Opinion of the Court juror would consider respondent's future prospects to be beyond the bounds of proper consideration. The judge told the jury to consider "all of the evidence," and "all of the evidence" included respondent's forward-looking mitigation case. While the judge did end his broad command to appraise all the evidence with the qualifier "except as you may be hereafter instructed," id., at 183, he did not later instruct the jury that it should disregard respondent's future potential in prison. The jury could not fairly read the limitation in the instruction to apply to respondent's central mitigation theory. By contrast, in response to a juror's question, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury not to consider whether respondent could receive psychiatric treatment while in prison. The sharp contrast between the court's instruction on aggravation (that only enumerated factors could be considered) and its instruction on mitigation (that listed factors were "merely . . . examples," id., at 186) made it clear that the jury was to take a broad view of mitigating evidence. Coming back to back, the instructions conveyed the message that the jury should weigh the finite aggravators against the potentially infinite mitigators. That the trial judge told the jury to "pay careful attention" to the listed mitigating factors, ibid., moreover, did not compel the jury to give them sole consideration. For this to be the case, the jury would have had to fail to take the judge at his word. The judge did not advise the jury to pay exclusive attention to the listed mitigating circumstances, and he had told the jury that these circumstances were simply examples. It is implausible that the jury supposed that past deeds pointing to a constructive future could not "extenuat[e] the gravity of the crime," as required by factor (k), much less that such evidence could not be considered at all. Boyde concludes that in jury deliberations "commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial [is] likely to prevail over technical hairsplit Opinion of the Court ting." 494 U. S., at 381. Here, far from encouraging the jury to ignore the defense's central evidence, the instructions supported giving it due weight. In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals cited queries from some of the jurors as evidence of confusion. Although the jury's initial question is not in the record, it appeared to ask the judge about the consequences of failing to reach a unanimous verdict. Cf. 414 F. 3d, at 1135. In response, the judge reread portions of the instructions and stated that "all 12 jurors must agree, if you can." App. 190. Before the judge sent the jury back for further deliberation, the following exchange took place: "JUROR HERN: The statement about the aggravation and mitigation of the circumstances, now, that was the listing? "THE COURT: That was the listing, yes, ma'am. "JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we were to decide one or the other and then balance the sheet? "THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing process. Mr. Meyer? “JUROR MEYER: A specific question, would this be an either/or situation, not a one, if you cannot the other? "THE COURT: No. It is not that. "JUROR MEYER: It is an either/or situation? "THE COURT: Exactly. If you can make that either/or decision. If you cannot, then I will discharge you. "JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a question? I don't know if it is permissible. Is it possible that he could have psychiatric treatment during this time? "THE COURT: That is something you cannot consider in making your decision." Id., at 191. The Court of Appeals decided Juror Hern's questions indicated she thought (incorrectly) that only listed mitigating factors were on the table-an error, in the Court of Appeals' Opinion of the Court view, that should have prompted a clarifying instruction confirming that all the mitigating evidence was relevant. 414 F. 3d, at 1136. The Court of Appeals further supposed the response to Juror Hailstone's question compounded the problem, since psychiatric treatment presumably would be necessary only in aid of future rehabilitation. Id., at 1137. The Court of Appeals' analysis is flawed. To begin with, attributing to Juror Hern a dilemma over the scope of mitigation is only one way to interpret her questions, and, as the California Supreme Court observed on direct review, it is not necessarily the correct one, see Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d, at 804, 755 P. 2d, at 344. It is at least as likely that the juror was simply asking for clarification about California's overall balancing process, which requires juries to consider and balance enumerated factors (such as age and criminal history) that are labeled neither as mitigating nor as aggravating. As Juror Hern surmised (but sought to clarify), the jury itself must determine the side of the balance on which each listed factor falls. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (providing that, "[i]n determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account" any relevant listed factors); see generally Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U. S. 967, 978-979 (1994) (noting that the § 190.3 sentencing factors "do not instruct the sentencer how to weigh any of the facts it finds in deciding upon the ultimate sentence"). Even assuming the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Juror Hern's questions, the court's conclusion that this juror likely ignored forward-looking evidence presupposes what it purports to establish, namely, that forward-looking evidence could not fall within factor (k). As discussed earlier, nothing barred the jury from viewing respondent's future prospects as "extenuat[ing] the gravity of the crime," so nothing barred it from considering such evidence under the rubric of the "listing." As for Juror Hailstone's psychiatric-care question, this inquiry shows that, if anything, the jurors were considering respondent's potential. The trial court's SCALIA, J., concurring response, far from implying a broad prohibition on forwardlooking inferences, was readily explicable by the absence of any evidence in the record regarding psychiatric care. In view of our analysis and disposition in this case it is unnecessary to address an argument for reversing the Court of Appeals based on the Court's holding in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), a subject raised by Judge O'Scannlain in his separate opinion in the Court of Appeals. See 414 F. 3d, at 1141-1142 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). IV In this case, as in Boyde and as in Payton, the jury heard mitigating evidence, the trial court directed the jury to consider all the evidence presented, and the parties addressed the mitigating evidence in their closing arguments. This Court's cases establish, as a general rule, that a jury in such circumstances is not reasonably likely to believe itself barred from considering the defense's evidence as a factor "extenuat[ing] the gravity of the crime." The factor (k) instruction is consistent with the constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring. I adhere to my view that limiting a jury's discretion to consider all mitigating evidence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 673 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Even accepting the Court's jurisprudence to the contrary, however, this is arguably an easy case, given our reiteration in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 372 (1993), that a jury need only "be able to consider in some manner all of STEVENS, J., dissenting a defendant's relevant mitigating evidence," and need not "be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable manner in which the evidence might be relevant." But since petitioner has not relied on Johnson, as Judge O'Scannlain did below, see Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F. 3d 1094, 11411142 (CA9 2005) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), I am content to join in full the Court's opinion, which correctly applies Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990). JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), the Court set aside Ohio's death penalty statute as unconstitutional because it unduly restricted the mitigating evidence that a jury could consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. In his opinion announcing the judgment, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id., at 605 (plurality opinion). The respondent here, Fernando Belmontes, was sentenced to death in 1982, a scant four years after Lockett. See People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 755 P. 2d 310 (1988). Yet at the time of his sentencing, there remained significant residual confusion as to whether the Constitution obligated States to permit juries to consider evidence that, while not |