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The bill prays for general relief, and specifically, first, that the deed be reformed so as to correctly name the grantee as Littleville Camp, No. 258, Woodmen of the World, and all Christian denominations, except the Mormon and Catholic; second that the agree ment that the first story of the building should be used by Christian denominations be enforced, and the said camp of Woodmen be enjoined from interfering with complainant's use of the building as practiced, and as they may have a right; and, third, to ascertain and decree the right of complainant, and of the Baptist Church to worship in the building.

[3] The equity of the bill, if any it has, must be sought in the averment of a parol agreement between the camp of Woodmen, as holder of the legal title, and members of the Christian and Baptist Churches, by which the building, to be erected by their joint contributions, should be used, as to its lower floor, as a place of worship by Christian denominations, Mormon and Catholic excluded. By specific prayer it is sought to compel the performance of this agreement, and to enjoin any interference with complainant's customary use of the building.

This agreement is anomalous in its terms, and it is not at all easy to say at first blush whether it is a mere license to do a series of acts upon the licensor's land, or whether it is a lease vesting in its beneficiaries a possessory interest in the nature of a tenancy at will, or whether it is an easement giving a right of entry and a specific limited use in

The respondents to the bill are the said Littleville Camp, No. 258, the Baptist Church at Pilgrim's Rest, and the grantors in the deed, all of whom, except Murray, file joint demurrers on the following grounds substantially: (1) No equity; (2) complainant has no right in the land; (3) complainant had no ex-perpetuo. istence when the deed was made; (4) if reformed as prayed, the deed would still be void for uncertainty; (5) it is not shown who the Christian denominations are; (6) it does not appear that the grantors intended other grantees than those named; (7) no legal injury is shown to complainant; and (8) no consideration moved from complain- | ant. These demurrers were sustained. Kirk, Carmichael & Rather, of Tuscumbia, for appellant. William H. Shaw, of Tuscumbia, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE, J. [1] It is a general rule of equity, the reasons for which are too obvious to require explanation, that a voluntary conveyance will not be reformed in favor of a grantee as against his grantor, unless all the parties consent thereto. 34 Cyc. 928, and cases cited. A few cases have recognized an exception to the rule where there was a "good," though not a valuable, consideration, and valuable improvements have been made by the grantee, or his subvendee. Cummings v. Freer, 26 Mich. 128; Price v. School Directors, 58 Ill. 452.

The deed here sought to be reformed was purely voluntary, without consideration either valuable or good, and the prayer for reformation is without equity.

The distinctions are somewhat subtle, and often elusive; but we are inclined to the view that the benefit here claimed is in the nature of an easement in gross, and, not resting in either a written grant, or prescription, or an estoppel in pais, is void and unenforceable.

[4] But, however the agreement might be regarded, it is not founded upon a valuable consideration-at least so far as is made to appear-and for that reason cannot be speA. C. Railroad Co. V. cifically enforced. Long, 158 Ala. 301, 48 South. 363; 36 Cyc. 544. And even if the agreement were supported by a valuable consideration, it is not sufficiently certain as to beneficiaries, terms, and stipulations to require a court to undertake its specific execution. Moon v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 77 Ala. 339.

Complainant's theory, in one aspect, is that its possession under the parol agreement made with third persons for its benefit, coupled with valuable improvements, made or contributed to by it, gives it an independent equity to protection in the contemplated use of the building. There is, indeed, a line of cases from some other states which hold that "an oral gift of land, or promise to give land, followed by the vendee's taking possession of the land in pursuance of the promise, and making valuable and permanent improve[2] Moreover, the reformation sought would ments in reliance thereon, may be enforced avail complainant nothing, since a convey- by a court of equity against the donor or his ance to "all Christian denominations," with heirs, or grantees, with notice." 36 Cyc. 681, or without the exception stated, would be and cases cited. But we have not here a gift wholly void for uncertainty. Again, conced- of land, and the doctrine itself is not in haring that the word "but" in the first para-mony with our statute of frauds as consistgraph should have been "and," and thus have indicated a trust donation in favor of "all Christian denominations, Mormon and Catholic excluded," this would not authorize a court to convert the deed from the form of a trust into the grant of a legal fee to the

ently construed by this court.

We concur in the conclusions of the chancellor, and the decree will be affirmed. Affirmed.

DOWDELL, O. J., and MCCLELLAN and

(185 Ala. 538)

HENDERSON v. HOLMAN.
(Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 18, 1913.)
DETINUE (§ 31*)-CLAIM BY THIRD PERSON-
BOND-LIABILITY OF CLAIMANT.

