3,339 other cattle, 3,960 sheep, and 13,566 | liberally in favor of the debt or action. That swine; 1 flour mill, and 3 saw mills. Capital, is, they permitted the defence of the statute to Athens. II. An E. central county of Texas, be overthrown by slight and even frivolous watered by the Navasoto and several other evidence of any acknowledgment on the part small streams; area, 900 sq. m.; pop. in 1870, of the debtor within six years; and although 8,591, of whom 1,919 were colored. The sur- they could not say that this made the original face is undulating; about two thirds of the soil debt any younger, and so took it out of the is a fertile sandy loam, the rest being black operation of the statute, they did say that the sticky prairie. The Houston and Texas Cen- acknowledgment was a new promise, and maintral railroad passes through it. The chief pro- tained the action on this ground. But in reductions in 1870 were 190,609 bushels of Indian cent times wiser views began to prevail. Judge corn, 13,741 of sweet potatoes, 10,608 lbs. of Story said (5 Mason, 523): "I consider the wool, and 3,414 bales of cotton. There were statute of limitation as a highly beneficial stat6,000 horses, 620 mules and asses, 844 milch ute, and entitled as such to receive, if not a cows, 38,472 other cattle, 3,681 sheep, and liberal, at least a reasonable construction, in 13,370 swine. Capital, Springfield. furtherance of its manifest object." These views now decidedly prevail both in England and America. The question, by what rule the statute shall be construed, is in fact the question whether it shall be regarded as a statute of presumption or a statute of repose. If the former, then an action founded upon an old debt is to be barred only because it is probable that an old debt has been paid; and therefore all confessions or acknowledgments, all acts and all words, in any way throwing a doubt on this payment, may be considered as overthrowing the presumption of payment, and maintaining the action. But if it is to be regarded as a statute of repose, then it is founded on the principle that an old debt, whether it have been paid or not, should not now be brought out to disturb relations between the parties which had become settled by time; for a creditor who has been negligent enough to let his debt lie by so long, neither prosecuted nor verified, should lose it, because the peace of society requires that claims which have long slumbered should be considered as dead. Where this view was adopted, it is plain that no mere acknowledg ment of an old debt would prevail against the statute; but if the debtor saw fit to make, within the six years, a distinct new promise to pay the debt, there was no reason why he might not make it, and none why, if he made it, he should not be held to perform it. So also, if the debtor saw fit to make, within the six years, a part payment of the debt, not in full, but as an acknowledgment of the whole debt, it might fairly be regarded as a promise to pay the remainder, and as reviving the balance of the debt. These views at length prevailed so decidedly in England, that in 1828 (9 George IV.) what is there called Lord Tenterden's act was passed; which appeared to be so reasonable, and was found in its operation so useful, that it has been widely adopted in the United States. This statute provides, in substance, that no debt which is barred by the statute of limitation shall be revived by any new promise or acknowledgment, unless that be in writing; but this statute still permits a part payment to revive the debt.-As the law now stands, it may be said that the new promise which revives a debt must not be in words LIME TREE, or Basswood. See LINDEN. LIMITATION, Statutes of, laws which provide that certain debts or claims shall not be prosecuted after a certain time. The origin of these statutes, which are now found in every civilized community, was undoubtedly the probability that an old debt had been paid, and the hardship of holding a payer to pay his debt twice over because, in the lapse of time, he had lost the evidence of his payment. When therefore such a stale debt was brought before a court, the law presumed that it had been paid, without proof. Such a presumption still exists in cases not provided for by the statutes; it being a general rule of the common law of England and America, that there is a presumption of payment of all personal claims, after 20 years have passed without any evidence of acknowledgment by the debtor. But in the year 1624 (21 James I.) it was enacted by the parliament of England that all actions of account, and all actions upon the case other than such accounts as concern the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, all actions of debt on any lending or simple contract, and all actions of debt for rent due, should be commenced and sued within six years next after the cause of such actions should accrue. This statute was the foundation of all the statutes of limitation which have been since then enacted in England and in the United States; nor have they varied greatly from it. Divested of technical language, it may be said that no action can be maintained for any debt more than six years old, founded upon a simple contract; by which is meant any contract not created by a sealed instrument or resting on a judgment of