In Keith v. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300, and Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 (both grading cases, i. e., taxation for grading), it was not the local tax or special tax-bills that did the damage-it was the grading. The issue of the special tax-bills was not a benefit or damage. If the grading did a damage, the special tax-bill did not increase or diminish it or convert the damage into a benefit. The damage would have been the same if the special tax-bill had never been issued.

In Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23, if Kansas City did not violate the Constitution, how could Mrs. Smith get a judgment against the city for $2,750. If Kansas City did violate the Constitution, how can she tax for it? How can she tax the very person and property intended to be protected? If Kansas City did not violate the law, how could Mrs. Smith get a judgment against the city for $2,750? If Kansas City did violate the law, how can she tax the injured person and the injured property to pay for it? If Kansas City did not violate the Constitution or the law, how can there be a judgment against the city for $2,750? If she did violate the Constitution or the law or both, how can she tax the injured owner or injured property for it? It was the very object of the Constitution to protect Mrs. Smith and her property. Our cities can take private property for public use without just compensation, else why the prohibition? Why prohibit damaging private property for public use if it cannot be damaged? Why prohibit an act that cannot be done? If the thing cannot be done, why prohibit it? Why make the prohibition? The English Parliament cannot do an act physically impossible; our cities can. Here we have $2,750 as the damage of a benefit, and $300 as the benefit of a damage. The English Parliament cannot make a $2,750 damage to a person or his property a $300 benefit to that person or his property; our North American cit

ies, towns and villages can. South American revolution.

This is worse than a

This doctrine is the quintessence of malicious anarchy in its most hideous form. It betokens a return to savagery and barbarity. The most absolute and despotic government on earth never has done and never can do worse. The arch fiends and devils of hell, with all their legendary tendencies to evil, cannot equal much less excel it!

"Property which is wholly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of another State received none of the protection for which the tax is supposed to be the compensation." [Union Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, l. c. 204 (Temp. Nov., 1905).] But if the State, the city, town or village (the protector) had damaged the property to be protected, then this traitor, Judas-like, has the power to tax. This corporation, the creature of Kentucky statute law, has grown beyond its creator. Say the court in effect:

These Kentucky cars were used in Illinois and taxable in Illinois only. If these Kentucky cars received protection from Illinois law; if they received a benefit from Illinois law, the cars ought to pay for the value received. But should that prohibit Kentucky from taxing these cars also if Kentucky benefited the cars or their owner?

Is it no benefit to this Kentucky corporation for the State of Kentucky to confer on it the power to hold and use these cars? Illinois ought yet to pass a law to tax Dr. Emerson for two years for holding, owning and using his slaves, Dred Scott and his wife and two children, at Rock Island, Illinois. Dr. Emerson surgeon, in United States Army was protected in his property in these slaves and he ought to pay a tax in Illinois for it. Would such taxation in Illinois ex

clude Missouri from taxing these slaves? Slaves were no more movable than railroad cars, perhaps not as much [Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard 393, et seq.] The State of Missouri through the Kansas City Charter and her council damaged Mrs. Smith $2,750 and the tax was valid. Kentucky refrained from damageconferred a benefit-and her tax was invalid. Such is the irony of fate.

CHAPTER 13.

EXISTING STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND REMEDIES

PROPOSED.

We have seen that the Missouri Constitution itself places limitations on the amount of state taxes, county taxes, city, town and village taxes that may be levied under legislative authority. No limitations would exist but for these constitutional prohibitions or restrictions. Every Legislature of every State in the Union has had and has the power to limit the amount of taxes to be levied by counties, cities, towns and villages, including special taxing districts to be formed at the pleasure of the Legislature (with such powers and with such limitations as the Legislature may provide).

Under article 8, section 9 of the Constitution of New York, the New Lork Legislature may authorize a county tax of one hundred per cent. The Legislature may authorize an assessment of one hundred per cent. The Legislature shall pass laws to restrict these various taxes and assessments and debts. The Constitution of New York does not restrict cities in making debts or levying taxes or in making local assessments. In New York a city tax may be fifty per cent of all taxable property, so far as the New York Constitution is concerned. The Legislature shall limit city debts, taxes and assessments. Suppose the Legislature does not act does not limit-then the power is without limit. There is no power in the State to compel the Legislature to act and fix limits. The courts cannot mandamus the Legislature to act: one co-ordinate branch ( 291 )

of the government cannot compel another equal co-ordinate branch of the government to act; the judicial department cannot sustain a writ of error against the legislative department. When the New York Legislature authorizes an assessment (local) of one hundred per cent to pay for a local improvement, and the city makes it, then the New York Legislature did just what the Constitution gave them authority to do, and the city did just what the Legislature intended them to do. In creating debts, in levying assessments, and in levying taxes, the cities of New York and the Legislature of New York are not governed by the Constitution of New York, according to the plain terms and meaning of that instrument.

In Missouri, cities may be authorized to levy one per cent only; in New York it may be one hundred per cent. The New York Legislature may authorize a debt of one hundred per cent of the whole property; here in Missouri it can never exceed five per cent. In New York the tax, the assessment, can take it all; in Missouri only five per cent. But in Missouri it is only in these latter days that the cities, towns and villages were judicially authorized to damage property fifty per cent and then tax the damaged property fifty per cent to pay the damages.

The New York Constitution requires her Legislature to restrict the power of assessment, taxation and creating debts "So as to prevent abuses in assessments and contracting debts by such municipal corporations." The Missouri Constitution fixes the limit; the New York Constitution does not. The Missouri Legislature cannot go beyond the constitutional limit in her Constitution; in New York there is no constitutional limit at all, either on the Legislature or the cities; on the contrary, the command in the New York Constitution to the New York Legislature is, to fix the limit; other