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laws are provided by the legislature that may | for their government," is not subject to imbe inconsistent therewith." plied limitations that would curtail the real

Section 20, art. 3: "The Legislature shall intent and purpose of the authority expressnot pass special or local laws reg-ly conferred, as disclosed by a consideration ulating the jurisdiction and duties of any of the language used and the subject-matter class of officers, except municipal officers, upon which it operates. * regulating the practice of courts of justice, except municipal courts."

Section 8, art. 8: "The Legislature shall have power to establish and to abolish municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time. When any municipality shall be abolished, provision shall be made for the protection of its creditors."

While, under the express authority "to provide for the government" of municipalities, and to "prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time," the Legislature cannot delegate to a municipality its general lawmaking power for the state, nor confer a power that violates any other express provision of organic law, nor confer "powers" other than for municipal purposes, yet the Legislature has a Whether the first sentence of section 8, art. wide discretion in the government it may 8, above quoted is a declaration of the com- | provide and in the powers it may prescribe mon-law powers of the lawmaking body of a for a municipality, and also in the means and sovereign state or not, it is a specific defini-instrumentalities it may use in providing the tion in general and comprehensive terms of the powers of the Legislature with reference to municipalities.

At common law the legislative authority could empower a municipality to pass ordinances that had the force of law in their proper sphere; and this legislative authority is not curtailed by the provision of the Constitution vesting "the legislative authority of the state * in a Senate and House

of Representatives."

[5] In conferring upon municipalities appropriate quasi legislative powers for local governmental purposes, the Legislature does not violate the implied principle of organic law that the Legislature shall not delegate its general lawmaking power. See State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, text 634, 47 South. 969, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 639; State v. Westmoreland, 133 La. 1015, 63 South. 502; Cooley on Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 138; McQuillon on Mun. Corp. par. 124; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. Ct. 256, 32 L. Ed. 637.

[6, 7] The section of the Constitution empowering the Legislature "to establish and to abolish municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time," does not prescribe the manner by which, or the instrumentalities through which, the Legislature, in dealing with municipalities, shall "provide for their government" or "prescribe their jurisdiction and powers." In the absence of organic direction or limitation, the Legislature may adopt any appropriate instrumentalities in discharging its duty "to provide for the government" of a municipality. Purely local regulations may as legally and more conveniently be provided through municipal governments, and liberal use of municipalities for local governmental purposes is clearly contemplated by the quoted provisions of the Constitution.

The express authority given to the Legislature by the Constitution to "prescribe" the

government and prescribing the powers, when organic law is not plainly violated. See Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa, 452, 115 N. W. 177.

The exercise of the power conferred by the statute here considered does not change existing state laws or declare what the laws of the state shall be, except in so far as the law affects the particular municipality in its municipal affairs; and the specific and limited powers conferred by this particular statute upon the municipality cannot be said to be a delegation of the general lawmaking power of the Legislature in plain violation of the Constitution. Certainly by giving this limited authority the Legislature has not lost its control over every municipal power. See Straw v. Harris, 54 Or. 424, 103 Pac. 777; City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753. Under the Constitution the Legislature may "alter or amend the same at any time."

[8] A statute may be in whole or in part repealed or superseded or abrogated by implication of law as a result of the due enactment of a subsequent statute covering the same subject, or by the operation of a later statute upon the occurrence of a definitely specified contingent event.

[9] If it is clear from its terms and purpose that the intent of a statute is that it shall supersede another statute upon a stated contingent event, the courts will give effect to such intent, when organic law is not thereby plainly violated, since the intent of the law is its vital force, and the province of the courts is to ascertain and effectuate the valid legislative purpose.

The statute expressly provides "that all laws or parts of laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." This repeal of conflicting charter powers becomes operative upon the taking of the specifically designated action by the municipality for municipal purposes, under the limited authority expressly given by the statute. This is manifestly the legislative intent, and such intent is the

the charter powers of the city, but it does not repeal or suspend the operation of particular feaures of the charter acts, except in the event that expressly authorized action is duly taken by the municipality that is in accord with this statute, but is in conflict with other charter acts. The authority conferred by the statute is for a municipal purpose, and is within the powers that the Legislature could lawfully confer upon the municipality, viz., the creation, change, and duty of municipal officers and boards; the legislative powers and duties of the city council being expressly excluded.