Where plaintiff brought detinue for all of the lumber at a certain yard, and defendants filed a claim therefor and gave a bond conditioned to have the property forthcoming if found liable therefor, and after judgment for plaintiff, claimant delivered to the sheriff all the lumber "then" at the yard, but there was evidence that not all of the lumber there when the suit was begun and the bond given was delivered, the delivery was insufficient to relieve claimant from liability on the bond.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Detinue, Cent. Dig. § 57; Dec. Dig. § 31.*]

There

or the alternative value thereof as fixed
by the jury of $15 per thousand B. M.
of the aggregate value of $1,500."
seems to have been, on the same day, a
separate trial of the claim suit, and in that
suit the jury returned the following verdict:
"We, the jury, find the issue in favor of the
plaintiff find the value of the lumber to be
$15 per B. M. thousand in the aggregate
$1,500." A judgment was thereupon ren-
dered by the trial court, upon said verdict,
in the following language: "It is therefore
considered and adjudged by the court that
the property involved in this suit and de-
scribed in the claim bond filed in this cause
on the 1st day of July, 1907, to wit, all lum-

Appeal from Circuit Court, Coffee County; ber at F. M. Mixon's sawmill and lumber H. A. Pearce, Judge.

Action by Y. Allen Holman against J. E. Henderson. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. W. Simmons, of Elba, and W. O. Mulkey, of Geneva, for appellant. Foster & Samford, of Troy, for appellee.

DE GRAFFENRIED, J. It appears from this record that Y. Allen Holman brought a suit in detinue against W. W. Wise and J. Z. Brooks for all of the lumber situated at F. M. Mixon's sawmill and lumber yard, and at Clintonville switch, on the Atlantic Coast Line Railway. J. E. Henderson made claim to the lumber under the provisions of section | 3792 of the Code of 1907, which provides that "if the property seized is claimed by a person not a party to the suit, and affidavit and bond is executed as required by law in cases of trial of right of property when levied on by the writ of fieri facias, the property must be delivered to the claimant," etc. Henderson made the required bond, which was approved by the sheriff, and the bond, as required by our statutes, was conditioned to have the "said property above described forthcoming for the satisfaction of the judgment if it be found liable therefor." The property is described in the bond as "all lumber at F. M. Mixon's sawmill and lumber yard and at Clintonville switch on Atlantic Coast Line Railroad near Clintonville, Alabama." Upon the execution and delivery of the bond the sheriff delivered the lumber to said Henderson. A trial was had of the detinue suit, with the result that the plaintiff obtained a verdict in the following language: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff | for the property sued for, and we fix the value of the lumber to be $1,500." The court rendered judgment upon the verdict in the following language: "It is adjudged by the court that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendants the lumber sued for, to wit, 100,000 feet board lumber, poll stocks, and decking products of the F. M. Mixon mill while run by the defendants, being all of said lumber at said mill and Clintonville switch, all in Coffee county, Ala.,

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yard and at Clintonville switch on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad near Clintonville, Ala., is not the property of the claimant, but is the property of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession. It is further considered and adjudged by the court that the value of said property is $15 per thousand feet B. M. of lumber, and that its aggregate value is $1,500."

We have quoted from the above claim bond for the purpose of calling attention to the fact that the property involved in the claim suit-and, as to that matter, in the original detinue suit-was all of the lumber at Mixon's mill and at Clintonville switch. The complaint in the detinue suit is not before us, but the claim bond is, and in the claim bond the property is so described.

Under our statutes the said Henderson had 30 days after the rendition of the above judgment within which to return the said lumber to the sheriff. The sheriff is required by our statutes, upon the failure of the claimant in such a suit, to return to him the property claimed within 30 days after the rendition of a judgment against him, to indorse that fact upon the claim bond, and to return to the court in which the claim suit is tried the bond as forfeited. Thereupon the clerk of the court is required to issue execution against the principal and the sureties on the claim bond for the alternate value of the property as fixed by the judgment. In this case, the sheriff, after the lapse of 30 days after the rendition of the above judgment, returned into the trial court the claim bond with the following indorsement: "The time having expired for the delivery of the property and the payment of the costs, this bond is hereby forfeited." Thereupon an execution was issued by the clerk against the obligors on the claim bond for the alternate value of the property. Thereupon the said Henderson filed in the cause a petition for a writ of supersedeas, in which he alleges, as his sole ground for relief, that "upon the trial of said cause the issues were found against your petitioner, and that thereupon within 30 days, as allowed by law, and in strict compliance with the claim bond filed in said cause,

your petitioner delivered to the sheriff of | Holman, was entitled to all of the lumber at Coffee county all property sued for and claim- the mill and switch, and that Henderson ed by your petitioner, and the sheriff of said could only meet the letter of his claim bond county accepted same." by delivering all of said lumber to said Holman. Of course the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court related back to the date of the claim bond, the date upon which the claim suit was instituted.