court. The exception of actions founded on mutual accounts of trade between merchants is common; and in many states all mutual accounts are excepted, while in some others there is an exception in favor of a witnessed note of hand, these accounts and notes being barred only by the 20 years' presumption. For a time the courts favored these laws, and construed them liberally against the debt or action. Then, however, the views and practice of courts changed, and they seemed to regard the statutes of limitation as proper objects of dislike, and construed them very of doubtful meaning, but an actual promise; some of our courts however, it must be admitted, apply the rule, even now, with much laxity. So if there be an acknowledgment, written where that is required, or spoken elsewhere, it must be a distinct acknowledgment that the debt now exists and is due. It need not acknowledge or promise any precise amount, for evidence may prove this; but it must be sufficiently precise and definite to show that this very debt was in contemplation when the promise or acknowledgment was made. Hence, it is now clear that an acknowledgment which negatives a promise, as "I owe that debt, but do not choose to pay it," does not revive the debt; and it is but an extension of this rule to say that an acknowledgment so guarded and defined or limited that it cannot be fairly regarded as intended to be a new promise, will not revive the debt. So if the promise or acknowledgment be conditional, as, "when I am able," or "if I recover such a debt," it revives the debt only if the condition be performed.-If part payment is relied upon as reviving the debt, it must be shown, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the payment was made as a part of a larger debt, and of the debt in controversy; for in the absence of all such evidence it will be presumed that the payment was made as of the whole that was due. If a debtor owes his creditor several debts, some of which are outlawed (which is a common phrase for barred by time) and some are not, and pays him a sum of money without in- | dicating what debt it shall be applied to, the creditor may apply the payment to the outlawed debts, but cannot, by such part payment, revive the remainder. But if a debt consist of principal and interest, a payment on account of either will take the whole debt from the statute. Tenterden's act, which requires the new promise to be in writing, is now held, in England and in the United States, not to require the evidence of a part payment to be in writing. As a part payment operates as a new promise, it is clear that no part payment can revive a debt unless it be made not only on account of the debt, but by some one who had authority from the debtor to make it as a part payment, or to bind him by his promise. If the original promise were made by two jointly, it cannot be revived by either so as to bind the other, unless he has (as a partner has if the firm be in existence when the promise is made) a right to promise for himself and the other also. Formerly, the acknowledgment by one revived it as to all, because it removed the presumption of payment. But now that the statute is regarded as one of repose, the rule is as above stated.-It is important to determine when the six years begin to run. The general answer is, from the day when the creditor could have commenced an action for the debt. Thus, if the original promise be on time, or a sale be on credit, or any debt contracted on definite credit, the six years do not begin when the debt begins, but when it is payable; that is, when the time or the credit expires. So if a surety pays for his principal, he may make his principal repay him; and his action is not barred when six years elapse from the maturity of the debt which the surety paid, but from the time of his payment. If an action cannot be brought until after a demand, it is not barred (or outlawed) until six years after the demand is made. But a note on demand may be sued at once, and is always payable; and the six years begin to run against it from its date. The six years begin to run as soon as the action accrues, although the damage or injurious consequences occur later; as if one is injured by the fault of another (a railroad company for example), the action must be brought within six years from the time when the injury occurs, although its consequences, for which the action is in fact brought, were developed at a much later period. If money be payable by instalments, the statute begins to run as to each instalment from the day on which it becomes due; but if there be an agreement that when one is unpaid all shall become due, the statute begins at once to run as to all.