the agency of municipal ordinances and regulations, prescribe and provide for the "numbers, powers, duties, terms of office, and the time and manner of election or appointment of any or all boards and officers of the city of Jacksonville;" and the Legislature may itself provide how any and all boards and officers of the city may be abolished and new boards and officers created, or it may delegate this power to the municipality or its electors, without violating the organic law of the land. This being so, the fact that some of these regulations may be already directly prescribed by statute does not deprive the [10, 11] Neither the Constitution nor the Legislature of the right to alter or amend common law defines the line of separation be- them; and it may do so through the medium tween the powers that shall be exercised di- of the municipality, by express authority duly rectly by the Legislature and those that may given, where no provision of the Constitution be indirectly exercised through delegated au- is thereby plainly violated. By authorizing thority conferred upon municipal governmen- the municipality to adopt regulations pertal agencies. Where the Legislature has au- taining to the creation and abolishment and thority to provide a governmental regulation, powers and duties of municipal officers and and the organic law does not prescribe the boards that are in conflict with existing statmanner of adopting or providing it, and the utes, the Legislature, in effect, expressly aunature of the regulation does not require that thorized municipal action within its province; it be afforded by direct legislative act, such and, when that authorized municipal action regulation may be provided either directly is duly taken, the existing statutory regulaby the Legislature or indirectly by the legislations in conflict therewith are, by force of the tive use of any appropriate instrumentality, statute giving the authority, suspended or where no provision or principle of organic abrogated. This does not in reality amount law is thereby violated. If this rule is not to the repeal of a statute by municipal ac recognized, many useful governmental regu- tion; but the operation of a statute upon a lations may be practically unattainable to particular subject may be suspended by the the detriment of the public, when, in the lan-force and effect of another statute authorizguage of the Constitution, the "government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the citizens." This salutary principle is observed with reference to administrative boards and officers, and it is special[12, 13] Uniformity is not required in the ly applicable to powers that may be conferred character and number or in the powers and upon municipalities for local governmental duties of municipal officers; and it is enpurposes. Such a principle is particularly tirely clear that the Legislature may authoruseful in our system, where the Constitution, ize a municipality to create and abolish its in fixing the status and powers of municipali- own municipal offices and to define and ties, expressly authorizes the Legislature "to change the powers and duties of its municiprovide for their government," and "to pre-pal officers. If the subject is already covscribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to ered by the statute, the Legislature may alter or amend the same at any time," by abrogate the statute and confer the stated "local or special laws" to meet the inherent- authority upon the municipality. If the conly varied local conditions and requirements flicting statutes are abrogated by force and that are particular to this state, in the in- operation of the statute conferring upon the terest of the public welfare. municipality the power to create and regulate its own officers and boards, there is no obstacle to the exercise of the authority by the municipality. Such is the situation here. The statute complained of confers a limited power upon the municipality to regulate the character and number and the powers and duties of its administrative officers and boards for municipal purposes; and, when that power is duly exercised within the limitations of the law, the conflicting statutes are superseded by the force and operation of the statute in conferring the power upon the municipality, and in expressly repealing all inconsistent statutory provisions.

The Constitution expressly provides the manner in which statutes shall be enacted by the Legislature itself; but, in providing for legislative control of municipalities, the Constitution ordains, in general terms, that the Legislature shall prescribe the "jurisdiction and powers" of municipalities and "provide for their government." While the Legislature may itself enact all the laws required by a municipality, it certainly may delegate to the municipality power to enact ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution that have the force of law within their proper sphere. In its discretion, the Legislature

ing conflicting municipal action to be taken for a municipal purpose in accordance with express legislative authority given to that end.

its operation, is confined to municipal governmental regulations, and is not beyond all reasonable doubt in conflict with the principle of organic law which forbids a delegation of the general lawmaking power of the state. Nor does the statute in effect authorize a municipality to repeal a state law. See Munn v. Finger, 64 South. 271, decided at the last term; City of Yazoo City v. Lightcap, 82 Miss. 148, 33 South. 949; Dobbin v. City of San Antonio, 2 Posey Unrep. Cas. 708; Village of St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300, 9 Atl. 571, 59 Am. Rep. 731; City of San Luis Obispo v. Fitzgerald, 126 Cal. 279, 58 Pac. 699; Bearden v. City of Madison, 73 Ga. 184; 28 Cyc. 365 et seq.; McQuillin on Mun. Corp. pars. 643, 843; Plinkiewisch v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 58 Or. 499, 115 Pac. 151; Smith on Mun. Corp. par. 106; Dillon on Mun. Corp. 69, 573.

