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is challenged upon the ground that it is un-, Company, and S. L. Schoonmaker and H. M. constitutional, the objector assumes the bur-Atkinson, receivers of said Atlanta, Birmingden of showing that it is an exercise of authority not legislative in its nature, or that it is inconsistent with some other provision of the Constitution. In cases of doubtful construction, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act." State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 South. 543; Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 52 South. 941, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 499; Railroad Commission of Ala. v. Northern Ala. Ry. Co., 62 South. 749, present term; Nos. 291, 292, and 293, October term, 1912, being the cases of George T. Simpson et al. v. David C. Shep ard, George T. Simpson v. Emma B. Kennedy et al., and George T. Simpson v. William Shillaber, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, present term.

[3] B. "Constitutions were made for practical purposes, and not for the exercise of critical gymnastics; they should be construed so as to carry out the intention of the lawmakers, which should be reasonable rather than absurd." State v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98, 38 South. 679; State v. McCarty, supra.

[4] C. "All laws are carried into execution by means of officers appointed for that purpose; some with more, others with less, but all must be clothed with power sufficient for the effectual execution of the laws to be enforced." Georgia R. R. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. 47, 32 L. Ed. 377; Railroad Commission of Ala. v. Northern Ala. Ry., present term, supra; State v. McCarty, supra; Spraggins v. Jefferson County, 63 South. 83, present term.

[5] D. The appointment of a receiver for a corporation does not dissolve the corporation. Cook on Corporations (6th Ed.) § 871; Green v. Walkill Nat. Bank, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 63. [6] E. When a board is created for the purpose of carrying a law into execution, all legal intendments are with the orders of such board, and such orders will be upheld unless their invalidity is shown by those who complain of such orders. The legal presumption is that such orders are reasonable; that they were made upon proper evidence; and that they are valid. It is only when such orders were unauthorized by the law or were made by such board without or in excess of legal authority, or were unreasonable, that they are void. Railroad Commission of Ala. v. Northern Ala. Ry. Co., supra; State Highway Commission v. Jefferson County, supra; State v. McCarty, supra; Whaley v. State, supra.

ham & Atlantic Railroad Company, to procure sufficient grounds within a certain specified territory in the city of Bessemer for a union passenger station for said railroads and upon such ground to erect, within a given period, for the use of said roads, at said city, a union passenger station. The order was made on February 5, 1912, and required said parties to "proceed to the procurement of sufficient grounds within the boundaries above set out, and proceed with the construction of an adequate passenger station thereon, to be used jointly by the above set out railroad companies, and that work on the construction of said building shall commence within ninety (90) days, and shall be completed within six (6) months."

The above order of the Railroad Commission was made pursuant to section 5545 bf the Code of 1907, which is as follows: "Any two or more railroads which enter any city or town may be required, when practicable, or when the necessities of the case in the judgment of the Railroad Commission de-' mand it, to have and maintain one common or union passenger station for the security, accommodation, and convenience of the traveling public, and to unite in the joint undertaking and expense of erecting, constructing, and maintaining such union passenger station commensurate with the business and revenue of such railroad companies or corporations, on such terms, regulations, provisions, and conditions as the Railroad Commission may prescribe; and any company failing to comply with the orders of the Railroad Commission shall be liable to a penalty of not less than one thousand nor more than ten thousand dollars, for every six months in default, to be recovered by the state."

Under the above provision of the Code we presume that the Railroad Commission, before making the above order, informed itself as to the necessities of the situation, and we accept the order as tantamount to a declaration that the reasonable necessities of the traveling public demand a conveniently. located union passenger station in the city of Bessemer, to be used by the named railroad companies for the reception and discharge of their passengers at that point, and that the building of such station will not amount to an unreasonable burden upon the railroad companies, taking into consideration the volume of their passenger business at that point and the cost, to the railroads, of such union passenger station. In other words, we accept, in the present state of the record, the making of the order by the Railroad Commission, as a finding by the 1. In this case the Railroad Commission Railroad Commission, that the situation at made an order requiring the Alabama Great Bessemer is such as to justify the making Southern Railroad Company, the Louisville of the order. See above subdivision E of & Nashville Railroad Company, the St. Louis this opinion, and the authorities there cited. & San Francisco Railroad Company, and [7] 2. It is argued by the railroad com

it does not appear from the order or the pe- | road, 139 N. C. 126, 51 S. E. 793; Industrial tition for mandamus that the companies Siding Case, 140 N. C. 239, 52 S. E. 941; have it within their power to comply with Dewey v. R. R. Co., 142 N. C. 392, 55 S. E. the order, in that it does not appear that 292; Griffin v. R. R. Co., 150 N. C. 312, 64 they own or can obtain at reasonable figures S. E. 16. sufficient land within the prescribed limits upon which to build the union passenger station.