-The statutes of limitation always contain exceptions to meet cases of disability. In general, they are substantially the same as the exceptions in the original statute of James, which provides that if the plaintiff, when the cause of action accrues, be within the age of 21 years, a married woman, of unsound mind, in prison, or beyond the seas, he or she may bring his action at any time within six years after the disability is removed; or, as it is commonly expressed, the statute does not begin to run until the disability is removed. In applying this rule, it is held that if the disability does not exist when the cause of action accrues, or if it exist then and is afterward removed, although but for a short time, so that the statute once begins to run, the statute is not suspended or arrested by a subsequent disability. If several disabilities exist when the cause of action accrues, the statute does not begin to run until all are removed; but if there be one at that time, and afterward but before that one be removed there be other disabilities, the statute begins to run as soon as the first is removed, and is not affected by the subsequent ones. Thus, if one was 20 years old when a debt to him accrued, and before he was 21 went abroad and remained ten years, he could not bring his action on his return, because the statutory six years began as soon as his minority expired. So too, by a later English statute (4 Anne, ch. 16, s. 19), generally enacted here, it is provided that if the defendant be out of reach, as beyond the seas, when the action accrues, the six years do not begin against the plaintiff until the defendant returns; and in this country this is held to intend an open and public return, such as would afford opportunity to bring suit. In the United States, instead of the English phraso "beyond the seas," other phrases are used, the | most common of which is "out of the state," and all are held to mean that. It is sometimes provided that if, after the action accrues, the defendant shall be absent from and reside out of the state, the time of his absence shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. Where there is this provision, it has been questioned whether the aggregate of successive and distinct absences can be deducted from the time, or only one single absence. This is determined differently; in some states but one single absence is deducted, while in others all the absences are. The statute affects only the remedy for the debt, or the right to recover it by action, but does not affect the validity of the debt. Hence it does not affect any security given for the debt. Thus, if there be a mortgage of land or of goods to secure a note or bond, this mortgage remains in full force, although the six years have expired so that no action can be maintained on the note or bond.-Because the law of limitation is a law of remedy and not of right, it affects the method of recovering a debt, but not the debt itself; and therefore, in general, the law of the forum (lex fori), or the law of the place where the action is brought, determines the limitation, and not the law of the place where the debt is contracted. Thus, if A lives in Massachusetts, and there owes to B a certain debt which will be barred in six years, and they both go to Rhode Island, where we will suppose the debt to be barred in three years, and after three years B sues A in Rhode Island, the law of Rhode Island bars the action, although the law of Massachusetts would not. And we think the converse proposition equally true, that if the limitation be shorter in the state where the debt was contracted, and longer in that to which the parties have come, it is this last law which prevails. In Massachusetts (11 Pickering, 36) it was held that if both parties remain abroad until the debt is wholly barred where it was contracted, and then both come into that state, the creditor may sue the debtor in Massachusetts until six years have expired after their coming into that state. The principle seems to be, that wherever the statute of limitation is relied upon in defence, it is the statute of the jurisdiction where suit is brought that must be pleaded in bar, and the defendant must show that his case comes within it. But where a right of action is barred by lapse of time in any state, it cannot be revived in that state by a repeal of the statute.-The cases of actions founded on any specialties, as deeds, bonds, or judgments, and any action to recover land, have usually a limitation of 20 years, and in some cases 10 years. Besides these there are, in the several states, and in the United States, various provisions as to other actions, in which there is little uniformity, and of which we could make no useful statement without occupying many pages with the details. Thus, a limited time is given within which actions may be brought against sheriffs, or marshals, or executors or administrators, or for slanderous words, or for personal assaults or trespasses. For some of these actions, and in some of the states, this limitation is very short; a year, and even less in some cases. By the application of the ancient law maxim, Nullum tempus occurrit regi, or in other legal words, no laches (or neglect) is imputable to the king or government, it is held that rights of action possessed by the state may be enforced by action at any time, so far as the general statutes of limitation might affect them. But in many of the states there are statutes which bar the right of the state after a certain period; and it is very common to limit prosecutions for crime to some short period, excepting, however, the case of murder and perhaps some others.