key and Greece, 1827. Treaty Interven aid and driving them in their despair to insurrection. tion. Tur- The story of the six years that ensued between the commencement of the revolt, under the leadership of Ipsilanti · and Vladimaruk, in Moldavia and Wallachia in 1821, and the battle of Navarino in 1827, forms a brilliant and romantic chapter in modern history, in which the almost hopeless weakness and the desperate valour of the insurgents are in striking contrast to the overpowering strength and the bloodthirsty vengeance of their opponents. But however inviting it might be to relieve the dryness of a legal treatise with so romantic an episode, it is beyond the limits of this work and beside its purpose to narrate these events. Suffice it to say, that after six years of insurrection, chequered by some wonderful successes and overpowering reverses, in which defeat on land was almost counterbalanced by victory at sea, and when the power of Turkey was, by the superiority of its Egyptian forces, on the point of being established, the cause of Greece was recognized by Europe as worthy of protection, and after a protocol between England and Russia, on the 4th April, 1826', a treaty was signed between England, England, France and Russia in the following year, which brought those powers into direct contact with the Porte, as the allies of the Greeks and the upholders of their resistance. In that document the three powers, first announcing their desire to put an end to the sanguinary struggle that had so long been going on, to the consequent anarchy, and the piracy resulting from the disputed possession of the sea, upon the earnest invitation of the Greeks, declared their object to be the re-establishment of peace, which was called for by the interests of Europe no less than by humanity, proffered their mediation to the Ottoman Porte, and demanded an armistice on certain bases, adding this important article to the treaty, that it would be necessary for them to take immediate measures for forming a connection with the Greeks, and that if the armistice were refused the contracting parties would use all the means which circumstances might suggest in order to obtain the immediate effects desired. To this document the Turkish government replied in an able state paper, dated 9th June, 1827, in which they gave 1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1826-27, Vol. XIV. pp. 629-639. between France, and Russia, 1826. Reply of the Porte. key and 1827. among others the following reasons for rejecting the Interventerms of the treaty. They declared first, that whilst it tion. Turwas an undoubted principle that no state has a right to Greece, interfere in the private affairs of another, it is as undoubted that every independent state is entitled to unrestricted power over the regulations it may frame for the government of its subjects. That the Greeks from a very ancient period were tributary subjects of Turkey, and that being in rebellion against their sovereign ruler they were amenable to the consequences thereof, viz. punishment; that the repression of rebellion belongs as of course to the sovereign state; that in this instance the rebellion was confined in its limits to a small part of the Ottoman empire; and that neither armistice nor mediation were terms that could apply to the case of a rebellion against the sovereign authority, but only to that of a rupture between two independent powers. The consequences of this answer are too well known to need detail. The appearance of the fleet of the allied powers in the Bay of Navarino, the resistance and destruction of the Turkish fleet, the occupation of the Morea by a French force under General Maison, and the eventual independence of Greece, are prominent facts in the history of our own times. The narrative of the Greek rebellion, in all its picturesque detail and brilliant colouring, deserves a leading place in the history of the 19th century, but its peculiar value in a treatise on International Law is derived from the light it throws upon the doctrines of Intervention and Recognition. As however we shall have in other parts of this work to state and examine these subjects and the principles on which they are founded, it is unnecessary now to do more than to point out a few of the leading features of the event just recorded. In the first place, the all-important point for notice is the fact that the contest was one caused by the revolt of subjects against the sovereign state. Secondly, that, though that contest lasted for nearly seven years, an actual present independence was never achieved. Thirdly, that the sovereign state, so far from abandoning the struggle for supremacy, had almost restored it. Lastly (and this seems to be the chief, nay, only possible ground for forcible intervention when remonstrance failed), that the commerce of neutrals The ReGreece, its dis volt in tinct features. tion. Rebellion Interven- was so seriously endangered by the piracy resulting from the disputed possession of the Levant, and the general anarchy consequent upon the prolonged contest, as to require more vigorous measures of repression than the Porte was master of. in Greece, 1827. The intervention of Powers. But the intervention of Great Britain, France and the Three Russia, was based on three grounds. First, in order to comply with the request of one of the parties; secondly, on the ground of humanity, in order to stay the effusion of blood; and, thirdly, in order to put a stop to piracy and anarchy. If the recognition of the Greek insurgents and the intervention in their favour are to be looked upon as precedents, it is fitting that all the facts connected with them should be investigated, all the documents examined, and a careful distinction made between the policy and the legality of what was done. And then, in spite of the vigorous defence of the British minister of the day, it is difficult to withhold our assent from the judg ment passed by an able writer