The Constitution is the controlling law, and while, in appropriate proceedings properly taken, it may be the duty of the court to declare a legislative enactment to be inoperative in whole or in part, if it plainly violates the Constitution, yet, as under our system of government the lawmaking power of the Legislature is subject only to the limitations contained in the state and federal Constitutions, the court should, in deference to the Legislature, take care to so interpret an enactment as to make it consistent with the Constitution, if it can be done upon any reasonable consideration of the legislative intent, as shown by a fair application of all the language used to the purpose designed to be accomplished by the enactment.

In State v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 95, 28 South. 781, the portion of the ordinance condemned was in direct conflict with the prior statute on the subject, and not authorized by the later statute. Here the ordinance apparently accords with the statute authorizing its adoption.

In the case of State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 774, Dexheimer v. City of Orange, 60 N. J. Law, 111, 36 Atl. 706, Elliott v. City of Detroit, 121 Mich. 611, 84 N. W. 820, and other cases holding such authority to be a delegation of lawmaking power in violation of organic law, the decisions were apparently controlled by the restrictive provisions of the Constitution or by the unrestricted nature of the authority conferred. In this state uniformity of municipal government is not required, and the Legislature has plenary powers in the premises. The ordinance is apparently in substantial accord with the statute, and it is not clearly void for uncertainty. The statute is not affected by the restraining of the first election thereunder at the time required by the act. See State ex rel. Law v. Saxon, 25 Fla. 792, 6 South. 858. The discussion herein has reference to the particular

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The lawmaking power of the Legislature of a state is subject only to the limitations provided in the state and federal Constitutions; declared to be inoperative on the ground that and no duly enacted statute should be judicially it violates organic law, unless it clearly appears beyond all reasonable doubt that, under any rational view that may be taken of the statute, it is in positive conflict with some identified or designated provision of constitutional law.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 290*)-EMINENT DOMAIN (2*) — MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 266*)-DUE PROCESS-COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY TAKEN SIDEWALK ASSESSMENT. There is no express provision in the Constitution of the state of Florida as to special assessments by a municipality for local imLaws of Florida (Acts of 1891, p. 134), known provements. Section 4 of chapter 4089 of the as the "Charter Act of the City of Ocala,' which reads as follows, does not violate organic law or deprive any citizen or property owner of any constitutional right:

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"The said city council shall have power by ordinance to regulate, provide for and compel the construction and repair of sidewalks and lot or lots shall fail to comply with the provipavements; and if the owner or owners of any sions of such ordinance within such time as may be prescribed therefor, the city council may contract for the construction and repair of contracted to be paid for the same by the city such sidewalks or pavement, and the amount shall be a lien upon such lot or lots along which said sidewalk or pavement is constructed or a special tax against the lot or lots adjoining repaired, and such amount may be assessed as which such sidewalk or pavement shall be constructed or repaired, and the same may be enforced by suit at law or in equity, or the said amount may be recovered against the said owner or owners by a suit before any court of competent jurisdiction."

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 871-875; Dec. Dig. 8 290;* Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-12; Dec. Dig. § 2; Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 712; Dec. Dig. § 266.*]


In a suit in equity by a municipality against an owner of real estate for the enforcement of a lien for the building of a sidewalk by such municipality along the lines of such real estate, where the allegations in the bill show that such owner had direct notice of the special assessment against his property for the building of a sidewalk, whereby such owner was afforded ample opportunity to go before the city council with a petition or complaint, if he so desired, or to resort to a court of equity for a restraining

order, but did neither, and where it is alleged SHACKLEFORD, C. J. The city of Ocala, in such bill "that the construction of the side- a municipal corporation, filed its bill in walk aforesaid was done with the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant and without chancery against R. L. Anderson for the enobjection by the defendant or any one in his be-forcement of a lien upon lots 2 and 3 of half," which allegations the defendant admits to be true by interposing a demurrer to the bill, such defendant is not in a position to take advantage of any omissions or irregularities in the ordinance providing for the construction of sidewalks, but will be held to be estopped by his conduct from so doing, where no constitutional right has been violated.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1147-1152; Dec. Dig. §§ 488, 489.*]

block 59 of the old survey of the city of Ocala, of which the defendant is alleged to be the owner, for the sum of $199.20, with interest, for the construction of sidewalks and curbing along and abutting such property, the cost thereof which had been incurred by the complainant. To this bill the defendant interposed a demurrer, which was overruled, and from which interlocutory order the defendant has entered his appeal. We do not copy the bill and exhibit, the de