Unless the contrary is clearly shown, we will presume not only that the place prescribed is suitable, but that sufficient ground can be obtained, either by private purchase, or by condemnation proceedings, at reasonable figures, for such station. Through the power of eminent domain which the law has conferred upon the railroad companies, they possess all the power which is necessary to acquire the needed lands at their fair value, and, under the present state of the record, we must presume that the Railroad Commission has placed no unreasonable burden upon the railroad companies in so far as the acquisition of the needed ground for the station is concerned. See above subdivision E of this opinion, and authorities cited.

[9-11] 4. Authorized as we are, in this state of the record, to presume that the Railroad Commission, when it made the order complained of, had by personal investigation on the part of its members, and by other proper evidence, arrived at the just conclusion that the city of Bessemer has reached that stage in its growth and development when the public travel to and from that city renders the location and maintenance of a union passenger station at that point a not unreasonable burden upon the named railroads, and that the passenger stations of said railroads at said city are so located, with reference to each other, that the necessities of the traveling public require that said railroads shall receive and discharge their passengers at the same point, the Railroad Commission, under the authority conferred upon it by the laws of this state, certainly had the authority to order said railroads to unite in one passenger station at said city. Railroad Commission of Alabama v. Northern Ala. Ry. Co., supra.

It is not the policy of the state to place the safety and convenience of the traveling public solely within the arbitrary control of those who manage railroad companies, nor is it the policy of the state to place the manner in which railroads shall conduct themselves, in the conduct of their business, in the uncontrolled discretion or judgment of the Railroad Commission. When, however, the Railroad Commission makes an order which is within the purview of the powers which the Legislature has conferred upon the Commission, when this body of men selected, presumably, for its intelligence and fitness, and charged by the law with the performance of its duties, makes an order in furtherance of the laws of the state which it is required to administer with equal justice to all interests, then, unless there is something on the face of the record, or evidence aliunde the record, showing the illegality or the unreasonableness or injustice of the order, the order will be upheld. See subdivision E of this opin

[8] 3. It is also contended by the railroad companies that "the order of the Railroad Commission is void in that the order of the Railroad Commission requires each railroad company to abandon presently occupied depot facilities in the city of Bessemer, and to build, in conjunction with others, a union depot, whereas the act authorizing the Railroad Commission to require the construction of a union depot does not authorize the Commission to compel the abandonment of depot and depot facilities already erected and in use." This argument was, of course, applicable to the facts presented by the record in Railroad Commission of Alabama v. Northern Alabama Railway Company, supra, but in that case this court held that it is competent, when the reasonable necessities of the public require it, and the needed improve ment will not place an unreasonable burden upon the railroads, for the Railroad Commission to order two or more railroads maintaining separate passenger stations in the same city or town to unite in one passenger station. Conditions which a few years ago were amply sufficient to meet the public needs are now found to be altogether inadequate, and in this day, when quick trans-ion, and authorities there cited. portation is a necessity, the public demands Under the opinion of this court in Railroad better and more convenient passenger stations than were formerly needed, and the statute which we have above quoted was passed to meet this new necessity of the public. It is out of respect to the reasonable public needs, and the power of the state to require those who serve the public to meet such reasonable needs, that statutes similar to the one now under consideration have in other states been held to be violative of no principle of constitutional law. Mayor and Aldermen of Worcester et al. v. Norwich & Worcester Railroad Company et al., 109 The question as to whether the Railroad

Commission of Alabama v. Northern Alabama Railway Company, supra, there is therefore but one question going to the validity of the order of the Commission, in the instant case, on constitutional grounds, left for our consideration, and that is whether so much of said section 5545 of the Code of 1907 as authorizes the Railroad Commission to require two or more railroads to jointly purchase or condemn lands for a union depot and to jointly erect a union depot thereon is within the power of the Legislature.