While judgments and decrees are solemn and, for that reason, are entitled to have every word in them carefully and candidly considered, nevertheless, like all written instruments, they are entitled to be given their plain and obvious meaning, provided, when so construed, they are of legal validity. Black, Judgments, p. 138, § 123.

1

There was evidence tending to show that the sheriff, before the expiration of the 30 days above referred to, accepted from the plaintiff, under the statement that it was "the lumber in the claim bond," all the lumber then at the mill and at the switch. The sheriff was not at the mill nor at the switch when this acceptance was given, but was in his office at Elba. The evidence on the subject of this delivery is as follows: "Said C. W. Simmons further testified that, being authorized by J. E. Henderson and representing him, and within 30 days-that is, So construing the verdict and the judgless than 30 days from the date of the judgment in the claim suit, it seems that the ment referred to in the claim suit-he went above construction which we have placed upto Mr. Knight, who was then sheriff of Coffee on the judgment is the only rational concounty, and told him that the said J. E. struction which can be placed upon it. If, Henderson was ready to deliver this lumber therefore, when the claim suit was instituted, to him; that he saw Mr. Knight at his of- there was more than 100,000 feet of lumber fice in Elba, Ala., and said to him, 'We would at the mill and at the switch, then, to meet now deliver you the lumber that is in our the requirements of his claim bond under claim bond, lumber at the mill and at the the judgment rendered against Henderson in switch; that we will deliver you all the the claim suit, it was necessary for Henderlumber that is in the claim bond,' and for son to deliver to the sheriff all of the lumber which they recovered judgment. Mr. Knight which went into his possession under the said, "That is all right then;' that he told bond which was filed in the claim suit, whethMr. Knight that this lumber was at Clinton-er there was more than 100,000 feet or not. ville switch, and a small portion of it was up at the mill; that the said lumber was seized at these two points, and was there when the claim was interposed; that Mr. Knight told me that it was all right, and he made no objections to it as a delivery; that the cost of the claim suit had been paid before the petition had been filed in this case; that he was positive that this transaction between him and Mr. Knight took place before the expiration of 30 days from the date of the judgment in the claim suit."

There was evidence tending to show that at the time referred to by the witness Simmons there was more than 100,000 feet of lumber at the said mill and switch; but we think that the evidence discloses, without dispute, that not all of the lumber involved in the claim suit, and for the recovery of which judgment was rendered against Henderson in the claim suit, was then at said mill and switch. The claim suit involved all of the lumber which was, at the time the claim bond was made, at said mill and switch. The claim bond shows this, and so does the judgment which was rendered by the court in the claim suit. It is true that the verdict of the jury indicates that the jury was of the opinion, from the evidence, that only 100,000 feet of lumber was at the mill and switch, but nevertheless the verdict of the jury, taken in connection with the claim bond which fixed the issue which they were called upon to try, and the judgment of the court which followed the verdict, shows that the jury found, and the judgment of the court follow

While Henderson testifies that he delivered more than 100,000 feet of lumber to the sheriff, and while all the evidence shows that, if he made such delivery, the lumber delivered was a part of the lumber involved in the claim suit, Henderson's own testimony shows that he did not deliver all of the lumber involved in the claim suit to the sheriff. Among other things, Henderson testified that he measured the lumber which he turned over to the sheriff; and he said, on crossexamination, "that he measured all the lumber that was there (at the switch) at the time, that some of the lumber at the switch when he interposed his claim was afterwards used on his place, but he does not know how much." The testimony which we have italicized evidently refers to lumber which was at the switch when Henderson interposed the claim, but was not at the switch when the delivery to the sheriff took place, because Henderson had used it on his place. We think it plain, therefore, that Henderson's own evidence shows that he did not, as he alleges in his petition for the writ of supersedeas, deliver to the sheriff "all property sued for and claimed by your petitioner" in said claim suit. In other words, the petitioner, by his own evidence, shows that he failed to comply with the above-quoted allegation in his petition for the writ of supersedeas; and it was upon the quoted allegation of the petition that the said Henderson relied for relief.

