THOMAS, J., dissenting plicable Federal or State law as a felony." 21 U. S. C. § 802(13).3 Under the Court's interpretation, that definition seemingly should apply. The Court concludes otherwise but never resolves the ambiguity it creates: It instead explains that "felony" is defined by the CSA as something other than the CSA's definition of "felony." Ante, at 56, n. 7. That explanation is, at best, unsatisfying. After gliding past the statutory text, the Court expresses concern over the fact that the Government's interpretation allows federal immigration law to turn on varying state criminal classifications. Congress apparently did not share this concern because some definitions of "aggravated felony" explicitly turn on the State's authorized term of imprisonment, not a uniform federal classification. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (J), (P)–(T). Even the Court finds this variance "not . . . all that remarkable." Ante, at 58. The Court's real concern therefore has little to do with variations in state law. Rather, it worries that "a state criminal classification [may be] at odds with a federal provision." Ibid. But, obviously, if a state offense does not qualify under the definitions in § 1101(a)(43), then the offense cannot be an "aggravated felony." As shown in Part I, supra, though, nothing about Lopez's offense conflicts with the plain language of § 924(c)(2) as incorporated into §1101(a)(43)(B). He was convicted of a "felony," and his offense was "punishable under the" CSA. The Court also notes apparent anomalies in the Government's approach. It asserts that, under the Government's 3 Several Courts of Appeals looked to this definition of "felony" when construing the meaning of "drug trafficking crime." See, e. g., United States v. Wilson, 316 F. 3d 506, 512 (CA4 2003). Although the Government would clearly prevail under 21 U. S. C. § 802(13), it has conceded that this definition does not apply. This concession makes good sense: The definition of "drug trafficking crime" resides in Title 18, and it is therefore most natural to construe "felony" as used in that title. See n. 1, supra. As discussed above, that definition as well requires that a crime be considered a felony if the State defines it as a felony. THOMAS, J., dissenting interpretation, a state felony conviction for simple possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana could be an "aggravated felony" even though the INA expressly excludes such an offense as grounds for deportation under 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Ante, at 59. The Court's concern has little basis in reality. Only one State authorizes more than one year of imprisonment for possession of over 20 grams. See Fla. Stat. §§ 893.13(6)(a)–(b), 775.082(3)(d) (2006). A few others classify possession of one ounce (or 28.3 grams) as a felony. See, e. g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 453.336(1)–(2) (2004), §§ 453.336(4), 193.130 (2003). The mere possibility that a case could fall into this small gap and lead to removal provides no ground for the Court to depart from the plain meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2). In fact, it is the Court's interpretation that will have a significant effect on removal proceedings involving state possession offenses. Federal law treats possession of large quantities of controlled substances as felonious possession with intent to distribute. States frequently treat the same conduct as simple possession offenses, which would escape classification as aggravated felonies under the Court's interpretation. Thus, the Court's interpretation will result in a large disparity between the treatment of federal and state convictions for possession of large amounts of drugs. And it is difficult to see why Congress would "authorize a State to overrule its judgment" about possession of large quantities of drugs any more than it would about other possession offenses. Ante, at 59. Finally, the Court admits that its reading will subject an alien defendant convicted of a state misdemeanor to deportation if his conduct was punishable as a felony under the CSA. Accordingly, even if never convicted of an actual felony, an alien defendant becomes eligible for deportation based on a hypothetical federal prosecution. It is at least anomalous, if not inconsistent, that an actual misdemeanor may be considered an "aggravated felony." THOMAS, J., dissenting III Because a plain reading of the statute would avoid the ambiguities and anomalies created by today's majority opinion, I respectfully dissent. Per Curiam TOLEDO-FLORES v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7664. Argued October 3, 2006-Decided December 5, 2006 Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 149 Fed. Appx. 241. Timothy Crooks argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Marjorie A. Meyers, H. Michael Sokolow, and Brent E. Newton. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorneys General Keisler and Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Patricia M. Millett, and Donald E. Keener.* PER CURIAM. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco and David W. DeBruin; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jayashri Srikantiah; for Human Rights First by Linda T. Coberly and Gene C. Schaerr; for the National Association of Federal Defenders et al. by Henry J. Bemporad and Frances H. Pratt; and for the NYSDA Immigrant Defense Project et al. by Christopher J. Meade, Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Marianne C. Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas. A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assistant Attorney General, Don Clemmer, Deputy Attorney General, and Amy Warr, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia. Syllabus CAREY, WARDEN v. MUSLADIN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 05-785. Argued October 11, 2006-Decided December 11, 2006 At respondent Musladin's murder trial, members of the victim's family sat in the front row of the spectators' gallery wearing buttons displaying the victim's image. The trial court denied Musladin's motion to order the family members not to wear the buttons. The California Court of Appeal upheld Musladin's conviction, stating that he had to show actual or inherent prejudice to succeed on the buttons claim; citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, as providing the test for inherent prejudice; and ruling that he had not satisfied that test. The Federal District Court denied Musladin's habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1), as determined by this Court in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, and Flynn, supra. Held: The Ninth Circuit improperly concluded that the California Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by this Court. Pp. 74-77. (a) Because "clearly established Federal law" in §2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision," Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412, federal habeas relief may be granted here if the California Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of this Court's applicable holdings. P. 74. (b) This Court addressed the effect of courtroom practices on defendants' fair-trial rights in Williams, in which the State compelled the defendant to stand trial in prison clothes, and Flynn, in which the State seated uniformed state troopers in the row of spectators' seats immediately behind the defendant at trial. In both cases, which dealt with government-sponsored practices, the Court noted that some practices are so inherently prejudicial that they must be justified by an "essential state" policy or interest. E. g., Williams, supra, at 505. P. 75. (c) In contrast to state-sponsored courtroom practices, the effect on a defendant's fair-trial rights of the spectator conduct to which Musladin objects is an open question in this Court's jurisprudence. The Court has never addressed a claim that such private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair trial |