roads to jointly purchase or condemn lands
needed for a union depot, and to construct
thereon a union passenger station, was left,
in the above case, an open one; but in that
case there is an intimation that the court
was inclined to the opinion that the Com-
mission possessed such power, and that this
court would probably so hold when the ques-
tion was properly presented. In that case
this court said, "We do not mean to hold,
however, that any part of said section 5545
is unconstitutional or that the Commission
cannot compel a joint construction and own-
ership of a union depot," and cited, in that
connection, the case of State v. M. & St. L. R.
Co., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60, 89 Am. St. Rep.
514; s. c., 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. 900, 46
L. Ed. 1151. While the Supreme Court of
the United States did not, in the above case,
in terms determine this question, the entire
argument of the court in that case, in sup-
port of the conclusions to which it actually
arrived, is strongly persuasive that the court
was of the opinion that the states possess
the power which, in this case, the Railroad
Commission has seen fit to exercise. In that
case the court said: "It is insisted that it is
beyond the constitutional power of the Legis-
lature to compel companies to enter into in-
voluntary, unreasonable, and unprofitable
contracts with other companies at the in-
stance of third parties, or to fix terms and
conditions upon which such contracts shall be
performed. This argument in its various ap-
plications is one which has been addressed
to and considered by this court in nearly
every case in which the power of the state
to regulate railway charges has been called
in question, and the answer made to it in
those cases is equally pertinent here. Indeed,
it is impossible for the state to exercise this
power of regulation without interfering to
some extent with the power of a railway to
contract either with its customers or con-
necting lines. The power is one which was
said in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 [24 L.
Ed. 77], to have been customarily exercised
in England from time immemorial, and in
this country from its first colonization, for
the regulation of ferries, common carriers,
hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, and
innkeepers; and the whole object of this
class of legislation is to curtail the power
to contract by limiting the exactions of those
engaged in these occupations and providing

that the rendition of such services shall not
raise an implied promise to pay more than a
certain fixed sum. This legislation may be
Justified by the fact that these various oc-
cupations are necessarily to a certain extent
monopolistic in their nature, and that in
dealing with customers the parties do not
stand upon an equality; the latter being
practically compelled to submit to such terms
as the former may choose to exact, unless
the state shall, acting in the interest of the
public, elect to interfere and prescribe a
maximum of charges."

Where a

The above opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States was delivered in a case which was appealed from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and in this same case the Supreme Court of Minnesota said: "If the state is to have any voice, therefore, in the establishment of reasonable rates, it must have a voice in some degree and some manner in the business of the carrier. single carrier is being dealt with, this can be accomplished by determining what the operating expenses ought reasonably to be; the reasonable value of the capital invested; what return, under all the circumstances of the case, would be fair; and then, by adjusting the rate, an economical management is secured. But in a case like the one at bar, where each may plead its inability to make the necessary agreement with the other, the state must have the power to arbitrate between them and, within proper limitations, compel the acceptance of its award. If the state is powerless to decide as between carriers, we have, as said by counsel for the commission, the following absurdity, namely: (a) The state may regulate rates; (b) the rate must be reasonable; (c) it must afford the carrier compensation over and above operating expenses; (b) the method of operating and consequent expenses is beyond the state control.' But this question has heretofore been considered and disposed of in this state adversely to defendant's contention in Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & Pac. R. Co., 71 Minn. 519, 74 N. W. 893 [40 L. R. A. 389, 70 Am. St. Rep. 358], now in the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error. It was there held that the act of 1895 did not, under the facts of that case, contravene the federal or the state Constitution when conferring upon the Commission the power to compel the transfer and interchange of loaded cars, and the making of joint rates for through shipments, where the haul was in part on one, and in part on the other, of two connecting roads. There are

no facts here which take this case out of the

operation of the rule thus established, and we must abide by it as perfectly legitimate until the federal court declares that an error has been committed. We hold, therefore, that Laws 1895, c. 91, violates no provision of the state or federal Constitution, and under it the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of this state has the power to compel the enforcement of joint through rates between points within this state by the connecting carriers affected by the order." State ex rel. R. & W. C. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 80 Minn. 191, 196-197, 83 See N. W. 60, 62 (89 Am. St. Rep. 514). further, on this subject, Wisconsin, Minne sota & Pac. R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. 115, 45 L. Ed. 194; Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & Pac. R. Co., 71 Minn. 519, 74 N. W. 893, 40 L. R. A. 389, 70 Am. St. Rep. 358.