-The word "limitation" is also used in law with reference to instruments transferring real estate. It means that an estate cannot continue after a certain contingency occurs; the limitation of an estate is therefore the definition or restriction which confines an estate not to a time certain, but to a time which may be rendered certain by the happening of an event; as if an estate be given to hold until from the net proceeds a certain sum shall be made, or until the grantee marries. The distinction between a limitation in a deed and a condition is technical, and sometimes difficult. In general, if an estate is given to be held by the grantee until a specified event shall occur, this is but a limitation; but if it be given only with a proviso, or a condition (that is, with the words "provided that," or on "condition that "), to the effect that the estate or interest of the grantee shall cease and determine when the event shall occur, this is not a limitation, but a condition. LIMITED LIABILITY, a peculiar responsibility for contracts, defined by statute. The instance of partnership is a common one in which parties by the relation itself assume a general liability for the acts and defaults of their associates when acting within the scope of the business; and this is irrespective of the several interests of the partners, and cannot be limited by the understanding between them. Nevertheless there is no reason in public policy why one partner should not be vested with exclusive authority to act for all, nor why others dealing with the partnership should not be permitted to stipulate to confine their negotiations to that partner. Indeed, public policy might often be subserved by that course, for men of large means might be willing to unite with others in important enterprises if their liability could be restricted to the consequences of contracts framed in every instance by themselves, when they would be unwilling to put their fortunes at stake upon the judgment, discretion, or integrity of others. Accordingly, it has been customary in very recent times to provide by statutes for the formation of partnerships with a limited liability on the part of some of the partners. In order, however, that quence of statutes, the statutes have been no injustice may be done to others in such passed for the purpose of extending individual cases, these statutes provide for the giving of liability, instead of restricting it as in case of public notice of the limited nature of the pro- partnerships and joint-stock companies. The posed responsibility, and establish other pre- policy of making stockholders liable further, cautions to prevent the arrangement becoming in some cases, was recognized in this country a cloak for fraud. These limited partnerships early in the present century, and it has been have everywhere the same general features. acted upon in a constantly increasing number There are general partners and special part- of cases ever since. In some cases stockners. They enter into a formal contract of holders in banks have been made liable genpartnership in writing. In giving public no- erally for all the bills of the bank. In other tice of the arrangement the names of all are cases all stockholders are made liable for all of given, and the amount of the capital put in by a certain class of debts; as, for instance, debts the special partner is named, and this capital, for personal labor performed for the corporaand this alone, is put at risk by him in the tion. In other cases they are made liable for business. But this capital must be actually all debts, though perhaps only to a certain expaid in, and any misstatement in this particular tent; as, for instance, to the extent of twice will make the special partner liable for all the amount of stock held by them. There debts. The notice is required to be published are constitutional provisions in several of the in some form, and generally, also, to be record-states on the subject, that of California making ed in some public office; and the general part- each stockholder liable for his proportion of ner assumes the management of the business, all debts; but a more common provision makes which must not be interfered with by the him liable for the stock held and an equal sum other. The contract specifies the term for in addition. Generally the corporation must which the partnership is to continue, and any be proceeded against first, and the resort to failure to comply with the statute in any sub- the stockholder is only after failure to colstantial particular (as, for instance, in publish- lect from corporate property. Laws or coning the usual notice in a newspaper, where stitutional provisions establishing this liability that is required) would be held to leave the do not affect corporations previously chartercase without the statute, so that only a com- ed, except where a power of control had been mon law partnership would exist, with full reserved to the legislature in chartering them. liability on the part of all members.-Analo- This extension of liability of stockholders has gous to these are the cases of joint-stock com- not been adopted to any considerable extent panies. Where these companies are formed abroad.