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§§ 406, 469*)SIDEWALK ASSESSMENT-FRONT-FOOT RULE. Under the provisions of section 8 of article 8 of the Constitution of Florida, "the Legisla-murrer, or the order of the court thereon, ture shall have power to establish and to abol- but shall refer to such portions thereof as ish municipalities, to provide for their govern- may be necessary to render this opinion inment, to prescribe their jurisdiction and pow- telligible. ers, and to alter or amend the same at any time," the Legislature may by statute confer upon a municipality the authority by ordinance to regulate, provide for, and compel the construction and repair of sidewalks, and to levy a special assessment upon lots along which such sidewalks are constructed, leaving the municipality free to pursue such course as it might think best in making such special assessment, so long as no principle of organic law is violated. Under such authority a municipality may, in providing for such special assessment, adopt what has become known as the "front-foot rule." | [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001, 1002, 11131117; Dec. Dig. §§ 406, 469.*]


An appellate court cannot take judicial notice of the location of the different streets, and avenues in a city or town.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 9-14; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 281*) - SIDEWALK ASSESSMENT-ENFORCEMENT OF LIEN. Where there is a substantial compliance with lawful requirements in the construction of sidewalks and street improvements by a municipality, and it is not made to appear that the improvements as made are unsuited to the purposes designed, or that such improvements are of no practical value, a lien under the statute on the adjacent property for such improvements may be enforced for the real value thereof under a lawful contract.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 745-749; Dec. Dig. § 281.*]

7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 456*)-SIDEWALKS GROSS ASSESSMENT-VALIDITY. Where neither the charter act nor the ordinance provide for a special assessment for the construction of sidewalks against each lot separately, such special assessment may be levied in gross upon several lots of the same


[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1094-1099; Dec. Dig. § 456.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; W. S. Bullock, Judge.

Bill by the City of Ocala, a municipal corporation, against R. L. Anderson, to enforce a lien. Demurrer to the bill overruled, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

R. L. Anderson, of Ocala, for appellant. Spencer & Hocker, of Ocala, for appellee.

The defendant has assigned 11 errors, but we shall not treat them in detail. As the defendant, who is the appellant here, says in his brief: "It is contended that the charter act itself is invalid; that the ordinance under which these proceedings have been taken is likewise invalid; and that finally, assuming or conceding that the charter act and the ordinance are valid, then the city has failed to comply with material requirements of its own ordinance, and there fore is not entitled to enforce the lien claimed." We shall treat these contentions in the order in which they are above set forth.

[2] The charter act, the validity of which is attacked, is chapter 4089 of the Laws of Florida (Acts of 1891, p. 134), being entitled "An act to extend and enlarge the boundaries and powers of the municipality known as Ocala, Marion county, Florida." The assault is directed against section 4, which reads as follows:

"The said city council shall have power by ordinance to regulate, provide for and compel the construction and repair of sidewalks and pavements; and if the owner or owners of any lot or lots shall fail to comply with the provisions of such ordinance within such time as may be prescribed therefor, the city council may contract for the construction and repair of such sidewalks or pavement, and the amount contracted to be paid for the same by the city shall be a lien upon such lot or lots along which said sidewalk or pavement is constructed or repaired, and such amount may be assessed as a special tax against the lot or lots adjoining which such sidewalk or pavement shall be constructed or repaired, and the same may be enforced by suit at law or in equity, or the said amount may be recovered against the said owner or owners by a suit before any court of competent jurisdiction."