On the 5th day of September, 1903, the | by condemnation proceedings, sufficient land Legislature passed an act (Local Acts 1903, upon which to maintain the building and to p. 771) entitled "An act, to locate and require jointly construct the necessary building. The the railroad companies whose railroads en- two positions are inconsistent and cannot coter the city of Mobile to provide for the con-exist. If the state has the power to which struction of an union passenger depot," etc. we have referred, and that power seems to The act required the railroad companies, be conceded, then it has the corresponding whose tracks enter the city of Mobile, to authority to put that power into exercise. provide for the location and construction of a In fact, we conceive of no more equitable union passenger station in said city and to basis for the apportionment of the expense in commence work thereon within eight months. the construction of such a building and in The act also authorized said railroad com- the acquirement of sufficient lands therefor panies or any one or more of them to con- than the apportionment of the total cost demn to public use all lands necessary to among the railroad companies, based upon the construction of said depot and also all the relative amount of the passenger traffic lands needed for rights of way into and out of each respective railroad company at the of said depot. It also lodged in the Railroad particular point. Such an apportionment Commission full authority to enforce the treats each railroad company with exact provisions of the act. The act clearly con- fairness and determines the exact extent of templated that, if the railroad companies did the ownership of each railroad in the joint not themselves, by a voluntary, joint arrange property. Neither are we able to discover ment, acquire the needed lands and construct a fairer basis for the apportionment of the the station, the Railroad Commission should cost of maintaining such a station than that have the authority to require such railroad which is fixed by the actual amount of the companies, if that was necessary, to joint- yearly use, by each railroad, of such station, ly purchase or, by condemnation proceedings, viz., the wheelage basis. to jointly acquire the needed lands and to jointly construct the station in accordance with the plans and specifications to be furnished by such Commission. Speaking of this act, Jones, District Judge, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (C. C.) 191 Fed. 757, said: "The general right of a state to compel a railroad entering a city or town to receive and deliver passengers at a union or common depot very properly is not questioned in this case. The state may so direct by a statute | giving specific regulations covering the whole matter, or leave the question and its details to the determination of an administrative body or commission." In another place in the opinion in this case, Judge Jones says: "The right which the state undertakes to exercise in the present case is its inherent right to regulate public carriers for the promotion of the public convenience." course the power to which we refer must be, taking into consideration the necessities of the situation and the public interests to be subserved, reasonably exercised, but the state possesses, under the state and federal Constitutions, all needed authority to so regulate public service corporations as to meet all the reasonable requirements of public convenience. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (C. C.) 191 Fed. 757.

Of

It would, however, create a strange anomaly for the courts to hold that a state has the authority to require all railroad companies operating railroads within a city, whenever the reasonable needs of the traveling public are such as to demand a union passenger station at that point, to use a union passenger station in said city, and at the same time deny to the state the power to require such

It seems to us, therefore, that the Legislature had the constitutional power to vest in the Railroad Commission the authority which it conferred upon it in the above-quoted sec tion 5545 of the Code of 1907, and that no part of said section is violative of any clause of the state or federal Constitution. State v. McCarty, supra; Whaley v. State, supra; Ingram v. State, supra; Dorman v. State, supra; Railroad Commission v. Northern Ala. Ry. Co., supra; Nos. 291, 292, and 293, October term, 1912, being the cases of George T. Simpson et al. v. David C. Shepard, George T. Simpson v. Emma B. Kennedy et al., and George T. Simpson v. William Shillaber, present term, supra; State v. Thompson, supra; Georgia Railroad Co. v. Smith, supra; Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith, supra ; State Highway Commission V. Jefferson County, present term, supra; Mayor, etc., of Worcester v. Norwich & Worcester Railroad Company, supra; Corporation Commission v. Railroad, supra; Industrial Siding Case, supra; Dewey v. Railroad Co., supra; Griffin v. Railroad Co., supra; State ex rel. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., supra; Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, supra; Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & Pac. R. Co., supra; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra.