2. In reaching the above conclusion we are not unmindful of the fact that, in his answer

Constitutions were made for practical purposes, and they should be construed so as to carry out the intention of the lawmakers.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. 88 9, 10; Dec. Dig. 8 13.*]

the appellee-plaintiff in the detinue suit-[3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ( 13*)-CONSTITUTION-CONSTRUCTION. says that, in the trial of the claim suit, "the issue was found against said J. E. Henderson as to 100,000 feet of said lumber, and that judgment was rendered accordingly," etc., but, in another part of his answer, the said appellee says that he "denies that the said J. E. Henderson delivered to the sheriff of Coffee county the said lumber for which judgment was rendered against the said J. E. Henderson, as such claimant, or any part thereof, within 30 days after March 1, 1908, and denies that the said sheriff accepted the same." Undoubtedly there was conflict in

the evidence as to whether the said Henderson did or did not deliver to the sheriff as much as 100,000 feet of lumber within 30 days, but there was not, we think, any conflict in the evidence on the proposition that Henderson did not deliver to the sheriff all of the lumber for which judgment was rendered against him in the claim suit, and we think this issue was made in that part of appellee's answer which we have above italicized.

The crucial point in this case is, Was there any conflict in the evidence on the proposition that Henderson did not deliver to the sheriff all of the lumber for which judgment was rendered against him in the claim suit? We do not think that there was any conflict in the evidence on that subject; and for this reason we are of the opinion that the trial judge committed no error in charging the jury, at the written request of the appellee, that if they believed the evidence they should find a verdict in his favor.

3. The sheriff, in returning the claim bond as forfeited, did not indorse thereon that the claimant had not delivered the property or paid the costs within the 30 days. The parties have treated the return of the sheriff as sufficient, however, and we have so treated it. Affirmed.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 62*)-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

All laws are carried into execution by means of officers appointed for that purpose, some with more powers, others with less, but all must be clothed with powers for the effectual execution of the laws to be enforced.

al Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 94-102; Dec. Dig. § 62.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution5. CORPORATIONS (§ 559*) - RECEIVERS - APPOINTMENT-EFFECT.

The appointment of a receiver for a corporation does not dissolve the corporation. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2241-2252, 2259; Dec. Dig. 559.*]

6. RAILROADS (§ 58*) -REGULATION-Orders OF COMMISSION.

When a board is created for the purpose of carrying a law into execution, all legal intendments are with the orders of such board, and such orders will be upheld unless their invalidity is shown, and hence an order of the Railroad Commission, requiring railroad companies to provide a union station, under Code 1907, § 5545, providing that any two or more railroads which enter any city or town may be required, when practicable or when the necessities of the case demand it, to maintain a single union passenger station and to unite in erecting and maintaining such station, must be presumed to be equivalent to a finding by the Railroad Commission that the necessities of the traveling public demand a conveniently located union passenger station.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. 88 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. 58.*]

7. RAILROADS (§ 58*) - REGULATION-UNION PASSENGER STATION.

On mandamus to compel several railroad companies to provide a union passenger station in obedience to an order of the Railroad Commission, it cannot be urged as a defense, that neither the order nor the petition showed

DOWDELL, C. J., and ANDERSON and that the companies had it in their power to MAYFIELD, JJ., concur.

(185 Ala. 354)

RAILROAD COMMISSION OF ALABAMA
V. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN
R. CO. et al.

(Supreme Court of Alabama. June 30, 1913. Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1913.)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 48*)-STATUTES BURDEN OF SHOWING INVALIDITY.

Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the objector assumes the burden of showing that it is invalid.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent, Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 48*)—VALIDITY OF STATUTES-PRESUMPTIONS.

All doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*]

comply with the order by obtaining the necessary land, for the power of eminent domain conferred by law upon railroad companies will enable them to acquire necessary land at a fair price.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]

8. RAILROADS (§ 58*) — REGULATION - Order. An order of the Railroad Commission, under Code 1907, § 5545, requiring railroad companies already maintaining separate stations to unite and erect and acquire a union station, is not void as placing an unreasonable burden on the railroad companies by compelling them to abandon stations already erected and in use.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]

9. RAILROADS (§ 9*)-REGULATION-POLICY OF STATE.

It is not the policy of the state to place the safety and convenience of the traveling public solely within the arbitrary control of the railroad companies, but neither is it the policy of the state to give the Railroad Commission

an uncontrolled dominion over the railroad companies.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. 88 12-19; Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