-The method of limiting the liability without reference to statutory provisions, they of common carriers has been referred to under may perhaps confine the authority to act for that title. The responsibility of the husband them to their officers; but as such companies for the debts and obligations of the wife is also are partnerships, troublesome questions of fact considered under the title HUSBAND AND WIFE. would be apt to arise, whether in any case a So far as the wife's debts at the time of the party contracting with a private member who marriage are concerned, no contract or setassumed to act for the company was fairly and tlement between the parties can protect the fully notified that he had no authority so to husband against liability; though if she has do. Accordingly many statutes have been an estate of her own, the proper contract passed, particularly in Great Britain and in the may give him a remedy against it. But statutes, Netherlands, for the regulation and control as was said under that title, have removed this of joint-stock companies with limited liability. liability altogether in some states. As to enThe provisions for this purpose are very mi- gagements by the wife after marriage which nute and particular, but the leading idea is are to charge the husband, he may preclude that they must apprise the public of the par- them by giving notice in advance that he will ticular nature of their association, so that no not be bound by them; but to be sufficient in one need be deceived. The companies assume the case of one who has dealt with the wife a joint name, after which, when used in their before, as agent for the husband and with public notices and elsewhere, is added the word her assent or ratification, the notice must be "limited," and their books are required to brought home to him personally. And even be open for public inspection. Observing the such a notice would not be sufficient to prostatutory precaution, the members are only tect the husband from liability for actual necesliable for company debts to the extent of the saries supplied to the wife where she was amount invested therein, or to the extent spe- living and cohabiting with him, or living elsecified in their articles.-The case of corpora- where with his consent and without means of tions with limited liability of members is quite her own, and was not provided for by him. different. In a partnership all members are -Corporations, especially those of a public presumptively liable for all the joint debts, nature, are often limited by their charters in but in case of a corporation all members are the amount of the debts they may incur; but presumptively exempt from liability except to when these are contracted in negotiable form, the extent of their investment. Where, there- and are negotiated, they have been held to be fore, members are liable further in conse-enforceable though the limit was exceeded; the rule of the law merchant for the protection of bona fide holders, overriding the rule of statute law for the protection of the corporation. For the limitation of suits to enforce liabilities, see LIMITATION, STATUTES OF. LIMOGES, a town of France, capital of the department of Haute-Vienne, situated on the right bank of the Vienne, which is here crossed by three bridges, 215 m. S. by W. of Paris; pop. in 1872, 55, 134. It is built on the top and side of a hill, and except in its older parts has regular streets, with two handsome squares and many fine edifices. The principal public buildings are the cathedral, a Gothic structure begun in the 13th century, the churches of St. Michel and St. Pierre, the bishop's palace, the public library, which contains 23,000 volumes, the town hall, the theatre, and the beautiful fountain of Aigoulène. The town also contains a theological seminary, a college, an insane asylum, and several institutions of charity. The most flourishing manufacture is that of porcelain, due to the discovery here in 1768 of kaolin. The art of enamelling, for which Limoges was distinguished from the 14th to the 18th century, has since declined. The commerce is active in grain, wine, brandy, iron, copper, tin, and kaolin. The Limousin horses are a celebrated breed, much valued for the cavalry service.-Limoges was the chief town of the Celtic tribe of the Lemovices. It was a place of importance under the Romans, was ceded to the English by the treaty of Bretigny, and formed part of the principality of Aquitaine under Edward the Black Prince, who in 1370 put 3,000 of its inhabitants to the sword in consequence of a revolt against his authority. A conflagration in 1864 destroyed de, and fissurellida. The shell is conical, with the apex turned forward, variously ridged, and with more or less indented borders; the species are all marine, very numerous both living and fossil, and largest in the tropical seas. The common or rock limpet (patella) is more or less circular, conical above, flat below, furnished with a large, thick foot, by which it adheres very firmly to rocks and other shells; the food consists of seaweeds, which it rasps with the powerful tongue. In the second family, or bonnet limpet, belongs the "boat shell" or "ladies' slipper" (crepidula) of the New England coast, having a wide horizontal partition over half the shell, like the seat of a boat; they adhere very firmly to the rocks. In the third family, the keyhole limpet (fissurella) has the apex pierced by a small longitudinal fissure, resembling a keyhole. LINACRE, Thomas, an Eng lish physician, born in Canterbury about 1460, died in London, Oct. 20, 1524. He was a fellow of Oxford, studied on the continent, became professor of physic at Oxford, was physician and tutor to the prince of Wales, and physician to Henry |