disloyal conduct, and it was contended on the part of the United States that the facts of the case justified his arrest as a disloyal person, openly giving aid and comfort to the rebellion by his language and expressions of sympathy, in a village situated upon the frontiers of the enemy's country, and where such conduct involved danger to the mili tary operations of the United States.

On the part of the claimant the charges of disloyal conduct and language were denied, and proof was adduced to show him a law-abiding and peaceable inhabitant.

The commission gave an award to the claimant of $8,300, all the commissioners joining.

In the case of Frank Russell Reading, No. 43, the claimant was arrested in the city of Washington on the 6th July, 1864, that city then being threatened by the rebel forces under General Early; was brought to trial before a military commission in Washington on the charge of uttering disloyal and treasonable language in the District of Columbia when threatened by the enemy, such language being calculated to give aid, comfort, and assistance to the enemy. He was found guilty by the commission, and sentenced to imprisonment for five years, with hard labor, at the Dry Tortugas, or such other military prison as the Secretary of War might select. Under this sentence he was imprisoned at Fort Delaware from the 30th August, 1864, till 1st June, 1865.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the military commission was a lawful tribunal, competent for the trial and punishment of military offences, and having full jurisdiction of the case of the claimant, both as to subject-matter and person; that at the time of his arrest and trial Washington was a city in military occupation, environed by forts of the United States, occupied and defended by their armies, the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and, as the capital of the country, always a vital point of attack for the rebel forces, and at this specific time the actual objective point of a vigorous and determined attack by the enemy, who actually reached, as their advanced post, on the 12th July, Fort Stevens, within the limits of the District of Columbia and within four or five miles of the Capitol.

That the offence charged against Reading was a purely military offence, of which the civil tribunals had not cognizance, and so was not within the principle held by the Supreme Court in the case of Milligan, (4 Wall., 2.)

That Reading having appeared in person and by counsel before the military tribunal, and having pleaded in chief, without raising any question to the jurisdiction, could not be heard to question the jurisdiction of the tribunal as to his person merely; and that the commission having by law jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the charge, the failure to object to jurisdiction as to the person obviated all question as to

their complete jurisdiction. The counsel for the United States cited the case of Vallandigham, (1 Wall., 243.)

On the part of the claimant it was contended that the military tribunal had no jurisdiction whatever, and that the imprisonment of the claimant under it was wholly without authority of law.

The commission gave a unanimous award in favor of the claimant for $15,400.

In the case of John I. Shaver, No. 51, the memorial alleged that the claimaut, being at the time domiciled in Canada, but travelling in the United States on the business of the Grand Trunk Railway Company, a Canadian corporation, of which he was an agent, was arrested at Detroit, on the 15th October, 1861, by direction of Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State of the United States; that he was taken thence to Fort Lafayette, in New York Harbor, and coufined there, and subsequently at Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor, until the 6th January, 1862. He alleged that by his arrest he was thrown out of lucrative employment as agent of the railway company named; that by it he lost the confidence of his employers and was unable to regain his position after his release; and that he suffered large pecuniary losses in consequence. He claimed damages $100,000.

The arrest was made upon information communicated to Mr. Seward that the claimant was engaged in conveying communications between the rebels in Canada and those within the insurrectionary States. The proofs failed to sustain the charge, and it appeared that Mr. Kennedy, chief of police of the city of New York, immediately after the arrest of the claimant, reported to the State Department that he found no proofs to warrant his detention, or to implicate him in any improper communication with the enemy.

The commission awarded the claimant $30,204, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting on the question of amount only.

In the case of Samuel G. Levy, No. 61, it appeared that the claimant, a resident of Canada, on landing in Boston from a British steamship from Liverpool in May, 1864, was taken thence to New York, and there detained for about eight days, on a charge of being engaged in blockaderunning. At the end of that time he was discharged upon giving bail for his appearance within six months, if required. He alleged large con. sequential damages by interference with his due attention to his business, and by the enforced breaking of an engagement of marriage in consesequence of his arrest, and claimed as damages, £20,000.

The commission unanimously gave him an award of $930.

In the case of James Stott, No. 271, it appeared that the claimant, domiciled in the State of Maine, was arrested at Dexter, Me., September 2, 1863, on the charge of being a deserter from a cavalry regiment in the United States service; was sent thence to the regiment from which he was

alleged to have deserted, at Warrenton, Va., where it plainly appeared that the charge was unfounded, it being a case of mistaken identity. He was detained until the 9th of November, 1863; and, for the purpose of making him some compensation as to loss of time, and of giving him transportation back to his home, was mustered into the United States service and discharged with the pay of a private soldier for the time he had been. detained, and with transportation back to his home.

An award was made for $775 in favor of the claimant, in which all the commissioners joined.

John I. Crawford, No. 79, was arrested in the city of New York, on the 10th of May, 1864; sent to Fort Lafayette, and there detained until the 27th of July, 1864, when he was brought to trial before a military commission in the city of New York, on the charge of violation of the laws of war, in passing through the military lines of the enemy, first, from South Carolina, by way of Richmond, to New York; second, from New York again, by way of Nassau and Wilmington, through the blockade, to South Carolina; and again from South Carolina, by way of Richmond, to New York; and also by purchasing goods in New York, and sending them thence through the lines to Richmond, Va. He was convicted on all the specifications except that relating to the purchasing and sending of goods, and was sentenced to give bonds in such sum and with such sureties as should be satisfactory to the general in command of the department, that he would not visit, traffic, or correspond with the States in rebellion, nor give aid, comfort, or information to the enemy during the war, in default of giving such bonds to be confined at hard labor during the war. The bond was immediately given, and Crawford was discharged. The proofs before the commission fully sus tained the findings of the military tribunal.