It is insisted that this quoted section of the charter act is violative of section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of our state Constitution, which provides, among other things, that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

treasury, or be assessed upon the abutting property or other property specially benefited, and, if in the latter mode, whether the assessment shall be upon all property found to be benefited, or alone upon the abutters, according to frontage or according to the area of their lots, is, according to the present weight of authority, considered to be a question of legislative expediency, unless there is some special restraining constitutional provision upon the subject. Whatever limitation there is upon the legislative power of taxation (which includes the power of apportioning taxation) must be found in the nature of the power, and in the express constitutional provisions." See, also, the discussion in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) pp. 729 to 738, and notes; 28 Cyc. 1103 et seq.; Dillon's Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) vol. 4, § 1436, wherein the effect of the decisions in Norwood v. Baker, supra, and subsequent cases is discussed at length, and the following conclusion reached and announced: "As a result of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it may be regarded as definitely settled that the Legislature of a state may create, or authorize the creation of, special taxing districts, and charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in such districts, or according to valuation or superficial area, or frontage, without violating the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution; and that the whole expense of paving or improving a street or highway may be assessed by a municipality pursuant to statutory authority upon the lands abutting upon the street or highway so improved in

law; nor shall private property be taken which, in the opinion of the designated triwithout just compensation." In support of bunal or officers, shall be specially benefited this contention, it is urged that the quoted by such street or improvement in proportion section is invalid, "because: First, it pro- to the amount of such benefit, or upon the vides for fixed charges or taxes against prop-abutters in proportion to benefits or fronterty, without any reference whatever to any age or superficial contents, is, in the absence benefit which may accrue by reason of the of some special constitutional restriction, a tax; and because also no provision whatever valid exercise of the power of taxation. is made in the act for giving notice to the Whether the expense of making such improperty owner to enable him to have a hear-provements shall be paid out of the general ing as to the assessment, or the benefit thereof, prior to the lien being fixed upon his property." The appellant cites Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443, 28 Cyc. 1104, and notes, and other authorities to the effect that "an assessment without benefit to the property, or in excess of any benefit, is the taking of private property without just compensation." Even if we concede the correctness of this principle as an abstract or general proposition, we fail to see wherein it sustains or helps the contention of the appellant. The doctrine enunciated in Norwood v. Baker, supra, has been the subject of much discussion and criticism, but there is no occasion for us to go into the matter at any length. Suffice it to say that the principle laid down in the cited case has been much modified or qualified in subsequent decisions rendered by the same court. See French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 325, 21 Sup. Ct. 625, 45 L. Ed. 879; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 21 Sup. Ct. 616, 45 L. Ed. 900; Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389, 21 Sup. Ct. 609, 45 L. Ed. 908; Webster v. City of Fargo, 181 U. S. 394, 21 Sup. Ct. 623, 45 L. Ed. 912; Cass Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, 21 Sup. Ct. 644, 645, 45 L. Ed. 914; Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. 399, 21 Sup. Ct. 624, 45 L. Ed. 917; Shumate v. Heman, 181 U. S. 402, 21 Sup. Ct. 645, 45 L. Ed. 922. We would also refer to Sheley v. City of Detroit, 45 Mich. 431, 8 N. W. 52; Cass Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, 124 Mich. 433, 83 N. W. 108; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 58 S. W. 934, 54 L. R. A. 492; Job v. City of Alton, 189 Ill. 256, 59 N. E. 622, 82 Am. St. Rep. 448; City Council of Mont-proportion to the feet frontage of such lands, gomery v. Moore, 140 Ala. 638, 37 South. 291. An exhaustive discussion of the entire subject will be found in chapter 28 of volume 4 of Dillon's Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), entitled "Special Assessments." The We think that this statement of the law great weight of authority fully sustains the is correct, and it would seem to be decisive principle as thus laid down by Judge Dillon as to the validity of the authority conferred in section 1431 of his work just cited: "The by section 4 of the charter act of the city of courts are very generally agreed that the Ocala, quoted above, concerning the conauthority to require the property specially struction of sidewalks and the assessment of benefited to bear the expense of local im- a special tax for the cost thereof against the provements is a branch of the taxing power, lot or lots adjoining which such sidewalk or included within it, and the many cases shall be constructed. As to the further conwhich have been decided fully establish the tention of the appellant that such quoted general proposition that a statute authoriz- section 4 is invalid, because it fails to proing the municipal authorities to open or es- vide for the giving of any notice to the proptablish streets, or to make local improve- erty owner to enable him to have a hearing ments of the character above mentioned, and as to the assessment, or the benefit there

without providing for a judicial inquiry into the value of such lands and the benefits actually to accrue to them by the proposed improvement."

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