.... whereas here the suit is founded on an act of Congress conferring jurisdiction on the circuit courts of the United States in suits by inventors against those who infringe their patents, including all cases both at law and in equity, arising under the patent laws, without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy, and that therefore the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act does not apply, but the process acts of the State where the suit is brought must govern, and that the act of Congress, May 8, 1792, so declares. . . . . That act (§ 2) declares that until further provision shall be made, and except whereby this act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided,' the forms of writs and executions and modes of processes in suits at common law shall be the same in each State respectively as are now used or allowed in the Supreme Court of the same. This was to be the mode of process, unless provision had been made by Congress; and to the extent that Congress had provided, the State laws should not operate. Now the only statute of the United States then existing regulating practice was the Judiciary Act of 1789, which is above recited. The eleventh section is excepted out of and stands unaffected by the subsequent process acts, and is as applicable in this case as it was to those where jurisdiction depended on citizenship. It applies in its terms to all civil suits; it makes no exceptions, nor can the courts of justice make any. The judicial power extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and it is pursuant to this clause of the Constitution that the United States courts are vested with power to execute the laws respecting inventors and patented inventions; but where the suits are to be brought, is left to the general law, to wit, to the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act, which requires personal service of process within the district where the suit is brought, if the defendant be an inhabitant of another State." This decision affirms the rulings in Saddler v. Hudson,1 and Allen v. Blunt; 2 and is followed in Goodyear v. Chaffee.3 The case of Day v. Newark Rubber Co., goes still further. Here the defendant was a corporation chartered under the laws 1 Saddler v. Hudson, 2 Curtis, C. C. 6. 2 Allen v. Blunt, 1 Blatchf. 480. 3 Goodyear v. Chaffee, 3 Blatchf. 268. 4 1 Blatchf. 628. of New Jersey, but having an agency and store in New York. The suit was commenced by attaching the goods in the store, and also by serving a summons on its president in New York. The motion to quash the writ of foreign attachment and summons was allowed, on the ground that the corporation was not an inhabitant of the New York district, nor found within it at the time of serving the process, a corporation having no corporate existence out of the State under whose laws it is created. The court said: "Without pursuing the examination of the case further, we are satisfied, for the reasons stated, that neither the levying of the writ of attachment upon the goods of the defendants in this district, nor the service of the summons upon their president within it, nor both together, have the effect to give jurisdiction to the court in this case against the defendants; and further, that, according to the true construction of the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the court would have no jurisdiction in suits instituted against foreign corporations, even in cases where the State practice, if adopted by it, would authorize the institution of such suits by the attachment of their goods found within their jurisdiction." § 498. Where, however, the court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, it may restrain him from violating the patent in a district other than the one in which the suit is brought. Still, where it may be necessary to proceed directly against the machine itself, as in cases of extreme contumacy or of fraudulent contrivance to evade an injunction, semble, proceedings must be instituted in the district in which the machine is located.1 The equity jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit courts by the act of 1836, § 17, is irrespective of the right of the plaintiff to an injunction or his demand for one. Consequently the patentee is entitled to a discovery and account after the expiration of the term for which the patent is granted.2 1 Boyd v. McAlpin, 3 McLean, 427; Wilson v. Sherman, 1 Blatchf. 536, citing Simpson v. Wilson, 4 How. 709, and Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109. Nevins v. Johnson, 3 Blatchf. 80. "The arrangement of the provisions of sec. 17 may be fairly referred to, as implying that the power to award injunctions was introduced by Congress, rather as ancillary to the general equity jurisdiction imparted, than as the substantive and primary purpose of the enactment. It bears more the aspect of an incident to the jurisdiction before conferred than a condition of the jurisdiction itself." § 499. With regard to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it may be stated that it does not extend by virtue of the act of 1836, § 17, to cases where the matter in controversy is, not the settlement of the claims and rights of a patentee, but the mere amount of costs. Such a question is left for decision under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and consequently the amount in issue must exceed $2,000. This limitation would still seem applicable under the provisions of the act of 1861, ch. 37, whereby an appeal lies to the Supreme Court irrespective of the value or amount in controversy. In Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 439, it was held, that when a case is sent up to the Supreme Court, under the discretion conferred upon the court below, by the act of 1836, the whole case must go up; the word "reasonable," in the statute, applying rather to the cases themselves than to the points of the cases. 1 Sizer v. Many, 16 How. 98. |