminated when it did.

This honor is to be equally divided between the academic and the industrial men. Even though industry is always using the results of purely scientific research, there has been a tendency on the part of the industrial men to decry the value of academic research. This feeling was entirely lost sight of during the past struggle and the two great classes of chemists worked hand in hand, often in the same office or laboratory, in order that a common end might be gained. No greater example of

coöperative research will ever be found than that of the Chemical Warfare Service.

Too much cannot be said of the coöperation of our Allies in this connection. Nearly two years had elapsed between the time of the first gas attack on April 22, 1915, and our entry into the war. During this time France and England had to face and to solve, as well as they could, all the new and perplexing problems of Chemical Warfare. While the American army had many of its officers observing the new and rapid advances in the various forms of fighting, and while the physician was studying the new methods of medicine and surgery, apparently little attention was paid to questions relating to the use of poison gases. We were, therefore, almost as unprepared to face these problems as were the Allies in the spring of 1915. Once, however, we took upon ourselves the task forced upon us by the barbarous acts of the German nation, the Allies put at our disposal all the vast store of information gained during their two years of experience. Not only did they send us reports of work done and samples of the materials used by their armies, but they sent to us trained men, with knowledge of field and factory conditions, who were of inestimable value to our scientists. We will always remember, with deepest gratitude and respect, such men as Lieut. Col. Auld, Major Le Sueur, Major Brightman, Dr. Grignard and their colleagues, who so ably and so willingly contributed to the success of our Chemical Warfare Service.

Census of Chemists. At the beginning of the war in 1914, there were no indications that the chemist would be of any more value than in previous wars. True, it was early evident that the need of ammunition would be very great, but even this increased output would require but a few of the hundreds of chemists of military age. Therefore, when the real need did come, England found that her young men, at least, were all in the trenches and that many of them had already given their lives in the great cause. In order that America might avoid this loss of potential power, the first task undertaken by the

American Chemical Society in coöperation with the Council of National Research was a census of the chemical talent of the country. Since 14,500 of the 17,000 chemists were members of this great organization, the Society was able to furnish the Government with such information that, if a man was needed for a particular work, the Government was able to place its hand on the right man and send him to the right place. It must be said in passing that this did not always please the younger men of the chemical fraternity. Many of them wanted to see the action of real fighting in France. Some of them tried to do so by enlisting in the actual fighting units of the army. While a few succeeded in this, so complete was the information of the War Department that the majority were secured for the more important task of the preparation of chemicals for the use of the men who could not do this because of the lack of training or experience. The value of this was evidenced by the remarks of Secretary Baker at the Philadelphia meeting (1919) of the American Chemical Society.

Early Organization. The first man to recognize the need for a systematic and detailed organization to study chemical warfare was Van H. Manning, the Director of the Bureau of Mines. In February, 1917, when war between the United States and Germany seemed inevitable, Mr. Manning pointed out to the War Department the peculiar manner in which the Bureau could be of value in the study of the gas mask. On April 4th, the first conference was held, with representatives of the army, navy, and Bureau of Mines present. This meeting may be considered the organization of the American University Experiment Station of the Bureau of Mines, later to become the Research Division of the Chemical Warfare Service. Mr. (later Colonel) George A. Burrell was called to be in charge of this work. At once the station began to grow ; prominent chemists were called from all walks of life to fill the ever growing need of information and more information. The story of the development of this wonderful chemical organization has been vividly described by Colonel Burrell and the other