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in error was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the amended information and was also arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the original information; a jury was sworn and a verdict was returned finding the plaintiff in error "guilty in manner and form as charged in the information filed herein," upon which he was sentenced to imprisonment in the house of correction for two months and to pay a fine of $600 and the costs. A writ of error was sued out to bring the record before us for review.

It is first contended that section 2 of the Municipal Court act, in so far as it attempts to confer upon the municipal court jurisdiction in criminal cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, is unconstitutional, because under section 26 of article 6 of the constitution the criminal court of Cook county is vested with jurisdiction of all cases of a criminal nature arising in the county of Cook. It was held in the case of Berkowitz v. Lester, 121 Ill. 99, that this jurisdiction was not exclusive, even though the legislature, by section 2 of division 10 of the Criminal Code, had attempted to make it so. Section 12 of article 6 of the constitution confers upon the circuit court jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity in language as broad as that which in section 26 confers upon the criminal court of Cook county jurisdiction in all cases of a criminal nature, yet in Myers v. People, 67 Ill. 503, we held that the jurisdiction conferred on the circuit court by section 12 was not exclusive, but that it was within the power of the legislature to confer upon county courts concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases. The jurisdiction conferred upon any court by the constitution cannot be diminished by the legislature, but in the absence of a constitutional prohibition the legislature may confer concurrent jurisdiction of the same subject matter upon another court.

It is next insisted that section 22 of the Municipal Court. act, so far as it provides for the review upon error by the

Appellate and Supreme Courts of the judgments of the municipal court of Chicago in criminal cases, is unconstitutional, because section 26 of article 6 of the constitution provides that all appeals in criminal cases in Cook County shall be taken to the criminal court, and for this reason counsel think the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded to the municipal court with directions to grant the plaintiff in error an appeal to the criminal court. The constitutional provision does not give an appeal in all criminal cases in Cook county to the criminal court, but provides that all appeals in criminal cases in Cook county which may be given by law shall be taken to the criminal court. The appeals referred to are such as are tried de novo in the appellate tribunal. No appeal is authorized by law in any criminal case in the municipal court. The plaintiff in error did not request in the municipal court an appeal to the criminal court, he was not denied such appeal, and the question of his right to such appeal was neither presented to nor decided by the municipal court. This assignment of error presents nothing for our consideration, because its determination would not affect the correctness of the judgment below.

It is finally urged that the plaintiff was tried at one time for two separate offenses, and that this was in violation of section 9 of the bill of rights, which provides that persons accused of crime shall have the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. Counsel argue that this prohibits a trial for several offenses at one time though all were committed in the county where the trial may be had. There is no such prohibition in this clause, which merely determines the place of the trial. Whether the defendant might have objected to going to trial on both the original and amended informations on other than constitutional grounds is not presented to us and is not decided. He went to trial without objection and

made no motion at any time to require the prosecutor to elect. There is no bill of exceptions in the record, and so far as appears no evidence of more than one offense was heard. Each information charged a violation of the same section of the statute, which was a misdemeanor. Each offense was of the same grade and subjected the offender to the same punishment. The charge of two different misdemeanors of the same nature may be embraced in separate counts of the same information. In the case of misdemeanors the joinder of several offenses of the same character will not, in general, vitiate in any stage of the prosecution. In such cases the practice of quashing the indictment or information or calling on the prosecution to elect on which charge he will proceed does not exist. I Chitty on Crim. Law, 254.

The judgment of the municipal court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Henry L. Arnold, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THERON ADAIR et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed December 21, 1910.

1. DRAINAGE when original classification is valid. An original classification of lands made out by farm drainage commissioners at the office of their attorney outside of the limits of the district is not invalid, where it was filed in the town clerk's office in the district and a time and place fixed for hearing objections thereto at the house of one of the owners of assessed land who resided in the district, where, after due notice, the commissioners heard the objections and confirmed the classification.

2. SAME-farm drainage commissioners must keep accurate accounts and make reports. Under the statute farm drainage commissioners must keep accurate accounts showing the receipts and disbursements of the district and make annual reports, which must be filed with the clerk and recorded in the drainage record for the information of land owners, as the latter have the right to be informed of the financial condition of the district at all times.

3. SAME-assessment for a deficiency cannot be levied unless the drainage record shows such deficiency. While farm drainage commissioners may, in a proper case, levy an additional or supplemental assessment, yet the drainage record must show that there is a deficiency which renders the assessment necessary; and it is error, on application for judgment and order of sale for such assessment, to enter judgment and order of sale without a deficiency being shown, and to refuse to allow land owners to prove that there is no deficiency.

APPEAL from the County Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. W. H. HINEBAUGH, Judge, presiding.

R. D. MILLS, and BUTTERS & ARMSTRONG, for appellants.

JAMES J. CONWAY, and HENRY M. KELLY, for appellee.

Per CURIAM: This was an application by the county collector of LaSalle county for judgment and order of sale in the county court of said county against the lands of appellants to satisfy a second additional assessment levied by Drainage District No. 2 of the town of Ophir for the purpose of building bridges and prosecuting an appeal in a certain mandamus case in which the drainage district was interested. The appellants appeared and filed objections to judgment and order of sale, and the objections were either overruled or stricken from the files and judgment and order of sale was entered against the lands of appellants to satisfy said assessment, and this appeal followed.

The objections were: (1) That each and every one of the meetings at which the lands in said district were classified and said assessment was levied was held outside the district; (2) that the assessment exceeds the amount of the estimate of the cost of the proposed improvement; (3) that no plans for new or additional work were made prior to the levy of the assessment; (4) that the record does not show any accounts or reports of money collected and dis

bursed and shows no deficiency of the funds of the district to, complete the improvement; (5) that the assessment is levied to pay an existing debt; (6) that a previous assessment of $1000 had been levied for the purpose of building bridges; (7) that the estimate of the cost of the improvement was $7212, and an original assessment of $9000 and an additional assessment of $1000 had been levied and collected, which is in excess of the estimate; (8) that the funds of the district have been paid out for illegal purposes and no deficiency exists; and (9) that no legal meeting was held to levy the present assessment. Objections Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 and part of I were stricken from the files and no evidence was allowed to be introduced in support of said objections.

The first proposition argued in the briefs is, that the assessment was void by reason of the fact that the classification of the lands of the district was made outside of the district. This additional assessment is based upon the original classification, and if that classification was made outside of the district it was void and would not support the present assessment. (Carr v. People, 224 Ill. 160.) The record shows the classification was made by the commissioners at the office of their attorney in the city of Ottawa; that it was filed in the town clerk's office of Ophir township; that a time and place were fixed for hearing objections thereto at the house of one of the objectors, who resided in the district; that due notice was given of the time and place where objections would be heard to the classification; that the commissioners held the meeting in the district at the time and place fixed for hearing objections to the classification, and after a hearing the classification was confirmed. We think this a compliance with the statute and that the original classification was a valid classification.

It is further contended that the appellants were not permitted to show upon the hearing that there was no de

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