of our own time upon the event', when he says that "The emancipation of Greece was a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law. As an act of policy it may have been and was justifiable; but it was not the less a hostile act, which if she had dared Turkey might properly have resented by war2" tion. Hol land and Belgium. The year 1830 was fruitful of remarkable events, not the least of which were the great revolutionary outbreaks Interven in the neighbouring countries of France and Belgium. In the former a change of dynasty was one of the consequences of the revolution, and a new king was seated on the throne whose watchword was Non-Intervention 3. In the latter two remarkable results took place, a startling change in the territorial arrangement made by the treaty of Paris and assented to at the Congress of Vienna, and an armed interposition by the great powers for the purpose, as was alleged, of preserving the peace of Europe. By the treaty 1 Letters of Historicus, p. 6. 2 For the history of the Greek revolution, see Alison's Continuation of the History of Europe, Vol. I.; Gordon's and Finlay's Greek Revolution. For the documents and State papers, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1826-30, Vols. XIV.—XVII.; Parliamentary Debates, New Series, Vols. XV. XVIII. XIX. XXII.— 3 Louis Blanc, Hist. de dir Ans, Vol. II. p. 146. tion. Affairs in Belgium, 1830. of Paris the two neighbouring countries of Flanders and IntervenHolland had been united under one crown on a foundation in appearance firm and lasting, in reality slight and ephemeral. Whatever other causes might have been at work to produce the separation between the two portions of these united states, there can be no doubt that the immediate impulse to the outbreak was given by the recent revolution in Paris, and by the existence of a strong French party in Brussels'; when, therefore, on the 25th Aug. 1830, a slight and apparently temporary disturbance was excited and the cry of Reform was raised, what at first seemed to be nothing more than a short and insignificant émeute grew into alarming proportions, and the little wave of riot swelled into an overflowing torrent of revolution, sweeping through most of the towns of Flanders and carrying all before it. The revolt ere long assumed a national aspect, and soon the cry was changed from reform into separation. Then followed the visit of the Prince of Orange to Brussels to treat with the revolutionary party; the visit of a deputation of Belgians with a long list of grievances to the king; the attempt on the king's part at conciliation, which was at once rejected; the appeal to arms and the entry of Prince Frederick into Brussels at the head of 9000 men, who were forced to retreat from that city and take refuge in Antwerp; the establishment of a provisional government, by whom the dethronement of Frederick William and the separation of Belgium from Holland were pronounced; and finally, after the surrender of all the fortresses save the citadel of Antwerp, which the Dutch still retained, the determination of the five great European powers (to whom both parties had appealed) to attempt a settlement of these troubles by a conference of ambassadors. On the 5th October, 1830, the king of Holland formally requested the assistance of Great Britain and the other four powers parties to the treaty of Vienna, in carrying out the principles they had therein established. The reply of Lord Aberdeen was a refusal to interfere by force of arms, but an announcement that a conference 1 Louis Blanc, Hist. de dix Ans, Vol. 1. p. 91. 2 British and Foreign State Papers, 1830-31, Vol. xix. p. 749, &c. Inter vention. Belgium, 1830. Protocol, 20th Dec. 1830. would be held in London for the purpose of remedying Affairs in the derangement caused by the troubles in Belgium to the system established by the treaties of 1814 and 1815. Accordingly the conference was summoned, and after several preliminary meetings a protocol' was published in which the five powers declared their intentions as follows: "In forming by the treaties in question the union of Belgium and Holland, the powers who signed these treaties had in view the establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe, and the assurance of the maintenance of general peace. Unhappily the events of the last four months have shewn that the full and complete amalgamation which the powers desired to produce in those countries had not been obtained, that it would henceforth be impossible to effectuate that purpose, that thus the very object of the union of Belgium and Holland was destroyed, and that henceforth it becomes indispensable to recur to other arrangements in order to accomplish the intention, the means of executing which this union ought to serve. The conference will be occupied with discussing and concerting such new arrangements as may be most proper for combining the future independence of Belgium with treaty stipulations, with the interests and security of other powers, and with the preservation of European equilibrium.” Holland and Belgium. London Conference. To this act, which a modern writer has denounced as a deliberate rending in pieces by the five powers of the work they had so carefully put together in 1814, and a barefaced spoliation under cover of the high-sounding phrases equilibrium and general peace, the king of Holland gave a most reluctant assent; nor was the adhesion of the Belgian provisional government to its terms so cheerfully yielded as it would have been had all reference to treaty-obligations been omitted. Armed, however, with this mutual consent the conference proceeded with its deliberations, and after communicating to both the rival parties the bases of the intended separation (which both accepted), on the 19th February, 1831, published another 1 20 Dec. 1830. British and Foreign State Papers, 1830-31, Vol. xix. p. 749. 2 Mons. Louis Blanc. 3 British and Foreign State Papers, 1830-31, Vol. xix. p. |