On the part of the claimant it was contended that the military tribunal was without jurisdiction, and that the claimant's imprisonment and detention were unlawful.

The memorial claimed $500,000 as damages, and the commission. unanimously disallowed the claim.

In the case of John Carmody, No. 85, it appeared that the claimant, domiciled in New Orleans, was, in March, 1865, conscripted into the military service of the United States; the notice of his conscription requiring him to report for military service was addressed to him by the name of John Kemdy, and on receiving it he procured from the British consul at New Orleans a certificate of his British nationality, which he alleged that he presented to the officer in charge of the office at which he was required to report, but two days after was arrested by a squad of United States soldiers, and was detained in a military prison for some five or six weeks. The arrest and detention evidently arose from mistake growing out of the confusion of names. The memoria

claimed $100,000 damages, besides interest, and the commission unanimously awarded the claimant $500.

In the case of William Patrick, No. 97, it appeared that the claimant. a British merchant, domiciled in New York, was, on the 28th August, 1861, arrested and committed to Fort Lafayette, where he was detained till the 13th September following, when he was discharged. His arrest was based on the charge that the firm in New York of which he was a member, and which had a branch house also at Mobile, Ala., was a channel for carrying on correspondence between rebels in Europe and those in the insurrectionary States. Representations by highly respectable citizens of New York of Mr. Patrick's loyalty were made to the Secretary of State, and the British minister also intervened in his behalf. Investigation showed that the charge against Mr. Patrick was without foundation, and he was discharged after a confinement of seventeen days. The proofs established Mr. Patrick to have been a gentleman of high social and business standing, and also to have been in conduct marked by loyalty and good faith toward the Government during the rebellion, and to have furnished liberal contributions in its aid. His arrest was undoubtedly caused by false or erroneous information.

On behalf of the claimant punitory damages were claimed. On the part of the United States it was insisted that no such damages could be allowed; that Mr. Patrick, domiciled within the United States, was exposed in the same degree with citizens of those States to arrest on false charges or erroneous information, and that, having been discharged within a reasonable time for inquiry to be made, he was not entitled to claim damages against the United States. That if any damages were awarded to him, they should be such only as would afford him fair compensation for the injury inflicted.

The memorial claimed $100,000, besides interest. The commission awarded the claimant $5,160, Mr. Commissioner Gurney dissenting on the question of amount.

In the case of Joseph J. Bevitt, No. 104, the claimant, until that time domiciled in South Carolina and Virginia, left Richmond in April, 1863, and passed through the rebel lines to the Potomac River, was there taken on board a United States transport steamer on the 30th April, 1863, taken to Washington, detained in the Old Capitol prison until the 19th May, and then sent back into the confederacy.

On the part of the claimant, it was contended that Bevitt, being a British subject, and not having offended against the laws of the United States, or taken part in the domestic strife then in progress, was enti tled to such egress without molestation by the public authorities.

On the part of the United States it was maintained that the attempt of the claimant to enter the loyal portion of the United States from the enemy's country, and through his military lines, after having voluntarily

remained within the enemy's country during two years of the war, was one which the United States might lawfully prevent or punish, and that their sending him back into the enemy's country, from which he came, was an act permitted by public law.

The commission disallowed the claim, Mr. Commissioner Gurney dissenting.

In the case of William Ashton, No. 325, the claimant, until then domiciled in the State of South Carolina, in February, 1863, came north through the Federal lines under a pass from the confederate General Lee, and while crossing the Potomac River into the State of Maryland was arrested by the naval patrol, on the 7th February, 1863. He was taken to Washington, there detained until the 11th May, 1863, and then sent back through the lines into the enemy's country.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the case was parallel with that of Bevitt, above reported, and that the arrest, detention, and return of the claimant were lawful acts under the recognized laws of war.

The commission awarded to him the sum of $6,000, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting.

The undersigned finds difficulty in reconciling the decision of the commission in this case with that in the case of Bevitt. It may be noted, however, that Bevitt was detained but twenty days before being sent back, while Ashton was detained three months and four days.

In the case of Thomas Barry, No. 127, the claimant, domiciled at New Orleans, alleged that, on the 15th March, 1864, he was arrested without any cause or provocation, but arbitrarily and maliciously, by a provostmarshal under the orders of General Banks, then in command of the department; was committed to the parish prison, there confined for ten weeks, and then released on giving a bond conditioned that he should report daily to the provost-marshal in the city of New Orleans. That he continued so to report until the 31st December, 1864, when the bond was cancelled and the claimant fully discharged. He claimed damages $50,000. The proofs showed that he was arrested in the act of clandestinely and in disguise attempting to pass from New Orleans through the lines into the enemy's country, having upon his person letters to residents within the enemy's lines, and carrying confederate money-the use of which was forbidden by the Federal authorities. That only two months before he had perpetrated the same offence in the same disguise; had visited many places within the enemy's lines, and had returned into the Federal lines in the same clandestine manner. Before his arrest he had applied for permits to go within the confederate lines for the alleged purpose of looking up and bringing back cotton alleged to have been owned by him; but such permission had been refused.

The claim was unanimously disallowed.