Said section 5545, it is true, says the Commission shall possess the authority to make such order "when practicable or when the necessities of the case in the judgment of the Railroad Commission demands it." The words which we have italicized in the quoted portion of section 5545 must be read in the light of the decisions of this court which existed at the time the statute was enacted, and, when so read, those words do not place

arbitrary and uncontrollable judgment of the | location or the proportionate cost to each for Commission. Those words, when so read, re- such location, or for the cost of construcquire that the judgment of the Commission tion, operation, and maintenance thereof," shall be reasonable, and when so read offend no provision of the state or federal Constitution. When such an order is made, however, the presumption is that the order was reasonable unless the contrary is shown either by the record itself or by evidence aliunde. Authorities, supra.

and for no other reason. In other words, this entire proceeding, from its inception, shows that the Railroad Commission had in mind, at all times, and was proceeding against, at all times, the railroads which maintain depots for the reception and discharge of passengers at Bessemer, and that the names of Schoonmaker and Atkinson, as receivers, were brought into this proceeding because it is through them, as such receivers, that the particular railroad is now being operated. We deem it well, also, at this point to say that the words "or either of them," which we have italicized in the abovequoted order, where they appear, evidently refer to Schoonmaker and Atkinson only. The order, as we understand it, is an order operating jointly upon all the railroad companies, and the words "and S. L. Schoonmaker and H. M. Atkinson, receivers, or either of them," simply mean that the Railroad Commission ordered that Schoonmaker and Atkinson, or either one of them, should, on the part of the railroad of which they were the receivers, comply with the order. It is contended by appellees, and in this contention they seem to have been upheld by the court below, that said section 5545 of the Code is highly penal, and that, as said section 5545 does not in terms include receivers of railroads within its provisions, the order requiring the Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic Railroad Company and Atkinson and Schoonmaker, its receivers, to join in the acquisition of the land needed for the station, and to join in the construction of the union passenger station, is void, and that therefore the order of the Commission requiring the construction of the station by appellees is altogether invalid.

[12-14] 5. In the present case the order of the Railroad Commission was as follows: "In the above cause, the defendant railroads, having failed to report to the Commission of any agreement as to location or the proportionate cost to each for such location, or for the cost of construction, operation, and maintenance thereof, as provided in a supplemental order of this Commission, dated October 2, 1911, the Commission of this date, after having given notice to the defendant railroads, proceeded to fix the location of said station and apportion the proportionate cost to each defendant railroad in the location and construction of the building, and the operation and maintenance thereof, as follows: The location of said station to be between Alabama avenue and Second avenue, and Nineteenth street and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. The proportionate part of each, in cost of site and construction, shall be proportioned to the receipts of each from passenger business, based upon passenger receipts for the past 12 months. The proportionate cost of operation and maintenance shall be on a wheelage basis. Therefore it is hereby ordered that the said Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, the Southern Railway Company, the Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic Railroad Company, and S. L. Schoonmaker and H. M. Atkinson, receivers, or either of them, proceed to the procurement of sufficient grounds within the In order that the contention of appellees on boundaries above set out, and proceed with this subject may be well understood, we the construction of an adequate passenger quote the following from one of the briefs station thereon, to be used jointly by the of counsel for appellees: "This order of the above set out railroad companies, and that Railroad Commission attempts to put this work on the construction of said building burden upon the receivers of the Atlanta, shall commence within ninety (90) days, and Birmingham & Atlantic Railroad, regardless shall be completed within six (6) months." of the statute, and absolutely ignoring the Schoonmaker and Atkinson are the receiv- words and terms of the statute. This statute ers of the Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic cannot be extended or stretched by the RailRailroad Company, and we direct attention road Commission of the state, or by the to the fact that said Atlanta, Birmingham & courts of the state, so as to include the reAtlantic Railroad Company is made a party ceivers in the order. In fact, the very printo this proceeding as well as its said receiv- ciple for which we contend, in this case, on ers. The first section of the above-quoted this point, has been decided by the Supreme order shows plainly that this proceeding was Court of the United States. U. S. v. Harris, directed against "the defendant railroads," | 177 U. S. 305, 20 Sup. Ct. 609, 44 L. Ed. 780. and that Schoonmaker and Atkinson were In that case the court had under considerabrought into the case simply because of their tion the construction of sections 4386, 4387, relation to one of the defendant railroad 4388, and 4389 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. companies as its receivers. The order which Comp. St. 1901, pp. 2995-2997). These statwe have quoted was made because "the de- utes impose certain penalties upon any comfendant railroads, having failed to report pany, owner, or custodian of cattle who fails

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