10. RAILROADS (8 58*)-REGULATION-ORDER OF RAILROAD COMMISSION.

An order of the Railroad Commission, made under Code 1907, § 5545, requiring railroad companies to unite to provide a union station at a given locality, will, unless it appears from the face of the record or from extraneous evidence to be unreasonable and unjust, be upheld.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]

11. RAILROADS (§ 6*)-REGULATION UTES.

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STATCode 1907, 5545, authorizing the Railroad Commission to compel railroad companies to provide union stations whenever the necessity of the traveling public demands it, is not unconstitutional, although compelling railroad companies to purchase property.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. § 6.*]

12. STATUTES (§ 241*) - CONSTRUCTION NAL STATUTES.

-PEPenal statutes are to be strictly construed but not so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the Legislature.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 322, 323; Dec. Dig. § 241.*] 13. STATUTES (§ 225*)-CONSTRUCTION-STAT

UTES IN PARI MATERIA.

Statutes in pari materia must be construed together.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. 88 302, 303; Dec. Dig. § 225.*] 14. RAILROADS (§ 58*) - REGULATION UTES "RAILROAD COMPANY."

STAT

Code 1907, 5545, provides that any two or more railroads entering any city or town may be required, when the necessities of the case, in the judgment of the Railroad Commission, demand it, to provide and maintain a union passenger station. Section 5507, which is part of the same chapter of the Code, provides that, unless otherwise clearly apparent, the term "railroad company," as used in this chapter, includes any person or corporation owning or operating a railroad. Held, that the statute is applicable to a receiver of an insolvent railroad company, and he may be compelled to join with other railroad companies in providing a union station.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 5908, 5909.]

15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (862)-LEGISLATIVE POWER-DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.

Code 1907, 5545, authorizing the Railroad Commission to require any two or more railroad companies entering a town to erect a union station when necessary for the traveling public, is not an unwarranted delegation of legislative power; the commission being an arm of the state which puts the law into effect when applicable.

mission made under Code 1907, § 5545, requiring him to join with other railroad companies in the erection and maintenance of a union depot, for U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508, in the federal courts there shall be a receiver provides that, whenever in any cause pending in possession, such receiver shall manage and operate the property according to the requirement of the valid laws of the state, and this statute is a remedial one.

Cent. Dig. 88 683, 684; Dec. Dig. § 207.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, 17. STATUTES (§ 236*) - CONSTRUCTION - REMEDIAL STATUTES.

A remedial statute is entitled to receive an enlightened and liberal construction. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 317, 324, 325; Dec. Dig. § 236.*] 18. RECEIVERS (§ 174*)-ACTIONS AGAINST LEAVE TO SUE.

Under U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 509, providing that every receiver appointed by the federal courts may be sued without previous leave of the court in which he was appointed, but that such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which the receiver was appointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice, a receiver of a railroad company, appointed by the federal courts, may be made a party defendant, without leave by the court appointing him, to a proceeding instituted by the Railroad Commission to compel him, with other railroad companies, to unite in providing and maintaining a union station at a certain point.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-343; Dec. Dig. § 174.*] 19. RAILROADS (§ 58*)-REGULATION ORDERS.

An order of the Railroad Commission, requiring several railroad companies to unite in providing and maintaining a union station, is not void because it does not fix the exact spot

upon which the station is to be built.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]

20. RAILROADS (§ 58*)-REGULATION-UNION STATION.

An order of the Railroad Commission, requiring railroad companies to provide and maintain a union station, is not invalid because not requiring the station to be erected according to plans and specifications furnished by the Commission.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; H. A. Sharpe, Judge.

Mandamus by the Railroad Commission of Alabama against the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company and others. From a Judgment denying the writ, relator appeals. Reversed and remanded.

R. C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., W. L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Estes, Jones & Welch, of Bessemer, for appellant. Tillman, Bradley & Morrow, E. L. All, J. T. Stokeley, and

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitu-A. G. & E. D. Smith, all of Birmingham, for tional Law, Cent. Dig. 88 94-102; Dec. Dig. § appellees. 62.*]

16. RAILROADS (§ 207*)-FEDERAL RECEIVERS -RAILROAD COMPANIES.

Where the federal courts have appointed a receiver of a railroad company, whose lines extend within the state, the receiver is bound to comply with an order of the Railroad Com

DE GRAFFENRIED, J. We quote the following propositions which in our opinion exert a controlling influence upon the questions presented by this record:

[1, 2] A. "Whenever the validity of an act

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