The Problem of KnowledgeMacmillan, 1915 - 503 lappuses |
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absolute epistemological absolute idealism abstract agnosticism assertion Bergson Bradley claims cognitive concept consciousness creative criterion critical definition of truth dependent Dewey dialectic doctrine dogmatic egocentric predicament elements empirical empiricism ence epistemological dualism Essays essentially existence experienced external F. C. S. Schiller fact fallacious feeling fundamental hypothesis idea idealistic identity independent reality independently real individual intellectualism intellectualistic interpreted intuition Journal of Philosophy judgment Kant Kantian knowledge logical idealism means mediate mental metaphysical mind mystical neo-Kantian neo-realists normative sciences perceived perception Philosophical Review physical Plato point of view position possible practical pragmatism pragmatist predicate present primary qualities principle priori problem psychical activity psychological idealism pure purposes rational regarded relation representation Royce secondary qualities seems sensations sense sense-qualities simply solipsism subjective idealism subjectivism synthesis theory thing-in-itself things thought tion true ultimate universal valid
Populāri fragmenti
422. lappuse - The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.
99. lappuse - But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.
15. lappuse - For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted.
29. lappuse - To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is ; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something.
260. lappuse - We may then describe a soul as a being that possesses, or is, the sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psycho-physical interaction, of which the most fundamental are (1) the capacity of producing, in response to certain physical stimuli (the sensory processes of the brain), the whole range of sensation qualities in their whole range of intensities; (2) the capacity of responding to certain sensation-complexes with the production of meanings, as, for example, spatial...
267. lappuse - I believe (he continues) that ' consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing ' soul ' upon the air of philosophy
16. lappuse - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them 4.
148. lappuse - That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.
410. lappuse - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
418. lappuse - Everywhere, these teachers say, "truth" in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means in science. It means, they say, nothing but this, that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience...